UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-31-2015

Barrett v. Hecla Min. Co. Clerk's Record v. 3 Dckt.
43639

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Barrett v. Hecla Min. Co. Clerk's Record v. 3 Dckt. 43639" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6116.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6116

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

TH

PR

E

OURT

H

T TEOFIDAHO
. BARR

etal

MP

H

Y, tal

ppealedfrom the Di trict ourt oft/1 Fir. t Judicial Di ·trict of
the tat of Idaho in and for the ounty of Kootenai.

ppel/ants

ttorney fo r Re po11dent

Exhibit 20

the
Stress monitors were installed to
llar after a violent rock
16,
These stress
we
as
for examination of stress levels in the damaged pillar.
Of the three
stress gauges instal
the East Low gauge never read stress
The
company continued to record inaccurate rea
on the East Low gauge until
another violent rock burst occurred on the East wall that seriously injured 7
miners.
The company has
more than
igence in that they were
the East Low stress gauge was
and assigned miners to work in an area without knowing if the East
building stress.
This order is an
See Continuation Farm (MSHA Form 700D-3a)

B. Section

9. Violation

C. Part/Section of
Title 30CFR

of Act

57.3401

10. Gravity:
A. Injury or Illness (has) (is):

No Likelihood

O

B. Injury or illness could rea-

Unlikely

O

Reasonably likely

0

Lost Workdays Or Restricted Duty

sonably be expected to be:

14. Initial Action
A. Citation

@

Safeguard

E. Citation/
Order Number

The I-Drift

007

E. Reckless Disregard

C. Moderate

A. None

B. Order @ C. Safeguard

15.AreaorEquipment

Occurred

Permanently Disabling

104d2

12. Type of Action

0

Number of Persons Affected:

C. Significant and Substantial:
11. Negligence (check one)

Highly Likely

1\11

Written Notice

Mo Da Yr

F. Dated

8565555

12/19/2011

5900 level.

17. Action to Terminate

18. Terminated A. Date

MoDa

Yr

B. Time {24 Hr. Clock)

Section IV--Automated System Data

19. Type of Inspection
(activity code)

22. Signature

20. Event Number

E07

1159243

21. Primary or Mill

p

I 23. AR Number

Rodric B. Breland

I

MSHA Form 7000-3, Apr 08 (revised)

4169

In accordance with the provisions of !he Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, U1e Small Business Administration has
established a National Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and 1o Region a! Fairness Boards to receive comments from small businesses about federal agency
enforcement actions. The Ombudsman annually evaluates enforcement activities and rates each agency's responsiveness lo small business. If you wish to comment on the
enforcement actions of MSHA. you may call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247), or write the Ombudsman at Small Business Adrnintstration, Office of the National Ombudsman, 409 3rd
Street, SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. Please note, however, that your right lo file a comment with the Ombudsman is in addition to any other rights you may have, including
!he right to contest citations and proposed penalties and obtain a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.
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See C_ontinua!ion Form
Section Ill-Subsequent Action Taken
8. Extended To

A. Date

Mo

Da

Yr

0

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

C. Vacated

D. Terminated

Section IV-Inspection Data

9. Type of Inspection

E07

l·rn. Event Number

1159243

i 1 Signature

AR.Number

Rodric B. Breland

4169

MSHA Form 7000-3a, Mar B5 (revised)

Date

3. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

1045

E. Modified

0

Exhibit 21

SUBJECT:

Modeling of
drift pillar was condncted
to selecting
dimensions for final
implementation. The !imitations of this modeling were recognized and, as a result, tThe
stability of the
ft circular pillar surrounding the 5900 level access through the orebody
has always been
some concern. As a result, this pillar was instrumented in mid-2005
to determine stresses in the pillar back and ribs, as well as closure across and along this
pillar. Instrumentation readings have continued, with the last readings taken 08/18/2011.
The stress data basically shows that the stress increased in the pillar rapidly after the
pillar was formed, but as mining continued the rate of increase decreased, and since 2010
the stress has dropped in the pillar except for a continuing slight increase on the east
The stress gages also responded to bursting in the pillar, the last burst occu1Ting
12/09.
While it was clear that nearb.y mining was no longer stressing the pillar, it was known
that the pillar was still being loaded by stope closure as a result of continued mining in
the Gold Hunter.
Drift closure across and along the 5900 pillar was gradual until the 12/09 burst, and since
has slowly but steadily increased to the 1.3 inch range.
Both the stress and closure values agreed well with the computer model simulations of
mining from the 5900 level in the Gold Hunter. Itasca concluded that the 5900 piilar was
stable and too big to fail suddenly and violently, behaving more like a stabilizing pillar.
This conclusion appeared to be confirmed by the observations all along the 5900 pillar
the
itself, as well as from inspection of the E and W observation boreholes drilled
pillar. While there was apparent stress deterioration at the back edge along the west end
of the pillar, as well as very minor stress effects around the 5900 drift, the 5900 pillar was
basically intact, and its appearance had not basically changed since mining began.
Two of the three bursts that were located along the back edges of the pillar did not cause
observable damage, but the last burst, 1.9 magnitude on 12/09/10,
minor damage to
the 5900 level drift along the pillar, as well as the to some sections of the back and left rib
of the chevron drift, just south of the 5900 pillar. This damage consisted of minor
spalling and shakedown which was all contained by the installed ground support.
rehabilitation was required.
The ground support consisted of a combination of Dywidag bolts and split sets \Vith chain
mesh. This reinforcement was supplemented by cable bolts in the back of the 5900

thoughts
burst, as well as the present stability of the 5900 pillar.

Mechanism of 5900 Pillar 2.8 (USGS Magnitude) Rockburst
At 01 :07:26, a 2.8 magnitude rockburst occurred as the last hole of the round from the
overlying 5500 level underhand stopc was blasted. The burst magnitude was determined
by the USGS national earthquake center, however, on the nearby Montana Tech seismic
sensors, the burst appeared to be larger, in the 3.0 range. While the damage from this
burst blocked off the 5900 access drift, there was also extensive damage to the footwall
access ramp system all the way up to the 5550 level, but particularly to some of the 5750
and 5700 sub level openings. Such widespread damage is not characteristic of a simple
pillar burst.

indicate that small bursts around
edges of the pillar
The numerical model results
could be expected \Vith magnitudes up to 2.0. We did have such bursting, with the lagest
a magnitude 1.9. Themodel results also indicated that the only way the pillar could fail
was if the height to width ratio changed and the pillar lost confinement, in which case a
foundation failure might occur. The model assumed a 10: l width to height ratio. The
foundation failure would occur out in the walls, rather than in the core of the pillar. And
further, the model results did not include any geologic structures intersecting the pillar.
With the observed stress deterioration along the inner and outer edges of the pillar, likely
in the 10 ft range, the width:height ratio of the in place doughnut shaped pillar is actually
3.5, assuming a 10 ft. vein thickness. This pillar is borderline stable based on mining
history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter.
The in situ stress in the 5900 pillar area before mining was some 1.2 psi/ ft of depth for
the vertical stress, and 1.5 times this value for the horizontal stress. The actual vertical
distance to surface above the Gold Hunter is in the 7000 ft range, hence the vertical stress
would be 8400 psi. and the maximum horizontal stress, N40°W direction, is 12,600 psi.
From the stress gages we know that the stress increase in the pi) lar from mining off of the
5900 level, taking into account the ore and waste rock modulus values, was also some
12,600 psi. Hence, the stress in the pillar was very near the Lmconfined compressive
strength of the pillar, and any further loss of confinement could lead to a pillar failure.
It \:Vas initially presumed that the 2. 8 rockburst in the 5900 pillar would represent a
' if

of
of
was a
type
occur when the pillar
is much
than
place
wall rocks, as is
case for Gold Hunter. Shear failures in the
going out from
edges of the pillar.
Itasca modeling concluded that this failure
mechanism could occur in the 5900 pillar, as well as the diminishing 5500-5700 sill
pillar. Favorably oriented structure tln·ough the pillar would frnther reduce the strength
of either pillar
~aa•-U=H~H>

A 3.8 magnitude sill pillar burst at the Macassa Mine in 1996 was determined to be a
foundation failure. There was major damage out in the footwall, and only minor
observable damage along the pillar or out in the hanging wall. In this case the pillar was
some 200 ft long by some 80 ft high. There was over 2 inches of closure measured
across the overcut immediately above the sill pillar.
Our 2.8 burst did major damage to the pillar, as well as major damage along some
openings up and to the east along the footwall. The majority of the energy released, as
well as the resulting damage, was due to instantaneous wal1 closure over the entire mined
out area around the pillar, not from the release of all the stored strain energy the pillar.
For this reason the 5900 pillar is still somewhat intact and partially loaded. The closure
· process is continuing to load this pillar, thus, there is the possibility of small strain bursts
still occurring in this pillar.
We need to measure the closure induced by this burst along the 5900 level drift. If none
of the existing closure points survived, then we can resurvey existing spads in the back
along the main drift to determine their displacements as a result of the burst. It is likely
that several inches of closure across the vein resulted from this burst.

Stability of 5900 Pillar

It is apparent that the 2.8 burst in the 5900 pillar did not completely destress this pillar.
Hence, it is possible that futiher small bursts could occur in this pillar as it continues to
be loaded by ongoing wall closure from continued mining off of the 5900 level. It is also
apparent that the remaining intact pillar has been significru1tly reduced in size, hence, the
amount of stored strain energy now in the pillar has also been significantly reduced. To
deal ,vi.th any future bursts, ground support is being installed in and along the 5900 pillar
to contain the effects of any further bursting.
In addition to the combination of longer Dywidag bolts, split sets, chain link mesh and
cable bolts, the back and ribs will be sprayed with 2+ inches of shotcrete. The addition of
the shotcrete adds 2 more kJ/m2 to the 9 .3 kJ/m 2 to result in a total dynamic support
l'-'uL:,c,c,.u,,v of some
1
burst at a

distance

7 m.

to

Summary
The 5900
USGS Richter magnitude, was most likely a foundation
failure since this pillar was not completely destroyed. Deterioration and a few small
bursts around the edges of this pillar resulted in reducing the pillar confinement, and
hence, its strength. It is not known whether any geologic structure through the pillar
contributed to the occu1Tence of this burst.
The large amount of energy released by this burst, as well as the resulting damage, was
due to the instantaneous wall closure over the entire mined out area surrounding the 5900
pillar. Wall closure will continue to load the remaining 5900 pillar as mining continues
in the underhand stopes currently being mined below.
The ground support installed during rehabilitation of the 5900 pillar will contain the
damage from any further small bursts that might be induced by continuing closure.
Installing some type of tunnel sets tlu·ough this pillar, and isolating them from the pillar
something like TechFoam, will insure the long term stability of the access through
pillar. While I would conclude that the occurrence of another large 2.8 magnitude burst
in this pillar is very unlikely, it cannot be totally eliminated.
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was
area.
s
states that
operator
conduct
two daily surveys at
start and
of the first shift to determine weather
movement
to
stress levels are
The
r
a plan
re
a day at
the same time.
On December 14,
the operator
the last
reading just
r to another
ent rock burst
uries to seven
The Mine Superintendent
could not be taken because steel liner was

15. Area or Eqllipment

17. Action to Terminate

In accordance with the provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Ao! of 1996, lhe Small Business Administration
has established a National
and Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and 10 Regional Fairness Boards to receive comments from small businesses about federal
agency enforcement actions. The'Ombudsman annually evaluates enforcement activities and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish lo comment on lhe
enforcement actions of MSHA. you may ca!l 1-888-REG-FA!R {1-888-734-3247), orwrile !he Ombudsman al Small Business Administration, omce of !he National Ombudsman, 409
3rd Street, SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. Please nole, however, that your right ID file a comment with Iha Ombudsman is in addition lo any other rights you may have,
including the righl !o conies! citations and proposed penalties and obtain a hearing before lhe Federal Mine Safety and Heal!h Review Commission.
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Continuation of 8. Condition or Practice

gauge and the gauges could not be read.
the s
ss gauges were
with extended wire so that
be read during the installation of the liner.
If this
was
taken it may have indicated high levels, which have removed
from the
2nd rock burst. This condition has not been des
ed as "significant and
substant
the conduct violated a
sion of the
rather
than a
ry sa
or heal
s

See Continuation Form
Section 111--Subsequent Action Taken

8. Extended To

A. Dale

Mo

Da

Yr

0

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

C. Vacated

O

D. Tenninated

Section IV--lnspeciion Data

9. Type of Inspection

E07

1i . Signature

Ronald L. Eastwood
MSHA

fc

10. Event Number

1159243

Number
IAR
1537

12. Date

Mo

Da

Yr

12/21/2011

7000-3e, Mar 85 (revised)

1

13. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

0800

E. Modified

0

Exhibit 23

Administration

on 12/14/2 1 at approximately 19:40
rescue and recover work s necessary this order is
being issued
of the federal
and
Act of 1977 to
of all persons at
s
. This order is being issued
ion of any evidence which would assist in investigating
the cause or causes of the accident. It prohibits all activity in all
underground areas of
mine except to the extent necessary to rescue an
individual or
an imminent
until MSHA has
determined it is safe
resume normal mining operations underground. This
applies to all persons engaged in the rescue and recovery operation
persons on
. This order was initially issued orally to the mine
at 21:00 pacific standard time
See Confinuetion Form

A. Injury or Illness (has) (is):

No Likelihood

Highly likely

Reasonably

B.

C. Significant and Substantial:
11. Negligence (check one)

D. Number of Persons Affected:
A. None

103.i

12. Type of Action

O

D. Written Notice

0

Safeguard

D
Mo Da Yr

F. Dated

E. Citation/

C. Safeguard

B. Order

Order Number

All underground portions of the mine

15. Area or Equipment

16. Termination Due

E. Reckless Disregard

. Order

14. Initial Action

A Citation

D

C. Moderate

A. Date

Mo Da

Yr

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

Section 111--Termination Acllon

17. Action to Terminate

18. Terminated A. Date

MoDa Yr

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock

Section N-Automated System Data

19. Type of lnspecilon
(activity code)

22. Signature

E07

20. Event Number

Scott G. Amos

· 1159243

21.

Primary or MIii

p
23. AR Number

4496

MSHA Form 7000.3, Apr OB (revised}
In accordance With the provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act. of 1996, the small Business Administration has
established a National Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and 10 Regional Fairness Boards lo receive comments from small businesses about federal agency
enforcement actions. The Ombudsman annually evaluates enforcement actMUes and iates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish lo comment on the
enforcement acikms of MSHA, you may can 1-388-REG-FAIR (1-868-734-3247), or write Iha Ombudsman al Small Business Administration, Office of \he National Ombudsman, 409 3rd
Street, SW MC 2120, Washlnglon, DC 20416. Please note, however, that your right to tile a comment wilh the Ombudsman ls in ac!d!Uon to any other lights you may have, including
\he rtght to contest citations and proposed penames and obtain a heanng before lfle federal Mine Safety and Health Revfew Commission.

the mine) and has now been reduced to

See Gontlnuatlon Form
Secllon 111....SubsequentAcilon Taken

8. Extended To A

. Dae
I

Mo

Da

Yr

.

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

C. Vacated

D. Terminated

0

Section IV-lnspecfion Data

9. Type of Inspection

E07

i. Signature

Scott G. Amos
MSHA Form i'000..3a, Mar 65 (revised)

10. Event Number

1159243
AR Number

4496

12. Date

Mo

Da

Yr

12/14/2011

13. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

2100

E. Modified

0

Exhibit 24

U.S. Department of Lal
Mine
Administration

Change

From

To

8. Condition Or Practice

Reason

The initial order is modified to reflect that MSHA is now proceding under the authority of section 103k of the federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977. This section 103k order is intended to protect the safety of all persons on site including those
involved in rescue and recovery operations or investigation of the accident The mine operator shall obtain prior approval from
an authorized representative of the secretary of all actions to recover and restore operations in the mine. Additionally, the mine
operator is reminded of it's existing obligations to prevent destruction of evidence that would aid in investigating fue cause or
causes of the accident. Item 12 is modified to a 103k order.

12. Type of Action1

Reason

103j

103k

The initial order is modified to reflect that MSHA is now pro ceding under the authority of section 103k of the federal Mine
Safey and Health Act of 1977.

The initial order {s modified to reflect _that MSHA is now proceding under the
authority of section 103k of
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.
This section 103k order is intended to protect the safety of all persons on
including those involved
rescue and recovery operations or
stigation of the accident. The mine
shall obtain
approval
from an authorized representative of the secretary of all actions to recover
and restore operations in the mine. Additionally, the mine
is
1
reminded of it s existing obligations to prevent destruction of evidence
would aid in investigating the cause or causes of the accident. Item 12. is
modi
to a 103k order.

Se<!! ContJnuaUon Form
Section Ill-Subsequent Action Taken
8. Extended To
Mo
Da

A Date

0

Time (24 Hr. Clock)

C. Vacated

OD. Temiinated

~ E. Modified .

Section lV-lnspection Data
9. Type of Inspection

E07

Signature

Scott G. Amos
MSHA Form 7000-3a, Mar 65 (revised}

10. Event Number

1159243
AR Number

4496

12. Date

Mo

Da

Yr

12/15/2011

i3. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

1113

0

Exhibit 25

Mine

U.S. Department of Lal

Mine

and Healtl1

(Contractor)

at

of a massive
the occurrence
in serious
uries to seven miners

burst.
Rock Burst
were
the I Drift Pillar
work from a
rock
that
occurred on 11/16/2011.
method in place dur
the accident was to
the main sill pillar above the 5900 I-Drift pillar.
The company was
warned that the rehabilitation should
with caution, and that a better
understanding of the cause of the
burst,
relation to mining into
the Sill Pillar, was needed.
Mine Management engaged in aggravated conduct
constituting more than ordinary negligence in that they were aware that mining
main sill
could cause added stress to
5900 I-Drift pillar
but directed the mining to be done.
See Continuation Form (MSHA Form 700Q..3e)

D

9. Violation

A. Health
SafetyO
otherD
Sectlon :: .. ·-~----· ~ 1:va1uetJon
10. Gravity:
A. Injury or Illness (has) (is):

8. Section

C. Part/Section of

of Act

Title 30 CFR

No Likelihood

D

B. Injury or illness could reasonably be expected to be:

Unlikely

D

57.346lbl

Reasonably Likely

D

Lost Workdays Or Restricted Duty

C. Significant and Substantial:
11. Negligence (check one)

O

Safeguard

16. Termination Due

C. Safeguard

The I-Drift

15.AreaorEquipment

Occurred~

Fatal

Mo Da

A Date

Yr

007

E. Reckless Disregard ~

C. Moderate

E.
B. Order ~

D

Pennanently Disabling ~

104d2

12. Type of Action
14. Initial Action
A Citation

Highly Likely

D. Number of Persons Affected:

A. None

i;zJ

Citation/
Order Number

8565555

Written Notice
Mo Da Yr

F. Dated

12/19/2011

5900 level.

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

Section Ill-Termination Action

1}. Action to Terminate

18. Terminated /\.. Date

MoDa

Yr

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

Section IV-Automated System Data

19. Type of Inspection
(activity code)

22. Signature

EO?

20. Event Number

Rodric B. Breland

1159243

21. Primary or Mill

p
23. AR Number

4169

MSHA Form 7000·3, Apr 06 (revised)
In accordance with !he provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the Small Business Administration has
established a National Small Business end Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and iO Regional Fairness Boards to receive comments from small businesses about federal agency

enforcement actions. The Ombudsmen annually evaluates enforcement activities and rates each agency's responsiveness to smell business. If you wish to comment on the

enforcement actions or MSHA, you may ca!J 1-88B·REG·FAIR (1·886·734·3247), orwrite !he Ombudsman at Small Business Administration, Office of !he National Ombudsman, 409 3rd
Stree~ SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. Please note. however, that your right lo file a comment with !he Ombudsmen is in addition to any other rights you may have, including
the right to contest citations and proposed penarnes and obtain a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.
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See Continuation Form
Seclion lll-Subsequeht Action Taken

8. Extended To

A.

D

ate

Mo

Da

Yr

.

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

C. Vacated

D. Terminated

O

SecUon IV-lnspecUon Data

9. Type of Inspection

E07

10. Event Number

1159243

11. Signature

AR Number

Rodric B. Breland

4169

MSHA Form 7000,3a, Mar 85 {revised)

12. Date

Mo

Da

Yr

05/15/2012

13. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

1035

E. Modified

0

Exhibit 26

Mine

{Contractor)

occurred at this mine on
15, 2011, when a
struck by falling material while working in the 6150 15-3 West stope.
substantial quantity of material (measuring approximately 25
in width, 74
feet in length, and 25 feet in height) fell 10 feet from the stope back after
portions of a supporting pillar were removed to extract ore. Ground support
was necessary in the stope to mine safely; but the ground support utilized was
not adequate. The ground c·ontrol was not designed,. installed and/or
maintained in a manner that was capable of supporting the ground in such a
wide.stope when the support pillar·was removed. Mine management has engaged
in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by directing
the. pillar to be mined as the stope advanced and allowing miners to work under
inadequately supported ground. This is an unwarrantable
See Continuation Form (MSHA Form 7000-3a)

9. Violation

A Health

0

B. Section
of Act

SafetyO
OtherO

C. Part/Section of
Trtle30CFR

@

57.3360

Section"

10.

A. Injury or Illness (has} (is);
B. Injury or Illness could rea•
sonably be expected to lie:

D

A. None[]

Reasonably likely

Highly Likely

0

O

Occurred

0
Fatal

Pemianently Disabling
D. Number of Persons Affected:

·B.Low

O

0

Lost Workdays Or Restricted Duty

0

c. Moderate

D. High

13. Type of Issuance (check one)

CL Safeguard

B. Order

O

No

Yes@

104dl

12. Type of Action·
14. Initial Action
A. Citation

Unlikely

No Lost Wort<days

C. Significant and Substantial:

11. Negligence (check one)

0

No Likelihood

D. Written Notice

O

Citation

0

0

001

E. Reckless Disregard
Order

Safeguard

D

0

Written Notice

F. Dated

E. Citation/

0

Mo

Da

Yr

Order Number

15. Area or Equipment

16. Telmination Due

A Date

Mo Da

Yr

0&/12/2011

B. Time (24 Hr. Clockj

0800

.Seciion 111-Termlna11on Action
17. Action to Terminate·

18. Terminated A Date

MoDa Yr

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

Section IV-AulDma:led System Data
· 19. Type of Inspection
(activity eode)

22. Signatur1::

20. Event Number

E06

Rodric B. Breland

1155254

21. Primary or Mill ·

p
23. AR Number

4169

MSHA Form 7000-3, Apr 08 (revised)
In accomance with the provisions of 1he Small Business Re9u1ato;y Enforcement Fairness Act. of 1996, the Small Business Administration has.
eslab!ished a National Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Ombudsman and 10 Regional fairness Boards to receive comments from small buSinesses about federal agency
enfcit::ement actions. The Ombudsman annually evaluates enforcement acfMties and rates eaci1 agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on the
enforcement actions of MSHA, you may call 1-888-REG-FAIR {1-<!86-734-3247), or wrtte the Ombudsman at Small Business Administration, Office of the National Ombudsman, 409 3rd
Stree~ SW MC 2120, Washington, DC 20416. ·p1ease_note, however, ihatyourrigtrtro file a comment with the Ombudsman is in addition lo al)Y other rights you may have, including
lhe right to conies! citations and proposed penatties and obtain a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.

700580-11
MSHA 001850.

See Continuation Form
Section Ill-Subsequent Aciion Taken

8. Extended To

A Date

· Mo

Da · Yr

·

DC. Vacated

B. Time (24 Hr. Clock)

D. Terminated

O E. Modified

Section 11(-lnspection Data

9. Type of Inspection E06
11. Signature

.

Rod.ric B. Breland

10. Event Number

1155254
AR Number

4169

12. Date

Mo

Da

Yr

0&/08/2011

· 13. Time (24 Hr. Clock) ·

0930

MSHA Form 7DD0-3a, Mar 85 (revised}

MSHA 001851

0

· Exhibit 27

U.S.Deoartmentofu.

(Contractor)

occurred at this mine on April 15, 2011

when a miner was

by falling material while working in the 6150-15-3 West stope.

A

substantial quantity of material (measuring approximately 25 feet in width, 74
in length, and 25
in heigh~) fell 10 feet from the stope back after
portions of a supporting pillar were removed to extract ore. Management failed
to adequately examine and t~st the ground conditions to determine if
additional measures needed to be taken. This was necessary due to constantly
changing ground· condition.s, they were mining a wide stope and removing the
pillar.
The operator has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting
more than ordinary negligence, as they needed to make·exal.1\inations and conduct
tests to ensure that all feasible precautions were taken. This is an
unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory
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occurred at
17, 20 , when
by blocked material in a bin.
victim and a coworker
bin to remove the
from below them when the material gave way,
thei.~ in the material~ The
entered the bin

harnesses and self-retracting lanyards, but they did not have
suitably fastened.
A second person per lifeline, similarly equipped, was not
Mine management
have been working underground with the
contractor on a shift to shift basis since the beginning of the contract with
Cementation, and have been in the bin when miners were working on potential
falling/sliding material while only being tied off by self-retracting
lanyards. Mine management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more
than ordinary negiigence in that they

present.

See Coniinuatioo Rnn (MSHA Form 7000-3a)
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MODEL

WITH
IDAHO I S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ,\ND

OCCUPATION DISEASE COMPENSATION LAWS 2 •

BY
E, B. SMITH
a workmen 1 s compensation law must neces

Analys

Its

of admini

Can the law be administered
(1)
(2)

II.

The general overall
Is
re separation
the
functions from the quasi-j

Its
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Is it a harmonious whole or has
jointed "topsy" fashion?

III.
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a

The coverage
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Classes of industries and emp
and exempted from coverage

(B)

Medical

(C)

Rehabilitation

(D)

Burial

IV.

Income Benefits

V.

Insurance

covered

1.
"The Model Code 11 is an abbrevia.ted reference to the proposed
Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law compiled under the
ces of the Council of State Governments for suggested state
s

Idaho's
the "Idaho Lawn or the

11

laws will
Law

times be referre

to as

p

fess

of

person

the work

The Code extends extra-territorial coverage, covers
s of

of

tutions under a

lC

and also preserves

p

party l

The Code spe

covers minors whether lawfully or

"

unlawfully employed or under apprenticeship; executive officers
of corporations; members of volunteer
members or

of the

or police departments;

Defense

regularly selling or di

s, and every person

newspapers and deemed employees

of the news agency or the p
The Code does not apply where
occasioned
to

ure or kill

ury to an

by his

was

or by his wilful intention
or another.

Thus, unlike the Idaho
in caus

Law, though intoxication may play a substantial
the injury, compensation is not

d if

is not the

sole cause.
The word "wilfuln rules out acts - even though loosely called
intentional - which are motivated by such things as intense p
or similar results of industrial

ury.

Mere

11

intentionll is not

enough, inasmuch as nwilful" connotes deliberation or calculated,
determined and stubborn persistence in a particular course in
order to satisfy the will of the actor.
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DIEP

)

VS.

CITY OF COEUR D ALENE, et al.

Case

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN PART AND
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN PART

)
Defendants.

I.

CV 2002 5424

)

)
)

INTRODUCTION.
On June 21, 2001, Plaintiff Diep To 's seven year old son

Beach in Coeur d'Alene.

drowned at the City
1

ived with his mother Diep To at St. Margaret's Shelter in

Spokane, Washington. Defendant Bal'bara Vere lien, another resident of the shelter took her

grandchildren along with

and his siste

to the City Beach to swim. Six

lifeguards were on duty at the Coeur d'Alene beach at the time. The head lifeguard at the time
was Christopher Taylor. Also using the city beach at the time in question was "PAAK in the
Park" which involved a large number of children that are supervised by counselors involved with

PAAK in the park.

drowned in the area under the supervision of lifeguard tower four.

The lifeguard manning tower four at that time was Thomas Allen.
The Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene (city) has moved for summary judgment. The
standard of review on summary judgment is as follows:
A trial court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment views all facts and
inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party to determine whether
the motion should be granted. The burden of proving the absence of material
moving
, the adverse party
not rest upon
facts is upon
1

Defendant St. Margaret's Shelter was previously

summary

based on a lack

to plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYl,\iG SUMMAR\' JUDGMENT IN PART AND G!UNTl:SG SUMMARY JUDGMENT lN rART Pagel

Judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
affidavits on file
there is no
of material

Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679,681,837 P.2d 805,807 (1992),
(citations omitted). More on point is the following:
In reviewing the affidavits submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment we must liberally construe the facts in favor of the child and resolve
all doubts against the city. The motion should be denied if conflicting inferences could
have been drawn from the facts alleged in the affidavits, and if reasonable people might
have reached different conclusions as to whether the city was willful and wanton.

Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 271, 766, P.2d 736, 741 (1988).
The city moves for summary judgment based on the immunity provided by Idaho's
Recreational Use Statute,

§ 36-1604. The city claims the acts

the

were not willful or

wanton and therefore the city is entitled to the immunity granted by the Recreational Use Statute.
Additionally the city claims to be protected by LC. § 6-904A for the actions of its employees
while acting with in the course and scope of there employment. Finally in their Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the city claims they are protected
from claims related to relocating the end buoy or adding a guard stand by the Discretionary
Function exception in LC. § 6-904(1 ).
The plaintiff argues the city is not entitled to protection under the Recreational Use
Statue because this is not a premises liability case, but is instead based on the negligent, reckless,
willful and wanton conduct of the city and its employees. Plaintiffs Response Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant City of Coeur d' Alene's Motion for Summary Judgment (Plaintiff's
Memorandum), p. 5. Plaintiff also argues that the defendant is not protected by LC. § 6-904A

MEMORANDUM DEC!SIO:-i AN!l ORDER DENYING SUMMARY Jl!DG,m:NT IN PART AND GRANTIKG SIJ~lMARY JUDGMEi'ff

!'ART Pagel

§

Statute,

§ 36-1604.

A. Applicability of tbe Recreational Use Statute to This Case.
Idaho's Recreational Use Statute applies to public entities. McGhee ex rel. McGhee. City

of Glenns Ferry, 11 l Idaho 921, 729 P.2d 396 (1986). Landowners are not reiieved of all
liability, they owe users the same duty as is owed to trespassers, which is the duty to refrain from
willful or wanton conduct. Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736 (1988).
The plain language of the Recreational Use Statute claims its purpose is to encourage
landowners to make land and water available to the public for recreation without charge by
limiting the land owner's liability to users. I

§ 36-1604. There is no

that the City of

Coeur d'Alene City Beach is open to the public free of charge. Plaintiff argues that this action
does not come under the Recreational Use Statute because this action is a regular wrongful death
lawsuit or simply a "premises liability" lawsuit. Plaintiffs Memorandum, p. 5. The tenninology
used by plaintiff has no significance. The cases cited by plaintiff, Scott v. Wright, 486 N. W.2d
40 (Iowa 1992) and Young v. Salt Lake City Co1p., 876 P.2d 376 (Utah 1994) both involve active
torts of the property owners (where the property owner did some affinnative negligent action)
not the conditions of the property itself. Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 5, Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendant's Reply), p. 2. 2 The Court is not
persuaded by plaintiffs arguments that this case should not come under the Recreational Use
Statute because it is a "premises liability" case or a "wrongful death" case. This case involves
the condition of the property itself The facts of this case are squarely within I.C. § 36-1604:

2

The city raises another distinction between these two cases and the present case. The recreational use statutes
Iowa and Utah do not have the equivalent of LC. § 36That effect of that distinction is discussed below.
MEi'vlORANOUM DECISION AND ORDER DEN\'ING SUMMARY JUOGM[!H IN PART AN!l GRANTING SUM,\!ARY JUDGMENT IN
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used

owns the land
§ 36-1

Cami

Recreational

lake

The
Statute applies to the. facts

case.

Idaho Supreme Court justices were somewhat divided on other issues in Jacobsen, they
were unanimous that the Recreational Use Statute applied to the facts in Jacobsen. This Court
finds the facts in Jacobsen to be analogous to those in the present case.
Even though the Recreational Use Statute applies to the facts of this case, that does not
mean that the land owner is absolutely immune to all liability. Jacobsen, 115 Idaho at 269, 766
P.2d at 739. The landovvner is not immune from willful or wanton conduct.

B. Willful.and Wanton Conduct.
It used to be that "willful and wanton" conduct involved only intentional conduct.

Jacobsen, 115 Idaho at 270, 766 P.2d at 740 citing the prior applicable jury instruction IDH 225
(1985). Idaho Juty Instruction 225 read as fo Hows:

Willful and wanton misconduct is present if the defendant intentionally does or fails to
do an act, knowing or having a reason to know facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize that his conduct not only creates unreasonable risk of harm to another, but
involves a high degree of probability that such harm would result.

Id (emphasis added).
The recent Idaho Supreme Court case O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 14, 77
P.3d 849,854 (2003), n. 1, notes that the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions have recently been
revised, and that IDJI 2d now defines Willful and Wanton as follows:
The words "willful and wanton" when used in these instructions and when applied to
the
case, mean more than
intentional or reckless
taken
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING !:WMMARY JUDG;\!ENT IN PART ..\Ml GRANTING SUMMARY JUDG~!ENT IN PART Page .f

0
wanton" used to be an

at
and now it can

an

act or a reckless act

Fmiher confusing this area is the circular concept that now "reckless" appears .to be the
equivaient of "willful and wanton", and that the word "reckless" is more understandable
according to the Idaho Supreme Court Civil Jrny Instructions Committee. Comment to IDJI 2d
3.J 9, citing Comment to Instruction 2.25. The logical way to make sense of this situation is to
look at the definition of "reckless", and equate that definition with the tenns "willful and
wanton".
"Reckless" has been defined as "creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to
others and by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk".
Black's Law Dictionary,

i 11 Ed., p. 1276 (1999).

"Recklessness" is defined as:

Conduct whereby the actor does not desire hannful consequence but nonetheless
foresees the possibility and consciously takes the risk. Recklessness involves a
greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser degree offault than intentional
wrongdoing. The state of mind in which a person does not care about the
consequences of his or her actions.

Id p. 1277. (italics added). This definition includes an affirmative act that creates the unreasonable
risk and a probability that harm wiii actualiy result. While short of intentional conduct, this is still a
very high level of "bad conduct". The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that foreseeability is an
element of willful and wanton. Hams v. State Dept. of Health, 123 ldaho 295,299,847 P.2d 1156,
1160 (1992), citing Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736 (l 988). This
foreseeability is more than a mere possibility. Id Whether an injury is the result of willful and

3

This Court realizes that on October 27, 2003 the Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order In re: Civil Jury
Instructions where it stated it will not approve any
instruction but will simply address individual
instructions though appellate review. Since the Idaho Supreme Court mentioned IDJf 2d 2.25 in O 'Guin a:nd did
this Court views that as the Idaho Supreme Comt's acceptance of !DJ! 2d 2.25.
not disapprove of the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN !'ART AND GRANTING SUMMARY
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to
to

training and

statements
of the lifeguards and the

Deposition of

Christopher Taylor attached. to the Gaffaney Affidavit describes the operation of the beach and
swimming area. The plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of Gerald M. Dworkin, who claims to
be an "expert consultant in aquatics safety and water rescue." Dworkin Affidavit, p. 1. This
Comi found this affidavit admissible for the purpose of summary judgment. Dworkin concludes:
"Therefore, it is my opinion that the City of Coeur d'Alene was grossly negligent, reckless,
willful and wanton in their actions which proximately caused the drowning death o

Id., p. 9.
Since "willful and wanton" conduct is a question for the jury (0

77 P.3d at 854)

and Dworkin concludes the city was willful and wanton in their actions, one would think
summary judgment should clearly be denied in this case. However, the Dworkin affidavit, while
admitted for summary judgment, needs futiher analysis under J.C. § 36-1604. First of all, gross
negligence is not sufficient to get around the immunity LC.§ 36-1604 provides, so Dworkin's
conclusion to that extent has no merit. Second, Dworkin's conclusion that the city was
''reckless, willful and wanton" in its conduct is not clearly supported by specific "facts" in his
affidavit. Dworkin does not come right out and state "why" he came to that conclusion that the
city's conduct was "reckless, willful and wanton", so the Court looks to the rest of his affidavit.
One paragraph that gives insight as to "why" he came to that opinion reads:

It is my opinion that as a result of the City's failure to prevent this
incident; its failure to recognize the potential as well as the incident itself; and its
failure to manage the inciden
died as a result of a prolonged submersion
which went undetected by Lif
rsonnel for several minutes. And, once

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING SUMMARY .IUl)GMENT IN PART AND GRANTING SUMMARY JUOGMENT IN !'ART J>3g~ 6

Affidavit, p. 9. None of this lists "intentional" acts, nor does

list

actions that were done knowingly, with utter disregard for foreseeable consequences which were

highly likely to result from those actions."
That does not end the analysis. The above explanation by Dworkin is based on 24
separate items that Dworkin lists in his affidavit. While Dworkin's affidavit lists acts of
negligence, probably even gross negligence on the part of the city (if all acts were true, which
the Court appreciates the city contests the truth of those alleged actions, but at this juncture it is
sufficient that there is a dispute of fact), it is a much closer call as to whether Dworkin lists
"reckless" or "willful and wanton" acts to support Dworkin's conclusion of willful and wanton
behavior on the part of the city that proximately cause

death.

Reviewing the 24 acts Dworkin identifies, the Court has determined plaintiff through the
Dworkin affidavit has created a jury issue as to whether these acts are "willful and wanton". The
Court's reasoning is as follows. These acts if believed (understanding the city disputes that, but
that is a jury issue for the finder of fact), are at least negligent, probably grossly negligent, and
perhaps willful and wanton or reckless. These acts if true, are bad acts. It is really up to the jury
to decide if as to one or more of these 24 acts, the city 1) knew of the deficiency and 2) could
have forseen the possibility

a drowning and 3) the possibility

drowning was highly likely to

occur with that deficiency and yet 4) the city consciously proceeded to act knowing the risk
caused by that deficiency created a high likelihood of drowning. Each of those has to be proven
as to at least one claimed act. Additionally, the plaintiff

cause, and wil I have to address contributory

the burden of proving proximate

and the

of

The acts listed by Dworkin which do not suppott "intentional" or
MEMORAND()M DECISION AJ\:D ORDER DENYING SUMMA UV .ll'DGMENT IN PART ANO GRANTIN"G SUilli\!ARV
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being

not from a lifeguard.

provided by one qualified to

so, there is no concept in

break in and perform resuscitation.
that the city must eliminate

law that a I ifeguard ls required to

p. 5, ,r l 6, p. 6 ,r 19. There is no requirement in the law

dangers at City Beach". Id., p. 3,

'lf 2.

the city's "equipment" was proximately related to the death o
At this juncture, the case boils down to the allegations of the

There is no showing how

Id P. 5, ,r 12, 13, 16.
failure to detect the

drowning. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 10, 17 and 18 ofDworkin's affidavit address the alleged failure to
detect the drowning. Dworkin states the city failed to establish appropriate Surveillance
Protocols by the lifeguards to scan their zones of responsibilities, failed to establish acceptable
lifeguard to patron ratio, failed to adequately assess and supervise Christopher Taylor as head
lifeguard, failed to conduct emergency response drills and failed to develop an incident
command structure for emergency situations. Dworkin opines that because of these alleged
deficiencies, the lifeguards failed to recognize the incident. Id., p. 8. These allegations, if
believed by a jury, provide a jury issue sufficient to survive summary judgment. In a willful and
wanton failure to act case (as opposed to willful and wanton commission of an affirmative act
such as in Scott and Young above) such as this, recklessness/willful and wanton conduct may
well be extremely difficult to prove. Justice Bakes noted that in his specially concurring opinion
in Jacobsen. Justice Bakes felt that since "willful and wanton misconduct" were required to be
proved, the factual record must be evaluated on a higher standard than in an ordinary negligence
case. J 15 Idaho 266, 273, 766 P.2d 736, 743. He
as to

or not

the record in that case presented "a very

affidavits
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as to whether
misconduct.

Bakes felt

which arguably constitute such willful and wanton misconduct that "reasonable minds might
reach different conclusions as to whether the city was guilty of willful and wanton conduct."
115 Idaho at 274, 766 P.2d at 744. Illustrnting the fact that reasonable minds might reach
different conclusions, Justice Shepard in his dissenting opinion, came to the opposite conclusion
that the Jacobsen facts did not support a finding of willful and wanton conduct. 115 Idaho at
275, 766 P.2d at 745. This Court in the present case reaches that same conclusion as the
majority of the Idaho Supreme Court in Jacobsen.
This Court determines that

disputed facts in this case, viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party, are analogous in general terms to the undisputed
allegations presented by the injured party in Jacobsen. In Jacobsen plaintiffs presented evidence
that was not disputed by the city at summary judgment, that the city had placed playground
equipment very close to a ditch that seasonally had rapidly running deep water, and that the ditch
was spanned by a bridge with a single rail three feet off the bridge deck that a child could slip
under, causing the injury. The Idaho Supreme Court wrote:
Considering these facts and the reasonable inferences from them that can be
drawn in favor of the child, and resolving all doubts against the city, reasonable minds
might reach different conclusions as to whether the city was guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct in nor protecting children who came to the park from the dangerous condition in
the part created by the ditch and the bridge. Jt is reasonable to infer that the city knew of
the dangerous condition that existed in the park in the springtime when the ditch was
swollen with rapidly running water, that the City knew of the condition of the bridge, and
that aUov,1 ing the ditch and the bridge to remain in that condition in the spring would
create unreasonable risk of harm to children and would involve a high degree of
probability that harm would result.
Justice Huntley said in his dissent in Johnson:
The most
element of wantonness is knowledge, and that element need not
be shown by direct evidence; rather, it may be made to
by showing
MEMORANDUM DEC1Sl0N AND ORl)ER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART AND GRANTING SU,\li\!ARY .JUDGMENT IN PART P:ige 9

766

at 742.

same

expert Dworkin, at ieast as to

to

the

drmvning. If summary judgment in Jacobsen was inappropriate back in the day when intentional
conduct had to be found in order for there to be willful and wanton behavior, then summary
judgment would be even more inappropriate now that intent may have been removed as an
element of willful and wanton behavior, via the jury instructions.
Even that does not end the inquiry. Idaho Code § 36-1604 is different now than at the
time Jacobsen was decided. Idaho Code§ 36-1604(c) was not in existence at the time Jacobsen
was decided in 1988. Many of these 24 acts by the city were acts made by city personnel who
performed those acts "for the purpose of improving the safety of others" and under LC. § 361604(c ), such acts simply do not" ... create liability on the pait of the owner of land where there
is no such basis for such liability." LC.§ 36-1604(c) also states: " ... not the failure to maintain
or keep i"n place any ... modification made to improve the safety, shall create liability on the part
of an owner of land where there is no such basis for such liability." At first glance, such
language would result in elimination of liability by the city. However, I.C. § 36-1604(c) pertains
to there being no dutv to warn by the landowner, as the subsection is captioned "Owner Exempt
from Warning".

that reason, the Court interprets that

as

limited

to the

issue of failure to warn, and this is not a case of failure to warn. For that reason, the distinction
made by the city as to comparable Utah and Iowa statutes, is not persuasive. Under the city's
reading of LC. § 36-1604(c ), even if the city was grossly negligent in performing those acts, no

liability would

This interpretation of LC. §

was willful and wanton in its canying out

604( c) would mean that even

acts "made
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the purpose
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with

to the

no

§ 36- 1604(c): " ... not the failure to maintain or keep in place any ... modification made to
improve the safety, shall create liability on the part of an owner

land where there is no such

basis for such liability." That interpretation would gut existing law on recreational use statutes,
and it would ignore the fact that LC. §36-1604(c) pertains to failure to warn situations.
At trial, plaintiff will have to prove "willful and wanton" conduct as to each bad act
alleged to have been committed. Plaintiff will have to prove the act was either intentional or, at
least an affirmative action that was done knowingly, with utter disregard for foreseeable
consequences which were highly likely to occur as a result of those

-~,.,v,,v

As pointed out by

themajority decision in Jacobsen: :'Themostcriticalelement of wantonness-is knowledge, and
that element need not be shown by direct evidence; rather, it may be made to appear by showing
circumstances from which the fact of knowledge is a legitimate inference." l 15 Idaho at 272,

766 P.2d at 742.
Accordingly, while the Idaho Recreational Use Statute clearly applies to the facts of this
case, summary judgment on behalfof the city on the basis of the Idaho Recreational Use Statute
is DENIED due to a jury issue on willful and wanton conduct.

III.

Idaho Code§ 6-904A Does Not Provide the City With Immunity.
Idaho Code § 6-904A provides immunity for "a governmental entity and its employees

while acting within the scope of employment and without reckless, willful and wanton conduct."

The Idaho Supreme Court has held:

purpose

LC. § 6-904A, which is to limit the liability
under

or care."
JUDGMENT

was not under
was under

care,

Memorandum in Support

time

§ 6-904A specifically

§ 6-904A(2) holds

if he
immune.

Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 14. That argument misses the

point. Immunity arises from the status of the person causing the injury, not the status of the
person injured. Coonse, 132 Idaho at 806, 979 P .2d at 1 l 64. In Hei v. Holtzer, 139 Idaho 81, 73
P.3d 94 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court found that when a teacher had an improper sexual
relationship with a student, the school district was not supervising the teacher. Id. Because the
district was not supervising the teacher, the statute did not apply. 73 P.3d at I 00. Because J.C. §
6-904A did not apply to the unsupervised teacher, the student was able to bring a claim against
the district for negligent supervision. Id. Plaintiff argues Hei indicates:

this case the City,

through its employees, is the negligent party. The City was not supervising any person within
the meaning of the statute [LC.§ 6-904A]." Plaintiff's Brief, p. 11. In oral argument, counsel

for plaintiff argued Hei makes it clear the city in this case is the bad actor. This unsupported
claim that the city, not its employees, is the negligent party, is directly contradicted by the list of
acts by "the City of Coeur d'Alene and its employees" enumerated only three pages earlier in

piaintiff's briefing. Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 8-9. Plaintiffs claims are directly contradicted by the
Dworkin affidavit quoted above, which sets forth nothing but the acts of people supervised by
the city.
Plaintiff's claims of the city being the bad actor do not ring true. These claims are
obviously made to skiit the application of I.C. § 6-904A. Plaintiff claims that only the city is
responsible, but then plaintiff presents a long string
with the actions

parks and

actions in the affidavits that deal directly
are all
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Boise
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LC.§ 6-904A

to the facts

ciiy has immunity under

§ 6-904A

1

that docs not end the
all acts except those that are willful and

wanton. The plaintiff further claims that even if LC. § 6-904A does apply the city's behavior
was reckless, willful and wanton so they still have a claim. Plaintiff's Brief, p. 11. The analysis
in section II above is applicable here. The Court notes that LC. § 6-904C requires reckless or
willful and wanton to be intentional as well. While Jacobsen dealt with the analysis of a
different statute, its analysis of willful and wanton at a time when "intent" was an element of

vvillful and wanton is instructive. Jacobsen tells us it is a jury question.
Accordingly, while the

6-904A applies to the facts of this case, summary judgment

for the city upon that statute is DENIED due to a jury issue on willfu!and wanton conduct

IV.
the

Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) Provides the City with Immunity As To Its Planning
Decisions of 1) Whether to Construct a Fifth Lifeguard Stand and 2) Location of
Swim Area Buoys.
As to its decision whether to construct a fifth lifeguard stand and the location of the swim

area buoys, the city claims it is immune under the discretionary function exception. A
government entity is not liable for any claim based upon the exercise of a discretionary function
or duty of the government, \.vhether or not the discretion was abused. Tomich v. City of

Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394,397,901 P.2d 501,504 (1995). To determine if the action qualifies as
a discretionary function a planning/operational test is used. Id. Under that test matters not
requiring evaluations of policy factors are likely to be operational and not given immunity. Id.

no

as to
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and is

§
Plaintiff claims

Recreational Director Steve Anthony

have chosen to

move the buoy line but did not, thus it is an operational decision for which immunity would not
Plaintiffs

p. 12-14. Plaintiffthen

"Mr. Anthony didn't need any authority or

approval to move in the buoy line. (See Deposition of Steve Anthony, Pages 45 and 46, attached
as Exhibit U).

Id. pp. 13-14. Anthony testified that he !!§...director had the ability to move the

swim boundary before June 200 l. Exhibit U, pp. 45, LL 20-25. As shown below, Anthony's
rank as Recreation Director for the City of Coeur d'Alene (Supplemental Affidavit of Steve
Anthony, p. 1, ~ I), is an indicia that this is a planning or policy

Ransom v. City of

Garden City, 1 I 3 Idaho 202, 204, 743 P .2d 70, 72 ( 1987). The city argues the matter regarding
buoy location was discussed at higher level meetings with the City Beach staff, the Parks and
Recreation Commission, and those discussions and recommendations were referred back to the
staff for a meeting with the Parks and Recreation Commission Chainnan and the City Manager,
Ken Thompson. Defendant's Reply Brief p. 12. But as defendants themselves note:
'planning/operational' test does not necessarily tum upon the status or rank of the actor."
Ransom v. City o_f Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 204, 743 P.2d 70, 72 ( 1987). However, greater
rank or authority will most likely coincide with greater responsibility for planning or policy
formation decisions. Id.
The determination of the applicability of the discretionary function exception is a twostep process. Id., 113 ldaho at 205, 743 P.2d at 73. First, the Court must examine the nature
matters not

the
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the

Id

Court finds that the

Steve Anlhony sets

facts showing the

decision on the buoy line location was set initially by those at high levels of the city government
after consideration of financial and other effects, and that even though he as Recreation Director
for the City of Coeur d'Alene had authority to move that line, his decision not to do so is a
planning or policy decision. This finding by the Court is due to the nature and quality of that
action, and also due to Anthony's position as Recreation Director of the city. Second, the Couit
must consider the tvvo policies underlying the discretionary function exception: 1) permit those
who govern to do so without being unduly inhibited in the performance of that function by the
threat of liability for tortuous conduct; and 2) to limit judicial re-examination of basic policy
decisions properly entrusted to other branches of government. Id., 113 Idaho at 205, 743 P .2d at
73. Those policies give the Court no reason to find that Anthony's decision not to move the
buoy line is an operational decision. The Court's finding that Anthony's decision not to move
the buoy line is consistent with those policies.
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the city as to its decision to
not construct a fifth lifeguard stand and its decision not to move the buoy line.

V. ORDER.
IT IS HEREBY ORD RED tllat defendant City of Coeur d' Alene's Motions for
Summary Judgment as to the immunity provided under Idaho Code § 36-1604 and Idaho
Code § 6-904A arc DENIED, although those statutes are applicable to the facts of this case,
and defendant

Coeur d

Motion for Summary Judgment as to the immunity

,\JEMORANDUM !l£CIS10N ANO OIW£R DEi'fflNG SUMMARY JUllGMfcNT !N l'..\!H ANO GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pnge I5

John T.
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a summary
instrumentation and
the 30 vein at the Gold Hunter operation
A drift protection pillar, siightly over l 00' in diameter, was left in place to provide access to
the footwall of the orebody from the hangingwall and Silver Shaft. The circular pillar was created
by adjusting the lengths
the adjacent overhand and underhand stopes as they mined
above and belov-i the 5900 drift. The drift was supported heavily, but not unusually, usirtg closespacing resin rebar and mesh. Due to tbe critical nature of maintaining stability of this drifl:, it has
been continuously monitored with instrumentation and its stability observed. To date (after
completion of the pillar creation), the drift has performed well and is stable with little observable
damage. Two basic types of instrumentation \,Vere installed in the pillar-IRAD stressmeters to
monitor the vein-perpendicular stress at a depth of about 20' into the pillar walls and back, and
closure measured across the 30 vein. Additionally, the mine-wide microseismic system provides
coverage of acoustic emission of the pillar. The stressmeters showed slowly increasing stress
change until the pillar was "detached" from the surrounding 30 vein, at which time the stresses
increased rapidly to significant levels. After a recent seismic event in tbe wall rock (Dec, 2009), the
stressmeter values have fallen off slightly and do not appear to be rising. The west side stressmeters
show higher stresses (by about 40 to 50%) than the east side stressmeters, with the highest induced
stresses at about 16,000 psi. This stress change is about a 50% increase over the in situ maximum
horizontal stress. The total maximum stress would also be about 50% higher than the estimated
uniaxial compressive strength of the silicic qumtzite tested (about 16,000 psi). As described in the
report, the IRAD stressmeters, although useful for understanding whether stress is increasing or
decreasing, and approximately how "large the increase, have limitations that must be recognized if .
they are to be used for detailed calibration or for understanding stress transfer mechanisms. 1n
pa1ticular, the stressmeter output is dependent on: a) the calibration factor (for conversion of wire
vibration frequency to stress) which is rock modulus-dependent, b) the gauge-borehole contact area,
and, c) the orientation of the gauge load axis. Of these dependencies, the gauge factor is particularly
important in the 5900 pillar as a single factor is used for all gauges, even thought the particular rock
unit may be of significantly-different modulus (e.g., siderite vs. quartzite), and this could account
for unexpected variability in gauge readings in the pillar.
u,,.,,""'"'' pillar

After completion of the pillar creation, two observation holes were drilled into the west and east
walls of the drift, radially in the pillar to its outer extent. The west hole was drilled down the axis of
the 30 vein, while the east hole was drilled slightly off the vein itself in the wall rock between the 30
and 40 veins. The core was disced over most of its length (with the exception of the region directly
near the drift), with the thickness of discs varying significantly from fairly wide-spaced to intense
discing. The east hole showed no discing for the last l 0' or so of the core. As described later, the
reason is probably because this portion of the hole is in good-quality silicic rocks. The west hole had
lost or rubblized core for about the bottom 10' of the hole (at the edge of the pillar). The west hole
has showed significant breakouts over the bottom half to 2/3 of the hole, although the hole, itself, is
open and passable. The east hole shows minor breakout damage.
The mining of the major strike pillar above 5900 Level is underway and will continue through 2015,
and Hecla desires to have a numerical stress analysis modd available that can be
with some
degree of confidence in examining the stability of this pillar during various extraction scenarios.
m

The questions

the 5900 pillar are as

•

Is the pi!!ar currently in a failed or unfailed state?

•

Do the monitored stresses make sense given the expected in situ stress field measured at
the Lucky Friday mine, and the stress concentration factor due to the pillar creation?

•

Given the high stress values monitored, why is the drift not showing more damage?

•

Is the discing and hole breakout observed what might be expected given the monitored
stresses?

•

Why is the response of the pillar apparently difterent on the

t\VO

sides of the 5900 drift?

The 3DEC model of Itasca was used to simulate the 30 vein and mining to create the pillar. The
model is different from previous modeling work by Pikalnis (2009) in that it allows inelastic failure
and stress redistribution to occur. Although very little site-specific laboratory strength test data was
available, literature values were used for some rock mass parameters. In addition to the limited lab
testing, in situ rock quality characteristics observed in the 30 vein stopes were used to estimate rock
mass strength parameters. The orebody rock mass was assumed to behave in a relatively brittle
fashion characterizea by a peak and residual strength. The wall rocks were assumed to behave as a
thinly-bedded material (a directional shear failure model) with bedding assumed parallel to the
orebody. The mining sequence was represented in the model in a step-by-step fashion, and the stress
state monitored at the location of the stressmeters. A sensitivity study was conducted in which the
orientation of the major in situ stress was varied as well as the uniaxial compressive strength (from
siderite to quartzite). Failure of the pillar and the sun-ounding stope backs and floors were also
predicted. Although discing and borehole breakout behavior is poorly-understood, some research,
particularly laboratory testing to simulate borehole drilling in stressed rock samples, have resulted in
estimates of the stresses that are required to produce these phenomena. Stresses from the model
were compared to the stress relationships estimated to produce discing and borehole breakouts
through the pillar along the length of the observation boreholes.

A summary of the calibration results are as follows:
1) A reasonable match of the model to measured stress change was achieved, taking into
account the considerable uncertainty of the IRAD stressmeters. The match to stress data
is best for an assumed range of major in situ stress direction of N40W to NJ 5W. This
direction matches the range of measurement of stresses within the Coeur d'Alene district
in general.
2) The reason for the variation in monitored stress on the east and west side of the 5900
drift is unknown, however, the measurements fall within the typical uncertainty of the
IRAD gauge
The most
is the
iv

the
to stress
calibration factor is dependent on the
the rock in which the
gauge is installed. The high variability of the rock modulus (vitreous quartzite to
siderite-argillite) means that a wide range of calibration factors should theoretically be
used for reduction of the gauge readings based on core obtained from the hole. Since the
same gauge factor is used for all gauges, considerable uncertainty in the conversion to
stress from location to location can occur. Other uncertainties involve installation
orientations and hole roundness (contact seating area). Because of these uncertainties,
the match of data to model is, in general, considered to be very good.

3) The model predicts that the outer boundaries of the pillar (about 10' to 15' thick) will
fail in a brittle extensional and shearing mode. This relieves the stresses from these areas
and transfers them further into the confined core of the pillar. Although prediction of
discing and borehole breakouts is highly uncertain, literature laboratory results have
been used to estimate the stress conditions necessary to obtain discing and breakouts in
brittle rocks. These stresses were compared to the stress predicted in the pillar along the
west and east observation holes. This compadson shows that the stresses, with the
exception of the zone around the 5900 drift, are sufficient to produce discing and
borehole breakouts, particularly in the weaker siderite zones. The observation holes
show extensive discing whose intensity appears to vary by rock type, but discing occurs
throughout most of the holes away from the 5900 drift. Breakouts occur in both holes,
and are strongest in the west borehole,.although both holes are. open and passable to the
camera The bottom l O' of the west borehole is rubblized and core lost, which
corresponds to the depth of extensive failure predicted by the modeling. The bottom 10'
of the east borehole, conversely, shows little non-failed core in what appears to be strong
silicic material. The east hole actually is drilled in the stronger rocks between the 30 and
40 veins, and this could account for the better condition of the core. The studies indicate
that breakout occurrence is predicted to be marginal in the strong quartizites.
4) The model indicates that the yielded region around the 5900 drift is relatively small;
about J drift radius in the back and sidewalls of the drift. The model indicates that the
drift should be stable under the given stress conditions, largely because it is driven
parallel to the major principal stress that flo,vs vein-perpendicular.
5) The rock strength prope1iies chosen for the stronger silicic rocks result in approximately
the correct yielding zone of brittle fracturing in the back and floor observed in the
overhand and underhand stopes (about 3 to 5' of back fracturing).
6) The model indicates a closure of the orebody (hangingwall to footwall) at the 5900 drift
of about 1.5" which is similar to that measured by the tape extensometer. This is not a
very accurate calibration measure, but at least the modeling appears to have used,
roughly, the con·ect applied N-S stress and Young's modulus of the material.

of Overall
The mode[ calibration is considered to be reasonable in comparison to observations
the
uncertainties in the rock prope1iies (lack of lab data) and measurements. The important question at
this point is: what is the stability state of the pillar, and how might it be expected to respond in the
future? The model clearly indicates that the core of the pillar is still in an unfailed, elastic state with
the yielded regions Jimited to about JO to 15' of the outer limits of the pillar and the area around the
5900 drift. The rate of stress change observed in the stressmeters is reproduced by the model and is
what should be expected-the most rapid increase in stress occurs during the final stages of
separation of the pillar from the surrounding 30 vein. Although modeling of the continued mining of
the 30 vein was not performed, it is expected that stress change in the pillar should stabilize. It is
expected that a pillar of this dimension should have an elastic core. As discussed in the document,
the pillar has a width:height ratio of around 8 to 10: 1. Experience at other sites and research studies
have shown that pillars with w:h ratios in brittle rocks become elastic for w:h ratios greater than
about 3. This is because the edges of the pillars will spall and fracture parallel to the free surface
(like discing) and undergo large dilation (i.e., the fractures will attempt to open in extension). Since,
for squat pillars, this rock cannot displace, it tends to confine the interior of the pillar, allowing large
stresses to build without yielding since the rock strength increases dramatically with confining
pressure. These pillars can sti!I produce small seismic events in the highiy-stressed regions around
the periphery, but are unlikely to crush out completely. Time-dependent yielding in this periphery
area can still lead to small seismic events as the pillar slowly adjusts to the stress redistribution.
Larger seismic events associated with this type of pillar (sometimes experienced in South Afi:ican
gold mines in shaft protection and strike or dip-stabilizing pillars) are most often attributed to
foundation shear failure-i.e., "punching" of the pillar into the softer foundation rocks with
associated shear fractures forming in the hangingwall or footwal! rocks along the edges of the
pillars. Since the wall rock at the Gold Hunter is argillite, it may continue to deform along this
boundary. It would seem that the most likely cause of seismicity in the wall rock would be
unfavorably-oriented fault structures affected by the stress redistribution rather than events
specifically in the pillar itself. Potential for these types ofevents can be examined during the next
phase of analysis of the mining of the pillar above the 5900 level.
It is recommended that monitoring of the stressmeters be continued as they provide a good
indication of any time-dependent, or unusual changes in stress applied to the pillar. It is expected,
however, that these stresses should continue to stabilize as the mining front moves away from the
immediate pillar area. Small scale seismicity can still be expected in the periphery of the pillar and
in the immediate footwall and hangingwall at the pillar boundary as it continues to attempt to
"punch" into the walls. For this reason, the 5900 drift could be subjected to repeated vibration. The
primary function of the ground support would seem to be retainment of the loosened 5' or so of
failed rock in the back of the drift. Grouted bolts and mesh would appear to be adequate for this
purpose, but continued re-evaluation of the drifi: condition and support adequacy should be made.
Use of closure measurements in the drift and possibly one or more ve1tically-oriented extensometers
in the drift back would help to identify whether loosened zone is
and thus
length of the insta!led support is adequate.
vi

vs

This

reviews

of the 3DEC numerical

and borehole and drift stability observations in

5900 drift at the

mine in

Mullan, Idaho. The 5900 drift crosses from the Silver Shaft through the 30 and 40 veins to the
footwall ramp development and is required to be stable for access to the stopes from the Silver
Shaft A 50-60' radius circular drift protection pillar was left in place through the 30 vein with
the 5900 drift at its center. The pillar was created by adjusting the ends of adjacent cut and fill
stopes such that a circular shape was created. After driving of the 5900 drift, IRAD stressmeters
were installed in short boreholes drilled vertically up and horizontally into each wall of the drift
at the orebody intersection. These stressmeters are oriented to monitor stress change resulting

from the pillar creation in the vein-perpendicular (roughly N-S) direction. In addition to the
stress data, two horizontal observation diamond drill holes were dri lied in the sidewalls of the
drift down the axis of the vein after the pillar was completed. The core was examined to record
initial pillar condition and have been scoped with a digital borescope a number of times to record

damage accmmilatfon.
A previous study of the stressmeter data and pillar failure observations was conducted by

Pikalnis (2009). This study utilized an elastic numerical model (MAP3D) to perform a prediction
of stress change in the pillar as a function of estimated orientation and_ magnitude of the in situ
stress components. The conclusion of this study 'i-Vas that an E-W major horizontal stress
component with a value of 15 times the vertical (gravitational) stress provided the best fit to the

stressmeter data. Empirical damage criteria, based on the ratio of either the maximum shear
stress (Gt - v 3) or the maximum induced stress (cr1) to the uniaxial compressive strength (ac),
were used to compare to observations of borehole discing, reportedly showing good correlation
to the discing. However, to achieve this correlation, stresses obtained from two different major

stress orientations (E-W and Nl SW) ,vere used to explain differences in observations between
the east and west observation holes.

In this study, the 3DECmodel is used to
the orebody

the

and pi!

rock mass behave as yielding materials. The induced

creation assuming
stresses and damage

that the

to stressmeter data and borehole
reasonably well to the data and observations,

that the major

stress is at an azimuth of roughly N40W. The conclusion from the analyses indicates that the
pil1ar is yielded around its perioherv. but that the interior of the oillar remains at an unvielded.

-

-
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elastic state. It is felt that the pillar stresses will not increase dramatically from the current state.
It is still possible to have relatively low-level seismicity occuning around the periphery of the
pillar where the stresses are high, but the potentially-larger events would be expected to occur
due to pillar foundation failure or slip on faults in the wall rocks around the pillar periphery.
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used here is based on

The numerical
This program is

to

3DEC program

three-dimensional

Itasca

geometries and uses a

"discontinuum" method. This means that the program is capable ofrepresenting the failure of the
rock mass (i.e., the general rock mass consists of intact rock and in situ jointing) as well as
movement along major fracture or fault surfaces. To represent rock mass mechanical response, it
is typically subdivided into blocks separated by the major fault traces. The blocks, which consist
of intact rock blocks separated by fracture or bedding surfaces, are typically represented by a
rock mass failure criterion (that takes into account the weakening effects of the general rock
fracturing). Specific, important faults may be represented explicitly as breaks in the model that
separate rock mass blocks. In this project, the rock mass is represented without specific fault
surfaces, and as a rock mass only. The orebody and argil!itic wall rock are represented as distinct
units with different properties and mechanical behavior The rock mass is subdivided into a large
number of tetrahedral finite-difference elements in which the stress state and deforn1ation are
determined.
The 5900 pillar and surrounding 30 and 40 vein stoping are represented in the 3DEC
modeL DXF files of the 30 and 40 veins and the access and stope development were supplied by
Lucky Friday staff, and these were used to form the numerical model. The 30 vein stopes were
subdivided as per the DXF file and exh·acted stope-by-stope in the actual sequence that occurred
in the mine. The stopes that formed the basic circular shape of the pillar were mined in a series of
23 steps (termed Phase I as was used by Pikalnis, 2009), followed by extraction of the remaining
ore above and below the pillar in 2 steps, tenned Phase U and

m. Figures

l through 3 show large

scale and close-up views of the 5900 pillar from the hangingwall. Here, the actual DXF slope
outlines are shown in transparent mode with the 3DEC model representation given behind. The
infrastructure development is also given showing the correspondence of the model to the actual
geometry.
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Figure l

Outer boundary of the model showing 3DEC block structure. The model is about
3300' on a side, with the y ax:is pointing north. The orientation of the 01·ebody
(dip 90°, dip direction 17°) can be seen in th e blocks. The 30 vein is located deep
inside this model.
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Large scale view of the 30 vein geometry superimposed on the 3DEC model
(note, the non-pillar areas of tbe 30 and 40 veins a1·e removed from the 3DEC
model for visual clarity).
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stopes as seen to form the 5900 pillar.
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3.1

TO REPRESENT THE MAJOR ROCK UNITS

The Gold Hunter rock mass is represented in this calibration .model as

material types:

the orebody and the footvvall and hangingwall argillites. For the level of this analysis, it is felt
that the orcbody and host rock are not required to be further subdivided into various rock types
since we don't have detailed mapping ofthe variability. However, a sensitivity study is made to
look at variability in the ore strength and separate models are run assuming a silicic quartizite

and siderite ore.

3.2

OREBODY REPRESENTATION
The orebody, which is composed of vein material and silicified rocks, siderites and

quartzites, is represented as a material that is elastic until its peak
by yielding and reduction in strength to residual strength

is reached, followed

failure. This type of model is

termed a "strain-softening" or "strain-degradation" model in that the strength is degraded with
increasing shearing strain after peak strength. The strength of the ore is defined using a standard
method using the Hoek-Bmwn failure criteria (Figure 4).
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Figure 4 The Hoek-Brown failure envelope is a parabolic function describing the rock
mass failure condition in ternts of the major principal stress. Stress states below
the criteria indicate an elastic rock mass, while stress states on the criteria
. indicate a failed state. Stress states above the cdteria are riot possible dhe to
yielding and stress redistribution.
A Hoek-Brown strength critetion defines the peak strength of the rock mass in terms of
the principal stresses (cr,, the major, or driving, principal stress; and cr 3, the minor or confining
principal stress). During excavation, the stresses in the 5900 pillar will evolve from the in situ
stress, typically increasing in the center, confined portion of the pillar as a result of stress relief
and concentration from the mining. If the stress state reaches the failure condition, yield in that
region will occur, and the stresses will decrease based on how much strain occurs in the rock

mass. Figure 4 illustrates conceptually, "stress paths'' for rock at the failing edge of the pillar and
in the confined, elastic core of the pillar. Figure 5 shows a schematic of the assumed stress~strain
behavior of the rock mass which is typical of strong, brittle rocks, such as quartzite. This figure
indicates that after peak strength, the rock will yield and the strength will decay to a residual
level over some amount of shear strain. The "brittleness" (or, violence) of the failure response is
governed by hmv quickly

strength decays from peak to residual strength. If this strength

very stnal l levels

the response

over

lTI
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response is more "ductile" in nature and is le ss violent and typi ca lly is accompanied by large
deformation. In the 3DEC ana lyses, it is assumed that t he ore resµonds as a relatively brittle
material which c ould respond in a seismic nature. This is an assumption based on experien ce in
the s il icic, Coe ur d' Al e ne roc k types.
S tro~1

· PEokSt r~ ngth

R,;;;idu~I .Strength

-

~

c'

- - -Figure ~

The

S1rii. i11

6reb-od5,- rock m-ass is- i·epresented \vith a peak and r esidual strength, termed

a "strain softening" model. The brittleness (i.e., the violence of the failure
response) is controlled by the slope of the failure response going from peak to
residual strength. In this report, it is assumed that the response is relatively
bt·ittle to reflect the brittle fracturing response observed in the orebody.
3.3

ARGILLITE W ALLROCK REPRESENTATION
The argillite, on the other hand, is assumed to behave in a ductile fashion in which the

response is dominated by the weak cleavage planes which are assumed to strike sub-parallel to
the orebody. A material model, termed tbe ubiquitous joint model, is used in 3DEC to represent a
thinly-bedded rock mass like the argi[lite. This material model assumes that the rock mass has a
large number of bedding planes or joints oriented parallel to the ore body, and that these joints are

weak (i .e., no cohesive strength-in other words, they can be pulled apart easily) and that the
friction angle along them is low , as a result of the typical s lickensides and chloritic/talcy
minerals on the ir surfaces. This model al lows shear to occur in the direction of the cleavage
pl a nes, and large defo rmation (buckling) into the excavat ions.
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is used to

As stated above, the Hoek-Bmwn

the stress level at

failure for the orebody. The Hoek-Brown criterion is a parabolic relationship between the major
and minor stress at failure (Figure 4). Rock mass properties are estimated by the following
approach:

l) The Hoek-Brown failure criteria for intact (laboratory-scale) rock specimens is
defined by curve-fitting the criteria to uniaxial (UCS) and triaxial compression data.
The HB failure criteria is expressed as follows:

Two parameters describe the failure envelope for intact samples of rock: the UCS
(crci) and m; which defines the amount of curvature of the envelope. In our case, we
have little actual laboratory data to describe the various rock types. Currently, a few
tests of the UCS (provided by NIOSHf indicate a significant variability in orebody
strength based on content of siderite, quartzite and argil!ite. The UCS of the siderite
samples averages around 50 MPa (about 7000 psi) whereas the vitreous quartzite is
around l 7,000 psi or 115 MPa. To fit the HB envelope to the intact rock sample data,
the curvature parameter, mi> shown in the above equation is required. 1n the absence
of triaxial data on these rock types, from which m 1 is typically derived, approximate
literature values for quatizite are used. Here, a value of mi of 20 is assumed. A
laboratory program consisting ofuniaxial and triaxial testing in the primary rock units
at the Gold Hunter will be recommended in a separate letter report. It should be
noted that the UCS testing conducted for Gold Hunter falls at the !o,ver end of the
range for ore types in the Lucky Friday mine as reported by Whyatt et al. ( 1996).
They

the following average values of mechanical properties for the Lucky

Friday mine (Table l):

to

••

rl,,'fJrTASCA"

TABLE l
Values of Rock Mass Strength and Modulus for
(Whyatt et al., 1996)

Mine

luel<y Fi.i,y,
Vitreous quartzite
Vl1toou• qu01ui11
Vrtu,aus quartzite
Soticitic quartzlt•

(FW)-4250 .

>

•

~

•••••••

<

(HWJ·S100. 5300 •..•.••..
(H\V--tuuled f1acture} -42$0 . ,
IFW).,,250
.,

·-·- .... ..

l<S
l&l
151
)1,1

9.6
11.1

0.2?

NO

5$,:Z

e.o

NO
NO

0.15
0.08

SJ.I

7.7

0.22

NO

S,8,300

17~

2.500

662

23.400
21,900
<S,500

NO
ND

NO

76.5

ND

17.2

2,500

Note: Table I was reproduced directly from Whyatt et aL (1996). There appears to be a typo in the MPa-psi
conversion for the first enu-y of compressive stl'ength. TI1ese values arc all taken from the Lucky Friday
Mine.

As seen in this table, the rock UCS values are significantly higher than estimated by
Pikalnis based on limited testing (10 UCS tests) of Gold Hunter rocks. Thus, it is
likely that the UCS for quartizite in the Gold Hunter could have a significantly larger
range (and perhaps higher strength) than assumed in the Pikalnis report.
Observations in a site visit to the Gold Hunter certainly indicated beds of quartzite
near the orebody whose UCS likely exceeded the 16,000 psi (l 15 MPa) assumptions
made here.
2) Obviously, the strength response for small, intact rock samples does not represent the
actual strength of the in situ rock mass. The Hoek-Brown approach provides for a
methodology for adjusting the failure envelope of the intact rock to in situ values
based on the "quality" of the rock mass. This quality is typically expressed in terms of
the GSI (Geologic Strength Index - approximately equal to the RMR) of the rock
mass, which is based on the degree of fracturing and the coatings on fractures. Figure
6 shows a chart illustrating the method of determining GSf. Pikalnis (2009)
performed an analysis of the GSI for the ore, which was confirmed during my visit to
the mine in Feb. 2010. The orebody is typically a good quality material with clean
and rough natural fractures, i·esuiting in a GSI estimate of around 55 to 60. The
resulting estimate of the Hoek-Bro\vn failure criteria for the ore body base condition is
given in Figure 4.
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IN
The in situ stress state in the
(1

et al.

d'Alene district has been reported

as shown in Table 2. This correlation is based on stress measurements at the

5300 levels of the Lucky
indicate a

cr1

as well as the 7300 level

and

the Star mine. The measurements

direction of about N40W and a ratio of cr 1/av of approximately 1.5. The maximum

stress direction is reinforced by numerous observations of breakouts in boreholes, shafts and
raises as summarized in Figure 7. Pikalnis (2009) estimated a maximum stress direction of E-W
based on a best-fit back-analysis of the 5900 pillar IRAD stressmeter readings. To my
knowledge, the available stress measurements and raise breakouts district-wide show a range in
cr 1 direction of approximately N20W to N40W (Whyatt, 2001). The borehole breakouts typical
of the Lucky Friday (and other mines in the Coeur d'Alene district) need to be compared to
breakouts observed in the Gold Hunter side of the mine. This was not done for this calibration
report. In commenting on this report, Gold Hunter staff report that breakouts in the Gold Hunter
are often bedding-related rather than necessarily being stress-related. This makes sense since the
\.vea1(bedding orienfatioh may dominate the failure 111echanisf1.i of a raisebore and thus "cloud"
the stress-related spalling mechanism that is often seen in hard and brittle rocks.

It was felt,

therefore, that observation of breakouts in the Lucky Friday and other Coeur d'Alene mines,
unaffected by the weak bedding, provide a better true picture of the stress orientation.

It is

important to note that the major stress direction in the district is relatively consistent, and a
function of the movement on the Osburn Fault. It is difficult to imagine that the stress direction
can have a major change in direction in the Wallace Formation due, presumably to bedding
anisotropy.
The in situ stress state applied to the

model was varied from Nl5W to N40W, with

the vertical stress component based on 1.2 psi/ft depth and a ratio of cr 1/crv of l .5.

TABLE
Mine In Situ Stress Estimate
(Why:att et at, 1995)

<1n.s·~~·-···

-~~~~-·

Q S'V •• - •• - • • • • - - • ~.

o • .............

1,,.,,., ..
T ns;/v
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~ • • · ·

. • . .
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.......... .
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Figure 7
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W
W
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Breakout observations at the Lucky Friday and Star mines (Whyatt et aL, 1995)
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A

of model analyses were run for comparison to stressmeter measurements,

discing, and borehole breakout observations. These are summarized below:
I) In situ stress variation

a)

Base case model assumes

0 1 direction

b) Alternative stress model assumes

(Ji

ofN40W and

0i/0v

of 1.5.

direction ofN1 SW and cr1lov of 1.5.

2) Strength variation

a) Assumes a base case stress condition.
b) Base case assumes a UCS strength for ore body of 115 MP a (16,900 psi) and
GSJ (or RMR) of 60. This is the "fair to good quality silicified orebody''
assumption.
c) Alternative case assumes a UCS strength of the orebody of l l 5 MPa, but a GSf
of 50, which is a "poor to fair quality silicified orebody" assumption.

d) Alternative case assumes a siderite orebody with UCS of 50 MPa (7350 psi) and
-GSf of 50, representing a poor-fair quality siderite.
The initial in situ stress variations were run for comparison to the stressmeters, followed

by variation of the strength for the N40W base case to examine the impact of strength variability
of the ore on pillar failure extent and mechanisms.
4.1

STRESS V ARIA TIO N
A series of plots showing the evolving maximum principal stress (vein-perpendicular)

and the regions of failed rock are contoured through the center of the 5900 pillar are given in

As seen in these plots,

8-11 for the base case stress state and

the immediate edges of the pillar as well as the back (and floor) of stopes yield in shear and
extension as the stopes are mined. This creates a thin "rind" of failed material initially about five
feet thick and pushes the stress concentration into the confined regions of the rock mass. This
failure depth corresponds reasonably well with the slabbing observed in the face of overhand
stopes which was induced by fracturing in the back of the previous stope. This slabbing is due to
both

and

and is a result of the stress concentration from the

from

stresses that
16

model

some

the
may

of the

assumed (l 5

a

As the mining progresses, the depth of failure within the pillar increases until it reaches a
thickness about 15 to 20' This is essentially the depth of spalling or failure that rn ight be
expected at the completion of Phase HI. Jnspection of the stress state shows that the stresses are
more-or-less symmetric on either side of the 5900 drift-in other words, there is not large
variation in induced stresses on the east or west side of the pillar, and no large influence of the 40
vein can be seen.
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Figure 8 Base case stress state and failed regions at mining step 14 (Nov/2006) Stresses
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pillar edges and immediate back of the 5900 drift are yielding (blue=nonfailecl,
elastic). Note the stope backs and tloo1· yield to a depth of approx. 5' with
these strength properties assumptions .
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have migrated inward from the failed pillar edges with destressing in the local
back of the 5900 drift. Approximately same yielding conditions as previous; note
inner core of pillar is elastic.

19
Ronnel E. Barrette, etal vs Helca Mining Co., etal

Docket No. 43639

574 of 1172

575 of 1172

Denver, Inc.

JDEC4. I O
¢t!DJ~t--.<o-. w.

~l~~Ol.i
1/1"..f.'0\1}~5&nA...i

(·:. .. ·.. ··. ~ _::;::1?·~~-· ·:-:· ~- " . ··. - ...·. ··:. ·····/\~
.. . . .
. .. . - .......... . - . -·· _. . ... ... .
.·
'

.

·:

.__

~

.

''•

_:.._-..

Stress Concentration Region

tt1~-1i i~c1m,~~ 1;«141, !11:..
MW:M~)ti1. ~foinanto IJS,\

3DEC4.10
8.W:WU~" "'"""·""·

St tp'3COJ

l/2U:,(U09:~J7 >M
Blorl<.
Cilby- Shh~

I :~:::.,nilon-p

..... ,

.,httt-nshur- p_ttt>liol'/1'
~ a shur,r
\t!\!,Q'IH'> lhOi.p lt n,io11-,

sh:111-n
u:shu,-p
11.slr~u-p u.ltf'h-«tP

I

lt'1Plt)l.f'\U:if.U1,p

1n llUHl v.1h,t1,p IJ:ll'l:,,.r.,p
v-1,11:ron-n.s:tonu~u:l1r,.:1al\-;>
1t.th•11of'I

.-t,nriofl..n•:s hu 1,p

Jl'l;CJ

o:cr

~'*~ltm_Asbuihs_Solill,.dt:
J<• 21~ 25110 Eit~ .U
Y::. .!:.,,S(9A 19 333.w.G

z,,,_,B37./6to•t::00.7s

t:,•.,=~~~~~;:-~;~tblt)

lb;.tJ CQrlUidrq Glee.,: , !tac.
t.rMus,otis, MIMHOlt~

Figure 10 Base case stress state and failed regions at mining step 24 (March/2008, end Phase
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the pillar reached about 10 to 15', depending on location. The greatest stress
concentration is formed in a sharp band in from the yielded rim due to the
confined nature of the pillar core.
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Figure 11 Base case stress state and failed regions at mining step 25 (current, end Phase III).
Stresses are in Pa {le6 Pa == 147 psi). The depth of failure in from the edges of the
pillar stabilized at about 10 to 15', depending on location. The greatest stress
concentration is formed in a sharp band in from the yielded rim due to the
confined nature of the pillar core.
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case

are

and

to the stressmeter measurements in

stress

that over and

the

(i.e.,

in situ stress) is plotted as a function

step). As seen, the stress is slightly higher (about 1500 to 2000

or about 10%) on the

west side of the pillar than on the east side. The range in stress for all three stressmeter locations
for the two stress cases are given by the shaded boxes. The base case (N40W) indicates induced
stresses at the end of Phase III mining ranging from about 12 to 16,000 psi and about 9

l l ,000

psi for the N 15 W case. The measured stresses fall in this same range, with the west gauges
falling within the range of the N40W case we! l and the east gauges falling within the NL SW case
reasonably well. In general, it is felt that this correspondence is actually very good, given the
typical sensitivity ofIRAD stressmeter calibration and results to factors such as:
•

Gauge factor the calibration factor of the gauges is sensitive to the modulus of the
rock mass. The high variability of the rock along the GH boreholes, from siderite to
vitreous quartzite results in a high variability of modulus. Depending on exactly
where the gauge is installed, the calibration factors could vary significantly. For
accurate stres_s sha_nge measurement, the gauges are typically calibrated for the
particular rock type by installing the
in a
core of the
and
compressing in the laboratory.

•

Gauge contact area with tbe borehole wall - the calibration and response of the
gauges is highly sensitive to the match of gauge seating platens to the hole wan and
the resulting contact area.

•

Orientation - the stress monitored by the gauge is sensitive to axis orientation. As
demonstrated by Pikalnis, the stress monitored by the stress meter will vary
significantly with even a few degrees ofrotation of the axis of the seating platen.

For these reasons, the calibration (which was done without attempting to manipulate the

estimated in situ stress magnitude) is considered to be very good and lends confidence to the
interpretation that a N40W stress provides a reasonable and conservative maximum stress
orientation and that the 1.5 maximum:minimum stress ratio is also reasonable. It does not make
sense to attempt to make any more detailed assessment of these measurements at this time.
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Figure 12 Prediction of induced stress change at East} West1 and Top stressmeter locations
for two cases of the direction of cr 1 : N40W and N15W. The approximate range of
the predictions is given by the shaded boxes.

4.2

COMPARISON OF MODEL TO OBSERVATIONS OF HOLE BREAKOUT AND
DISCING

4.2.1

Prediction ofFailed Regions
The depth of failure given by the base case model can be summarized as follows:
1) The failure depth in the pillar reaches a maximum of around 10 to 15' around the
outer rim of the pillar and stabilizes after the "Phase I!" extraction when the pillar is
fully created by mining (Figure 10). Failure is by extension along the outer edge, and
shear in the interior confined zone at the rim. Failure in this model would typically
mean formation of new fractures and shear on existing fractures. Drilling into this
zone would potentially mean encountering poor core recovery and core loss.
zones
The interior of the pUlar

and below the 5900 drift to a
elastic and is
23
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Further

this failed zone can be determined

in the pillar.

exam

the level of induced

13 shows the base case maximum principal strain induced in the pillar,

co ntoured to a level of 0.05%, which is an approximate level for extensional cracking of concrete

or rock. As seen, this zone of expected new fracturing is approximately the same depth as
indicated by the yielded zone. Again , the meaning of this zone is that formation of newlydeveloped fracturing or movement on existing fractures can be expected.
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Figure 13 Base case strain Jevels induced in the pillar. The red region has strain levels
exceeding 0.5%, which is the approximate level of extensional strain at which
concrete and underground cave mine cracking are observed. This zone roughly
follows the yield zone above and is the region where new fractures might be
expected.

4.2.1.1

Discing and Bre(l/cout
In addition to the damage level observed in the stope backs and floors, damage within the

pillar was observed from drilling of the east and west GH holes (Figure 14 and 15).
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Figure 14 GH West borehole core. Note moderate to strong discing over entire length of
the hole, with rubbiized and iost core beiow about 50' length.
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Figure 15 GH East borehole core. Note moderate to strong discing over entire length of the
hole, with the exception of the final 10' of hole which is in a mostly-undamaged
condition.

A summary of the hole observations is as follows:
•

Both holes show moderate to strong discing behavior over much of their length,
although the east hole shows no discing for the bottom 1O' or so of the hole.
However, the end of the ho le is in the reg ion between the 30 and 40 veins , which
appears to be more silicified and stronger (Figure 16).
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Figure 16 Plan view of the 5900 pillar and drift showing west and east observation holes.
Note that the east observation hole is not centered in the pillar and passes out
through the silicified zone between the 30 and 40 veins.

•

The bottom 5 to JO' of the west hole is strongly disced and rubblized.

•

Both holes remain open and passable to the video camera probe. Video shows that the
west hole has breakouts at the top and bottom of the hole for the final half of the hole.
The east hole has some breakouts in the hofe and joint offset from about 30 to 40'
depth, but the remainder of the hole is circular and in good condition.

The conclusion from these above points is that although the west hole shows greater
damage in terms of discing and breakouts, both holes (with the exception of the end of the west
hole) are open with only local evidence of intense hole failure or squeezing.
A number of researchers have studied the stress state and rock

that

in

discing of core. The most interesting work are laboratory simulations in which diamond drilling
was perfotmed into a rock sample subjected to applied biaxial stresses (e.g., Lee and Haitnson,
1993). These studies have resulted in estimates of the stress conditions that lead to discing and
borehole breakout for numerous rock
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of core stubs occurs when tbe stress

the

results

extensional failure of the core stub. The thickness of the discs is indicative of the intensity of

the stresses-the thinner the disc, the greater the principal stress difference. Figure 17 provides a
plot of the relationship between the principal stresses that result in discing for granite. To
understand the stress state in the stub, computer models were used to simulate the drilling
process and estimate the stresses corresponding to tensile failure of the core stub. The plot shown
in Figure 17 is an approximate relationship for granite and is based on a low tensile strength and
brittle behavior. The quartzites and siderites at the Gold Hunter will undoubtedly be different,
but this plot provides some basis for addressing the question of whether discing is expected in
the pillar, given the stresses, or is there some other mechanism occurring?
::)
•
•

No discinr,
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Figure 17 Relationship of the principal stresses for which core discing is likely to occur (solid
symbols). The stress crz is pa1·aI1el to the borehole while the other components are
perpendicu1ar to the hole. The component Gm is the average of all three
components. The black circles are derived from laboratory testing.
The stresses for an E-W line through the center of the 30 vein (we did not account for the
off-center East hole alignment), through the 5900 drift and to the E and W extremities of the
pillar ,vere detem1ined and plotted in the form of the discing predictions (Figure 17) in Figure
18. As seen in this plot, the stress conditions in the entire pillar are either in a possible discing
condition or borderline condition (with the exception of the area immediately adjacent to the
5900 drift). [t is therefore assumed that the character of the observed discing, which, \'\ 1th the
1
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rock

stress which

fall

discing limit. The bottom line is that the stress conditions in the pillar appear to be conducive to
related to extensive failure of the pillar, but

discing over most of its width and are not
due to strength variability.

4.2.J.3

B0rel1ole Breakout
Spalling of the boreholes, particularly the 'vvest borehole, has been observed in the digital

borehole video. The spalling has occurred at the top and bottom of the hole, which is consistent
with the maximum stress being horizontal and oriented in a vein-perpendicular direction. The
relationship of spalling in boreholes to stress magnitude and rock strength is not certain, and
some researchers have concluded that there is no unique relationship between stress and
breakout. However, Lee and Haimson (l 993) performed laboratory compression testing of large
rock samples of granite and limestone with boreholes and defined a range of conditions under
which breakout occuned. Figure 19 illustrates the relationship of the major and minor stresses in

axis under

to the

was

and

limestone. The stress state predicted for the 5900 pillar base case along a horizontal line across
the 5900 pillar in the 30 vein was determined. This line is at the center of the pillar elevation,
through the 5900 drift. The normalized stresses (normalized by the UCS of both quartzite and
siderite) are plotted (Figure 20) for positions along this line and given in the form of Figure 19.
The range of breakout criteria derived from the laboratory for granite and limestone are shown

on Figure 20. This plot indicates the following:
1) The pillar stress state (N-S and vertical) perpendicular to the borehole is sufficient to
result in spalling in quartizite in regions in the outer approximately Yi of the pillar.
2) The pillar stress state is sufficient to result in spalling in virtually all of the pillar
where siderite is present.
This simple correlation indicates that borehole breakouts can occur in highly silicic rocks,
but only in the outer approximately Vz of the pillar, whereas breakouts are possible anywhere in
the piilar in siderite. This generally agrees with observations where spailing occurs in the
rocks

west
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Figure 18 Stress conditions from base case model for a line from the west to east pillar
boundaries plotted as given in Figure 16. Essentially all of the stress conditions
in the pillar are conducive to potential discing.

0.5

0.0
0.0

0.2

o.e

0.4

OJI

LO

Figure 19 Relationship between the maximum and minimum stresses perpendicular to a
hole required for breakout. Three rock units: granite and two limestones are
shown. The stress component on each ax.is is normalized by the compressive
strength of the rock.
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Figure 20 Limits of approximate breakout regions from Figure 18 plotted for stresses
along an E-W line through 30 vein, 5900 pillar. The line goes through the middle
of the vein and the 5900 drift. The sti·ess states indicate
potential for
breakout in both quartzite and side1·ite, ho-wever, the potential for breakout in
the weaker siderite zones is much incl·eased.
4.2.1.4

Closure of Orebody Across 5900 Drift

· The model was used to estimate the c!osme across the pillar at the 5900 drift. Figure 21
shows the displacement of the hangingwall side of the pillar (in cm). The total closure
(hangingwall + footwall displacement) at the location of the 5900 drift is about J .5". This can be
compared to tape extensometer measurements made regularly and reported by T. Williams. The
closure reported after completion of the Phase IIl mining is about 1.3", or roughly the same as
predicted by the model. The deformation equates to a strain of about l.3"/120" (10' vein width),
or about I%. The exact measurement and comparison is not particularly relevant-the important
point is that the closures of the orebody are not large, and not sufficient to indicate complete
crushing of the pillar.
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Figm;e 21 N-S displacement contours (in

cm) of the hangingwall of the pillar.
Displacements are approximately 1 to 2 cm (0. 75"), or a total closure of 2 to 4 cm
(1.5") at the 5900 drift location. Measurements using a tape extensometer
indicate approximately 1.3" (reported by T. Williams).

4.3

DISCUSSION

The comparison of the model results to observation and measurement is summarized
below:
•

5900 Pillar Stresses - the modeled stresses co mpare quite well with the !RAD
stressmeter readings. The stress predictions for the base case (N40W 0 1 orientation)
and ratio of cri/Gv = 1.5, and for the alternative case of (N l SW c, 1 orientation) bound
the West and East stressmeter response, This comparison is felt to be very good,
considering the various inaccuracies inherent in the IRAD stressmeter gauge
measurement. The N40W orientation was also compared to borehole breakouts at the
Lucky Friday and other mines in the district. As noted earlier, the breakout directions
in the Gold Hunter may vary due to dominance of the bedding anisotropy in causing
failure of raisebore sidewalls, Since the Lucky Friday breakouts are in brittle rock,
they should show the true maj or principal stress o ri entation, which agrees reasonably
well v--' ith mode l-s tres smete r co mpar iso ns. Based on the agreeme nt of th e N40W
32
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Da1nage Estin1ates

=

The base case

that a thin

(roughly 10 to 15' thick) zone of failure develops around the outer periphery of the
pillar as a result of the mining. A smaller (about 5' +/-) yield zone develops around
the 5900 drift. This depth of failure correlates reasonably well 'With the rubblized and
unrecoverable core observed in the west observation borehole that was drilled in the
30 vein. The East borehole passes outside the vein and thus correlation of failure is
not certain. The modeling indicates that the interior of the pillar remains elastic and is
not in a failed state. The model indicates that the 5900 drift should be stable for the
given stress state, primarily since it is driven in the direction parallel to the maximum
stress direction.

•

Core Discing and Borelwle Breakouts - Extensive core discing and breakouts
(particularly in the west borehole) were observed in the observation boreholes.
Comparison of stress state to discing or breakouts is an inexact science.

we

have used laboratory-based testing correlations of discing and breakouts to stresses to
attempt to relate the modeled pillar stresses to observations. H was found that:

•

o

The predicted pillar stresses indicate that the magnitudes are sufficient to
create discing throughout most of the pillar, particularly in the siderite-rich
rocks. ln other words, the presence of discing at the outer regions of the pillar
in any rock type, but particularly in the siderite, is not unusual or surprising.
The fact that discing may occur is a natural result of the in situ stresses, but
does not indicate that the central portions of the pillar have failed-it is
simply highly-stressed.

o

The pillar stresses are also sufficient to cause borehole breakouts in the outer
half of the pillar, particularly in the siderite-rich areas of the orebody. The
extensive breakouts in the west half of the pillar may be indicative of the
lower strength rocks encountered in the west side of the pillar.

Closure - the closure of the 30 vein at the 5900 drift correlates reasonably well with
the model predictions.
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The

conclusion of the

is that the stress state predicted correlates

well with the IRAD stressmeter

and that damage observed is as expected

from the stress state. More importantly, the modeling indicates that the 5900 pillar is not
currently in a failed state. Only the outer l O' to 15 1 of the pillar has yielded, while the interior is
still in an elastic state. A question to be asked is whether or not this is unusual or expected, given
the potentially-high induced stresses in the piilar. The answer is no-the 5900 pillar has a
width:height ratio of approximately 8:1 to 10:l (100 ft diameter by 10' +/- width). Many
empirical studies have been perfo1med in which the strength of pillars in room and pillar mines
have been observed (Figure 22). Virtually all of the pillars in which failure has been observed

occur for pillar width to height ratios of less than 2. This makes sense since no pillars are
observed to fail for squat shapes characterized by w:h > -2.5. For example, strike or dipstabilizing pillars in South African gold mines with w:h ratios as high as 40 have been left in
place. It is \-Veil known that these pillars remain elastic, although the foundations of these pillars
may fail ln sheai·. Kaiser ar:id

l<:iiil (2008) have *ow.n tbat pillars in relatively strong and

brittle

rocks with w:h ratios greater than about 2 to 2.5 have a confined inner core (Figure 22). The
exterior rims of these pillars may fail by spalling, but the dilation and bulking of this exterior rim
rapidly confines the inner core with the result that it remains elastic. Figure 23 shows a
schematic of the mechanism of pi liar foundation failure due to punching and shear failure at the
edges of the pillar where the shear stresses are highest. If poorly-oriented fault structures exist in
these regions of high shear stress, slip and damaging seismic events are possible, even though the
host rock might be somewhat ductile. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine the scenario that the
5900 pillar would actually fail throughout. Thus, the pillar will likely remain stressed at or near
its current level, with the potential for relatively low level seismicity occuning in the highly
stressed areas along the boundary of the failed region along its periphery. This could result in
shaking of the 5900 dritl, but support with dywidag bolts and screen will likely be sufficient to
maintain loosened material. It is more likely that the foundation of the pillar in argillite along its
boundaries will shear and yield, If fault structures are present, these could produce larger events.
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Based on the calibrations prese11ted in this memo, it is felt that sufficient confidence in
the model is avail able to move to the next level, wh ich is simul atio n of future mining of Gold

Hunter.
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Figure 22 Empirical estimates of nornrnlized pillar strength as a function of pilla r width to
height ratio. Empirical estimates underestimate the pillar strength at w:h ratios
greater than about 2 due to a lack of data. Martin and Maybee (2000) show that
pillars in brittle rocks ha1·den and behave elastically for w:h ratios greater than
about 2 (the shaded band) (Kaiser and Kim (2008)).
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Figure 23 Squat pillars with large ·w: h ratios remain elastic in their cores and can punch
into wea ker foundation rocks, resulting in shear failure at the pillar edges. This
failure ca n result in seismicity in the wall rocks. Also, the high shear stress
regions (s hown in red) can cause slip on poorly-oriented faults in the wall rock
that crnss through this area.
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(303) 390-0008
November 8, 2013

nAE-MAIL

Mr. Kyle E. Jackson
Special Investigator
U.S. Department of Labor
Mine Safety & Health Administration
6811 South 204th, Ste. 180
Kent, WA 98032

Re:

Hecla Limited/Lucky Friday Mine
MSHA Special Investigation Case No. WE-MW 12-27
Citation/Order Nos. 8605620, 8559614, 8559615, and 8565565
JK File Nos. 70010/311, 70010/318, and 70010/325

Dear Mr. Jackson:
We submit this position statement on behalf of Hecla Limited - Lucky Friday Mine and
its agents ("Hecla"), with respect to MSHA' s investigation under § 110(c) of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the "Mine Act"), arising from the issuance of the abovereferenced citations and orders. Citation No. 8605620 was issued to Hecla at the conclusion of
MSHA's investigation of a rockburst that occurred at the mine on Nov. 16, 2011. This citation
was issued on Dec. 6, 2011. Citation No. 8565565 and Order Nos. 8559614 and 8559615 were
issued to Hecla following MSHA's investigation into the Dec. 14, 2011, rockburst. The citation
was issued on Dec. 21, 2011, and the orders were issued on May 15, 2012.
You requested interviews with the following Lucky Friday management personnel: John
Jordan, former Vice President/General Manager ("Jordan"); Doug Bayer, Mine Superintendent
("Bayer"); Scott Hogamier, Safety Foreman ("Hogamier"); and John Lund, Mine Foreman
("Lund''). Each of these individuals has declined MSHA' s request for an interview, and this
position statement is submitted on their behalf
With regard to the allegations in the citations and orders, Hecla denies the fact of the
and disagrees with
as
violations as an unwarrantable failure. Hecla

{D0875439.1}

Charleston, WY ,· Clarksburg, WV • Martinsburg.WV • Mo'lantown, 'NV • Wheeling, WV
Denver, CC) • Evansville, IN• Lexington, KY • .a,mon, OH • Pittsburgh, PA • Washington, DC

Mining

to

determine whether an agent of the operator committed a knowing violation of the standards, not
to determine whether a violation occurred or whether such violation was an unwarrantable
to comply. Notwithstanding, the facts discussed below are relevant to prove that there
was no violation of the standards, let alone an unwarrantable failure to comply with the cited
standards. Similarly, the ailegation of working in the face of an order issued under the Mine Act
cannot be sustained. Consequently, there can be no knowing violation on behalf of any agent of
Hecla based on the allegations in the citations and orders.

I.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

A.

November 16, 2011, Rockburst

Heda's Lucky Friday Mine experienced a rockburst on Nov. 16, 2011, resulting from a
fault-slip event associated with closure of the mined-out zone off of the 5900 level. The burst
was measured at 2.8 Richter, and its epicenter was between the 5700 sublevel and the
intersection of the 5700 slot access with the 5700 14 stope. There was extensive damage to the
footwall access ramp system all the way up to the 5550 level, and the 5900 I-Drift pillar
(sometimes referred to as the "5900 Mainline Pillar") also sustained damage. The burst occurred
following night shift blasting. 1 The damage to the 5900 pillar appeared to be the result of the
seismic wave traveling down in the hard, silicified, footwall zone adjacent to the fill and
impacting the stressed back of the 5900 I-Drift pillar.
of this pillar as well
The seismic wave damage to the 5900 I-Drift pillar reduced the
as its height-to-width ratio. This increased the stress in this pillar and made it potentially more
burst prone. The reduction in the size of the pillar, however, did not indicate to the rock
mechanics engineer that the pillar was likely to fail completely. In addition, the rock above the
pillar was intact and not de-stressed, and the load bearing capacity of the pillar was not affected.
The decision was made to install a tunnel iiner through this pillar to provide additional resistance
to possible seismic loading.
Initially, Wilson Blake ("Blake"), a longtime rock mechanics consultant to the Lucky
Friday Mine, believed that the burst was located in the 5900 pillar and that it was a foundation
failure. This conclusion was based upon his initial inspection of the 5900 drift on Nov. 16 and
was noted in Blake's Nov. 25 memo provided to MSHA. However, in mid-December, Blake
toured the eastern footwall ramp development along with Lucky Friday engineers and a
geologist, MSHA personnel, and others. After the opportunity to observe the footwall openings,
it was clear to Blake that the Nov. 16 rockburst was not a pillar burst in the 5900 pillar as he had
initially concluded. Rather, it was a fault-slip event at the ramp, from which the seismic wave
then induced the damage at the 5900 I-Drift pillar.

The vast majority of seismic events at the
Friday Mine are
blasting
with
the blast or within some time window thereafter). See Geotechnical Characteristics of the Lucky Friday Mine,
December 2012, Section4.2.3; Rockburst Control Plan, Lucky Friday Unit, December 2012, Section 3.3.
{D0875439.1}

December 14, 2011, Rockburst
Following the Nov. 16 fault-slip event, MSHA issued a §
order
the
affected areas. The § 103(k) order's prohibition on access to the 5900 main haulage meant that
access to all mining of the Gold Hunter deposit was effectively cut off and travel through the
mine prohibited. This is because the 5900 main haulage was the central travelway to access
production areas of the mine. In order to gain access through the 5900 main haulage, mine
management submitted a number of rehabilitation plans to MSHA, which had to be approved
and corresponding modifications to the§ 103(k) order issued before any action could be taken by
the mine.
The rehabbing of the back and walls of the 5900 main haulage area included the
following initial support: installation of 20' cable bolts, installation of 6', 8', and 12' Dywidag
bolts, installation of 4' and 6' split set bolts, installation of chain link mesh, and spraying the back
and ribs with a minimum of 3" of shotcrete. In addition, a heavy segmented steel culvert, or
tunnel liner, was ordered for placement through the pillar. Once the culvert was installed, then
the rehab would be finished off by backfilling the area with Tekfoam. 2 This ground support was
designed to be capable of containing the effects of a 2.5 magnitude event at approximately seven
meters distance. This proposed rehabilitation plan was accepted by MSHA.
After the main haulage was rehabbed, and while the mine was waiting for the liner to
arrive, MSHA approved the mine's proposed plan to allow travel through the main haulage and
continue mining in other areas, including Stopes 10, 11, and 14. Mining began again on Dec. 6,
2011, and advanced in those stopes between the Dec. 6 night shift and the rockburst on Dec. 14
as follows: 3
•
•
•

Stope 10 - 8' of advance and a 61 slab (this was a single-shift stope at the
time)
Stope 11 - 96' on both east and west sides
Stope 14 - 32' on both east and west sides

The tunnel liner components arrived at the mine on Dec. 12, and the representative from
the tunnel liner manufacturer arrived the next day. Once the manufacturer's representative
determined that all of the parts were on-site, he trained Lucky Friday personnel on the
installation process, and the liner components were moved underground. On Dec. 14 day. shift,
the miners started to install the tunnel liner. All production \Vork in the mine had ceased at the
end of the prior shift. At approximately 7:40 p.m. that evening, a rockburst occurred in the 5900
Tekfoam is a pumped, porous cement grout that will allow deformation of the tunnel to preserve the
integrity of the steel culvert.
3
The stopes that were mined during this time period are identified on the map attached as Exhibit A. Exhibit
A is a long-section, or longitudinal, drawing of the 30 vein. As you requested, it shows all stopes being mined in
December 2011. Please note, because the 520-10
mines on the intermediate veins (60, 80), you would not see
that stope in this view as it is behind this view by 100' or so to the north. We have superimposed the 520-10 stope
onto this section for your reference.
{D0875439.l}
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approximately
meters from
5900 drift through the pillar.
the
liner installation had been completed, including the Tekfoam backfill, it is presumed
liner may have
deformed from the
burst but would have remained serviceable.
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C.

Heda's Position as to the Individual Citations/Orders and Responses to
Specific Questions

As part of this special investigation, you requested that mine management respond to
questions presented by you. Those questions and the information provided by management in
response are below. Hecla has sought to clarify certain questions and has made some
assumptions in answering the questions below. If any of our clarifications or assumptions are
incorrect, please advise us so that we may attempt to fully answer the question that you intended
to ask.
i.

Citation No. 8605620

This citation alleges a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 57.3360 which requires, in part, that when
ground support is necessary, the support system shall be designed, installed, and maintained to
control the ground in places where persons work or travel. The citation alleges that the ground
control at the 5900 main haulage near the chevron was not properly designed or installed to
maintain control of ground .. The citation references.the fall of material .from the back in the 5900
main haulage after the Nov. 16 rockburst. It is Hecla's position that there is no violation of the
standard. We note that this is the first time MSHA cited Hecla for damage to ground support
caused by a rockburst at the Lucky Friday Mine.
The ground support in the 5900 main haulage had been maintained since the main
haulage was developed in 2005. The area was bolted with a combination of 4' and 6 1 split sets,
12' Dywidag bolts, and 20 1 cable bolts, and chain link fencing was installed on the back and ribs.
The ground support requirements for this area were established based on an analysis of ground
conditions in the area by rock mechanic experts and the operator's experience mining in similar
ground conditions.
The area affected by the rockburst at the 5900 main haulage was designed with a 50'
pillar of solid rock ail the way around the drift (I IT diameter). Stress models indicated that the
pillar was large enough to remain stable, with lower level seismicity expected on the periphery of
the pillar where it would yield. The history of prior rockbursts in the Gold Hunter deposit
conformed to a pattern of lower level seismic events, and a burst of this magnitude (2.8 Richter)
was not reasonably anticipated given the Gold Hunter's history of seismic events. The drift had
been bolted substantially, as per the rock mechanic experts' recommendations. The ground
support was designed to withstand damage cause by rockbursts of the anticipated magnitude.

MSHA's
on
ground
occurred along t.he same affected area near the chevron at
5900
{D0875439.l)

conditions [which] had
haulage" as basis

installed
was
is ,.,..,,,'-',.,v,_,,.,.,
were three prior seismic events located along the back edges of the 5900 I-Drift pillar prior
to November 2011. Two of the three events did not cause any observable damage to the pillar.
The last burst, of magnitude 1.9 Richter, caused minor damage to the 5900 level drift along the
pillar and to some sections of the back and Jeft rib of the chevron drift, just south of the 5900
pillar. The damage consisted of minor spalling and minor dislodging of loose material, all of
which was contained by the existing installed ground support, and no rehabilitation of the ground
support was required. See Blake Affidavit, ,I12. 4 This demonstrates that the installed ground
support was more than adequate for containing the effects of bursts of the anticipated seismic
magnitudes.
a.

How was the company monitoring the 5900 I-Drift pillar between
April 5, 2010, to November 16, 2011?

Mine management had been monitoring the 5900 I-Drift pillar for several years prior to
2011. In March 2006, stress meters were installed in the pillar. NIOSH had previously installed
other instrumentation in the pillar, and split sets, grouted rebar, and closure measurements were
instrumented in approximately May 2005. Ted Williams ("Williams")5 would obtain the stress
data and closure readings on a quarterly basis and provide the data to mine management.
Williams' information was provided to MSHA at its request during the rockburst investigations.
Blake also visited the mine regularly in his consulting capacity and would review the same data.
As well, the pillar area was inspected by mine staff daily and by consultants.

In Spring 2010, Hecla retained Itasca Consulting Group and Blake to review and evaluate
the status of the 5900 I-Drift pillar. Itasca's modeling of the pillar, based on the available data,
indicated that the pillar was likely failed only around the more highly-stressed outer periphery.
All indications in April 2010 were that the entire pillar was unlikely to violently fail. Following
April 2010, management continued to monitor the pillar's behavior through the data from the
stress monitors. In addition, the.mine's microseismic monitoring network was active throughout
that time and would have indicated whether any seismic or microseismic events indicating a
build-up to failure registered in the area. Finally, there were visual examinations of the pillar
during regular workplace examinations. There was no indication of "over-stressing" of the drift
as indicated by excessive closure, bending of rock support, fracture development in the tunnel
surface, rock spalling, etc.
b.

4

What was the company doing to ensure the 5900 I-Drift pillar was
stable before November 16, 2011?

An unsigned copy of the Blake Affidavit is attached to this position statement. A signed and notarized
copy will be forwarded to you next week.
5
Williams was an employee of the Bureau of Mines, Spokane Research Center, which came under NIOSH's ·
supervision, when the instrumentation was instalJed
Williams
:retrieved the data from the
instrumentation and provided it to NIOSH and the Lucky Friday Mine. Following his retirement from the Bureau of
Mines, Williams was hired as a consultant to the Lucky Friday Mine and continued gathering the data.
{D0875439.1}

same
observations
haulage,
pillar was stable. There were no visual signs damage on the skin of the pillar indicating
(e.g., rock bolt plates bending over or bagging of wire). Even though there had been some
Gold Hunter deposit (which is expected throughout the Coeur d'Alene
seismic activity in
Mining District), there had not been any damage to the 5900 I-Drift pillar requiring any repairs
to ground support ·
U.vtLVLL.:>

c.

Why did the company continue to mine the 5300 to 5900 sill after
recommendations that if they continue to mine these areas it might
cause stability problems?

We make the initial assumption that the phrase "stability problems" is referring to the
behavior of the 5900 I-Drift pillar. It appears that MSHA is misinterpreting Blake's April 5,
2010, Report and other statements and information received from mine management. We
assume that this question arises from Blake's statement on page 2 of the April 5 Report, "I do
have some doubts about the stability of the 5900 Drift Pillar." These concerns were directed at
the long-term stability of the pillar, i.e., stability of the pillar for the life of the mine. The
stability of the circular pillar surrounding the 5900 level access through the ore body was of
concern to management, as is the stability of all pillars in the mine. Blake recommended that the
mine continue to gather stress and closure data specific to the 5900 I-Drift pillar for purposes of
ongoing evaluation and that modeling of the pillar be undertaken. See Blake Affidavit, ,rs.
By way of background, Blake's April 5, 2010, Report was a review of Itasca's modeling
and pillar evaluation that Lucky Friday management had requested in Spring 2010. As part of
monitoring the 5900 I-Drift pillar, it was instrumented in 2005 and 2006 to determine the stresses
in the pillar back and ribs as well as closure across and along the pillar. In 2010, Itasca reviewed
the data and prepared a numerical stress analysis model to be used with some degree of
confidence in examining the stability of the 5900 I-Drift pillar during various extraction
scenanos. It was this numerical modeling that Blake reviewed in his April 5, 2010, Report.

ii.

Order No. 8559614

This order alleges a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 57.3461(b)(l), which requires that rockburst
plans shall include mining and operating procedures designed to reduce fhe occurrence of
rockbursts. The order alleges 1hat the mining procedure in place at the time of1he Dec. 14, 2011,
rockburst was not designed to reduce the occurrence of a rockburst. The order states, "The
mining method in place was to mine the main sill pillar above the 5900 I-Drift pillar." Hecla
maintains that no violation of the standard occurred and denies that its minirig procedures were
not designed to reduce the occurrence of a rockburst MSHA alleges that the company was
warned that rehabilitation should proceed with caution and that a better understanding of the
cause of the Nov. 16 burst was needed in relation to mining into the sill pillar. The order further
~,.. ~·,a.-" that
aggravated
were aware that mining
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On Dec.
the mine operator submitted a plan to MSHA regarding the repair work that
was to take place the area affected by the rockburst and a mining plan that would allow mining
above the sill pillar until the tunnel liner arrived. MSHA accepted this pian, and MSHA gave the
mine permission to continue mining via a modification to the § 103(k) order, Order No.
8605614-03. 6 The rehabilitation of the 5900 main haulage was proceeding with caution and
pursuant to the repair plan accepted by MSHA: the drift was repaired according to the plan, and
workplace inspections were completed by every employee traveling through the affected area. In
addition, stress gauges were installed in the 5900 I-Drift pillar and measurements were taken,
which showed a normal stress build-up and the beginning of stabilization prior to the Dec. 14
burst. The facts do not support a conclusion that the mine failed to proceed with caution.
Further, the reference to the need for a better understanding of the cause of the Nov. 16
rockburst as a basis for high negligence or aggravated conduct is misplaced. This statement was
taken out of context from the Nov. 18, 2011, Blake Report. Blake was advising that a better
understanding of the cause of the burst would be helpful in modeling the future mining of the
main sill pillar to determine whether the previous modeling was still accurate as to the long-tem1
mining of the sill pillar. It was not an advisory directed at the short-term future mining of the sill
pillar. Blake Affidavit, if 11. The plan for mining the sill pillar had been prepared in consultation
with rock mechanics and ihe mine's engineers; The main question regarding the mining of the
sill pillar was related to how much of the sill pillar could be mined safely before the sill pillar's
stability would become a concern. Based on the modeling of the sill pillar done in 2010, it was
determined that the sill pillar could be mined until it reached a height of approximately 70', at
which point a change in mining method would need to be considered. Following the Nov. 16
rockburst, Blake was advising the mine that the 2010 modeling should be re-evaluated to
determine whether it was still accurate in light of the additional known information.
Finally, MSHA's stated basis for aggravated conduct is factually incorrect. Mining an
additional ! O' off the top of the main sill pillar, which was approximately 141' - 200' in height in
Dec. 2011, would have no effect on the 5900 I-Drift pillar. Mining in Stopes 11 and 14 above
the sill pillar did not transfer stress to the 5900 I-Drift pillar nor did it cause the Dec. 14
rockburst. Moreover, with regard to the 5900 I-Drift pillar, the consultants believed it was
stable. The Lucky Friday Mine had never experienced a pillar burst in a pillar that was more
than 30' in height; prior to Dec. 14, 2011, the 5900 I-Drift pillar exceeded 30' in size as it was
11 7' in diameter. The modeling showed that most of the pillar was in an elastic and confined
state; in other words, the entire pillar did not look capable of instantaneous failure.

lv'ISHA erred in its numbering of the modifications to Order No. 8605614 and issued
different
modifications numbered-03. Unless otherwise noted in this position statement, references to Order No. 8605614-03
refer to the modification issued on Dec. 6,201 L

was
on
as
were
time. Stope 14 was at the 5550 sublevel and Cut #4 was being mined. While the west end
Stope 14 was directly above the 5900 I-Drift pillar, Cut #4 was to the east of and 348' from
the nearest point of the 5900 I-Drift pillar on Dec. 14. See Exhibit A. Mining in Stope 14 at this
level did not transfer stress to, nor have any impact on, the 5900 I-Drift pillar because of the
stope's distance from the pillar. See Blake Affidavit, ill 5. Stope 11 was offset from the 5900 IDrift pillar, and the mining done in Stope 11 · would have no effect on the pillar. See Blake
Affidavit, if16. Further, continued mining of 2645' in Stope 11 and 748' in Stope 14 has been
done in 2013, and there have not been any seismic events recorded in the 5900 I-Drift pillar
during this time even though it is believed the pillar is still largely in an unfailed state. If ·
"mining into the main sill pillar could cause added stress to the 5900 I-Drift pillar," thereby
constituting an inappropriate mining method and a violation of the standard, there would have
been seismic events in the pillar during this past year. 7 The mining methods in use at the Lucky
Friday Mine in the days leading up to Dec. 14 were designed to reduce the occurrence of
rockbursts, and the mining methods used (i.e., mining the main sill pillar a significant distance
above the 5900 I-Drift pillar) did not cause the Dec. 14 rockburst.
a.

Why did the company mine into the main sill pillar before
December 14, 2011?

Hecla assumes that this inquiry is specifically directed at the Dec. 6-14 mining of Stopes
1 land 14 and that it arises from the allegation in the Order stating, "The company was warned
that the rehabilitation should proceed with caution, and that a better understanding of the cause
of the previous burst in relation to mining into the Sill Pillar, was needed." It is apparent that
this allegation is based on language in Blake's Nov. 18, 2011, Report summarizing his Nov. 16
mine visit. On page 2 of the report, Blake states, " ... [W]e cannot yet assume that the remaining
pillar is completely destressed. Therefore during rehabilitation work we need to proceed with
caution." Mine management complied with Blake's recommendation to proceed with caution on
the rehabilitation of the 5900 main haulage, as evidenced by the installation of the stress
monitors, identification of closure points and measurements, the installation of significant
additional ground support, visual workplace examinations whenever anyone traveled through or
worked in the area on 5900 that was damaged by the Nov. 16 burst, and the suspension of all
Gold Hunter mining during the installation of the liner.

In answer to your specific question, mining the sill pillar was part of the overall mine
plan in mining the Gold Hunter deposit The area that is referred to as the main sill pillar is, in
fact, a solid piece of un-mined rock, or ore body, that the veins go through. 8 See Exhibit A. In
7

It is noted that the 5900 mainline drift has been filled with backfill to prevent any additional seismicity
from resulting in further damage.
8
The un-mined area between levels 5500 (Stope 11), 5550 (Stope 14), and 5700 is solid rock and ranged
from approximately 141'-200' in height when mining ceased in December 2011. Experience in the Coeur d'Alene
Mining District shows that solid ore between two mining fronts does not behave like a "pillar" and exhibit sill pillar
seismicity until its height has been reduced to less than 50' - 60'. See Rockburst Control Plan, Lucky Friday Unit,
Section 3.2.1 and Appendix A thereto.
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area was
1
'thick below Stope 14.
addition, there was almost 200' of cemented paste
between the
sill pillar and the 5900 I-Drift pillar. The on-going mining in Stopes 11 and 14 was located a
significant distance above the 5900 level, and this mining did not transfer significant stress down
to the 5900 I-Drift pillar. See Blake Affidavit, ,Il5, 16. In other words, Stopes 11 and 14 were
far enough away from the 5900 I-Drift pillar so as to be isolated from it from a stress standpoint.
MSHA mistakenly believes that mining of Stopes 11 and 14 caused the Dec. 14
rockburst. MSHA has stated that mining the main sill pillar above the 5900 I-Drift pillar is the
"mining method" which it believes contributed to the second rockburst, and it is this "mining
method" that MSHA relies on to allege a reckless disregard violation of§ 57.3461 in Order No.
8559614. The fact that the sill pillar was mined Dec. 6-14 has absolutely no bearing on, nor did
it cause, the rockburst in the 5900 I-Drift pillar on Dec. 14. One ofMSHA's stated concerns was
that the mine was "triple-shifting" to catch up on ore production that was lost due to the first
rockburst. According to the senior MSHA investigator, "the excavation in Stope 11 was
accomplished in a week which ... is a very high rate of advancement." This statement is
factually incorrect and demonstrates the senior investigator's fundamental misunderstanding of
the mining methods at the Lucky Friday Mine.
The rate of advance in Stope 11 (96' on both east and west sides) was the expected
amount. The mine works two 10-hour production shifts. There is also a Monday Friday
graveyard shift-for moving muck or doing projects. No-"triple-shifting" was done nor was any
mining done on Sunday, Dec. 11. Sundays typically are non-production days. Pursuant to the
modification to the § 103(k) order issued on Dec. 6, the Lucky Friday resumed mining
operations that night shift. From night shift on Dec. 6 through day shift on Dec. 14, the mine
advanced 96' both east and west in Stope 11. Each round advances eight feet, and miners
typically blast a round each shift. During this time period, Stope 11 blasted 12 rounds on each
side over 6.5 days of mining. Simple math makes it clear that no extraordinary mining efforts
were done in order to "catch up on ore production": 12 rounds x 81 = 96' of advancement in 6.5
days of mining. Furthermore, the mining of Stope 11 would have no effect on the 5900 I-Drift
pillar because of the distance Stope 11 was from the pillar (approximately 539') and the fact that
it was offset to the 5900 pillar. See Blake Affidavit, i116.
b.

Who directed the work force to mine the main sill pillar before
December 14, 2011?

Jordan and Bayer directed the work force to return to mining Stopes 11 and 14 after
MSHA approved the mine's proposed plan to do so, set forth in the Nov. 29 rockburst repair plan
submitted to MSHA. When management sought to resume production, it was understood that
there would be no stress transferred to the 5900 I-Drift pillar given that the main sill was so large
and Stopes 11 and 14 were far enough away from the 5900 I-Drift pillar. MSHA gave the mine
operator permission to resume mining and did not express any concerns to mine management
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November 16,
1 Rockburst to ensure the pillar was
de-stressed while rehabilitation work was being done?
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Hecla assumes you are referring to the 5900 I-Drift pillar when you ask about "ensur[ing]
the pillar was cornpietely de-stressed while rehabilitation work was being done." However, the
5900 I-Drift pillar was not completely de-stressed after the Nov. 16 rockburst, nor would
someone knowledgeable about rock mechanics have expected it to have been, given its large
width to height ratio. Management consulted with Blake regarding the rehabilitation plan,
including what supplemental ground support would be installed and the precautionary measures
that would be taken during the rehabilitation process. The rehabilitation work in the 5900 main
haulage was undertaken only after plans were submitted to and accepted by MSHA. The specific
safety procedures that were implemented included stress gauge monitoring, measuring of closure
points, visual examinations of the 5900 main haulage by every miner working in the area or
traveling through the area, and the on-going monitoring of seismic events in the Gold Hunter
deposit.
d.

After the November 16) 2011, Rockburst what did the company do
to better understand the cause of the burst?

In order to better understand the cause of the burst, Hecla conducted an investigation and
analysis of the availabJe~data; As part of this investigation, the mine operator brought in Blake
and Mark Board ("Board"), both of whom were longtime rock mechanic consultants to Hecla.
The investigation reviewed the seismic data and sought to determine the location of the burst and
the mechanism of the burst. The conclusions reached regarding the Nov. 16, 2011, burst are
described in Section I.A. above.
We presume this question arises from two statements in the Nov. 18 Blake Report. On
page 2, Blake stated, "We really need to better understand why this burst occurred, as it has
significant implications with respect to mining the main sill - particularly along the more burst
prone eastern portion of the sill." And, in the summary, Blake stated, "And, finally, we need to
better understand the cause of this burst to be able to relate it to mining the main sill." These
statements were not directed at immediate future mining of the main sill pillar; rather, they were
directed at mining the sill pillar beyond the innnediate future. Blake was suggesting that a better
understanding of the mechanism of the burst would be helpful in modeling the future mining of
the main sill to determine if the previous modeling was still accurate. See Blake Affidavit, ifl l.
e.

Did the company recover the instrumentation box from the 5900
pillar after the November 16, 2011 Rockburst?

The instrumentation box, or data collector, was damaged by the rockburst and \vas not
recovered.

This order alleges a violation
30
§
which requires, that persons
experienced in examining and testing for loose ground shall be designated by the mine· operator
to examine and, where applicable, test ground conditions in areas where work is to be performed.
The order aileges that the mine operator failed to adequately examine the 5900 I-Drift pillar
while additional ground support was installed. It is Hecla's position that the 5900 I-Drift pillar
was repeatedly and adequately examined during the period of time that the rehabilitation of the
main haulage was performed, including while the tunnel liner was being installed.
MSHA refers to the stress monitors that were installed in the I-Drift pillar after the Nov.
16 rockburst and alleges that "the East Low gauge never read stress levels" and management
recorded inaccurate readings. MSHA further alleges an unwarrantable failure based on
management's knowledge that "the East Low stress gauge was defective and assigned miners to
work in an area without knowing if the East wall was building stress." These allegations are not
supported by the facts.
The order suggests that the mine operator was recording inaccurate readings from one of
the three stress gauges that were installed in the burst area, in that the gauge was reading
negative. MSHA's statement that the East Low gauge "never read stress levels" is erroneous.
The readings from the three gauges are attached as Exhibit B. The exhibit demonstrates that all
three stress gauges were working and the East Low gauge was reading negative stress after it was
installed. This does not mean that the gauge is malfunctioning. It means that the gauge is not
seeing a recordable stress build-up. Geokon Inc., the manufacturer of the stress meters,
confirmed to Hecla that, if the gauge is giving readings, it is functioning. See Exhibit C. It was
not unprecedented to have a stress gauge in the 5900 I-Drift pillar read in negative numbers. For
example, in March of 2006 when Ted Williams from NIOSH installed six gauges in the pillar,
three of the gauges read almost zero stress and the other three dipped into negative numbers. It
took until July of 2006 before the gauges started to climb as they were starting to see a positive
indication of compressive stress. Those gauges continued to work properly until the Nov. 16
rockburst
a.

Who took the readings of the three stress monitors that were
installed in the I-Drift pillar after the November 16, 2011
rockburst?

Various people would obtain the data from the stress gauges, depending on who was
underground at the time the data was collected; typically, it was Geoff Parker or the surveyors.
Once the data from the stress gauges was obtained by connecting the handheld portable reader
unit to the gauges, the data was then taken to the surface and the data was downloaded into a
computer. The data as delivered by the stress gauges does not provide information in any
meaningful form. After the data is dovmloaded to the computer, an engineer would load the data
into a spread sheet and process it. The engineer uses a formula to translate the stress gauge data
into a psi reading, ivhich is then compared to prior readings to determine whether the stress is
{D0875439.l)

How often were the readings taken and for how long?
The :frequency and duration of the stress gauge readings is set forth in Exhibit B. The
time stated on the graph and chart is the time the data was read by the handheld reader, not the
time that the engineer translated the data into the psi readings. After the temperature stabilized,
the first data to be translated into a psi reading was retrieved at 4:30 p.m. on Dec. 2 and the last
data was retrieved at 6:30 a.m. on Dec. 14. During that time period, the data from the stress
gauges was read by the handheld device twice each day shift. The data from the stress monitors
was obtained generally toward the beginning and end of the day shift, but not at any specific
time.
c.

Who reviewed the readings from the stress monitors that were
installed in the I-Drift pillar after the November 16, 2011
rockburst?

Engineering would review the readings in order to process the data and convert the data
to psi readings. Jordan and Bayer also reviewed the data in its converted form.
d.

How were these readings used to ensure the stabilization of the IDrift pillar?

Technically speaking, the readings were not used to "ensure the stabilization of the IDrift Pillar." Stress data from a pillar will not tell you whether a pillar is stabilized; stress data
will tell you whether additional stress is being put on the pillar. For example, a sudden jump in
psi or a steady increase of psi over a number of days will indicate that stress is building in the
pillar. The increase in psi from Dec. 2-14 that was showing on the West and Back gauges was
not interpreted to be out of the ordinary. This data was compared to prior stress data obtained
from the gauges installed in 2006, and the data showed the pillar was behaving in a very similar
manner. Mine management understood this similarity in readings to mean that the 5900 I-Drift
pillar was not behaving any differently from how it behaved in the past.
e.

In the Lucky Friday Mine Rockburst Repair report by Doug Bayer
on December 6, 2011 it states that " ... any closure measurements
that indicate closure above the normal error factor ... " What is the
error factor? What is considered above the normal error factor?

Closure measurements are taken by placing the theodolite on a tri-pod and shooting the
laser at the measurement points. The measurement points are determined by the location of short
wedge-anchored bolts (Hilty bolts) installed in the rock wall, which present a target the
of a
quarter. Then, a "bulls-eye" is painted on the target for the surveyor to
{D0875439.l}

slight variation in measurement is
normal error factor that Bayer refers to in his Dec. 6, 2011, report. There is no precise
numerical amount attached to the error factor. Bayer believed that movement from reading to
reading above about one-tenth inch would indicate that closure was occurring the 5900 main
haulage. To put this into perspective, the mine has seen ciosures of one inch per week in some
stopes at times. Here, the closure measurements remained steady, indicating that closure, which·
is an indication of stress increase, was not occurring. The closure measurements are attached as
Exhibit D.
f.

In the same December 6, 2011 rockburst report it states "December
6 show no movement or closure .... " and " .... The stress gauge
readings show that the small expected increase stress over time has
slowed down." What readings were being used to come to this
conclusion?

The closure measurements discussed above were relied on to conclude that no movement
or closure was occurring. The measurements did not change. See Exhibit D. The stress gauge
readings are contained in Exhibit B. As discussed elsewhere, the data from the stress gauges
indicated that, in terms of measuring stress, the pillar was behaving as it had in the past.
g.

Was the East Low stress monitor in the I-Drift pillar used in these
readings?

Yes. See Exhibit B.

iv.

Citation No. 8565565

This citation alleges that the mine operator worked in the face of Order No. 8605614,
issued under § 103(k) of the Mine Act Specifically, the citation alleges that "subsequent action
number 8605614-03 states that the mine operator will conduct two daily surveys at the start and
end of the first shift to determine weather (sic) movement is occurring to indicate if stress levels
are increasing." The issuing inspector appears to have mistakenly combined the required closure
surveys (i.e., measuring of closure points to determine whether movement is occurring at the
survey stations) with the stress gauge readings, which are calculated based on information
provided by the data from the stress gauges. Stress readings and closure readings are two
distinctly different things. The specific language of Order No. 8606514-03 requires "the mine
will conduct two daily surveys at the start and end of the 1st shift to determine whether movement
is occurring at the survey stations of the 5900 main haulage near the chevron." (emphasis added)
In order to determine whether movement was occurring, closure readings were taken by
measuring specified points on bolts with a theodolite. And, pursuaTJ.t to Order No. 8606514-03,
these closure surveys were to be taken twice per day until such time as the culvert arrived from
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This citation further alleges that the mine operator failed to take the last reading on Dec.
just prior to another rockburst and "if this reading was taken it may have indicated high
levels, which have removed miners from the 2nd rockburst." As discussed above, in response to
question (a) regarding Order No. 8559615, the process of reading the stress gauge data is not
instantaneous. Even if the mine had gathered the data from the stress gauges later in the day on
Dec. 14, 2011, despite not being required to do so by Order No. 8606514-03, the conversion of
the data to psi would not have occurred until the morning of Dec. 15, long after the burst
occurred. Thus, MSHA's allegation in the citation that the stress gauge readings may have
indicated high levels and resulted in the removal of miners is utterly baseless.
a.

Why wasn't the last reading read on the stress monitors on I-Drift
pillar before the December 14, 2011 rockburst?

We assume that the "last reading" you are referring to is the "end of first shift" reading
on Dec. 14 that was not taken. The mine operator did not take closure measurements or obtain
the data from the stress gauges via the handheld reader on the evening of Dec. 14 because the
tunnel liner was being installed. According to Order No. 8605614-03, once the tunnel liner was
ready to be installed, aff other work in-the area affected by the §" 103(k) order was required to
stop. A representative from the tunnel liner manufacturer arrived at the mine site on Dec. 13,
confirmed that all necessary parts had arrived and trained Lucky Friday employees on the
installation process. The liner parts and tools were transported underground later that day and all
production operations ceased after that night shift ended. Beginning with day shift on Dec. 14,
the only work performed in the Gold Hunter deposit was the installation of the tunnel liner and
the continuation of repairs of the 54 Ramp rockburst damage. Mine management understood
from MSHA that the installation of the tunnel liner took priority in terms of completing the
repair work. The only "survey" required by Order No. 8605614-03 to be taken was the survey
"to deteTIPine whether movement is occurring." However, by the end of first shift on Dec. 14,
closure measurements could not be taken because some of the closure points were covered by the
liner, making it physically impossible to take any measurements. The stress data was not
obtained for two reasons: 1) the on-going installation of the tunnel liner took precedence over
other work in the 5900 main haulage; and 2) Order No. 8605614-03 did not require that it be
done. The data from the stress gauges could have been read by the handheld device because the
wires for the stress gauges had been extended to a location beyond the start of the liner for future
use.
The statement in the citation that "The Mine Superintendent stated that the readings could
not be taken because steel liner was installed over the gauges a.11d the gauges could not be read"

steel
liner started, the
prevented measurements of the closure points from being taken.
Wny

the stress monitors hooked up

the I-Drift pillar?

The new stress monitors were hooked up in the 5900 I-Drift pillar on Dec. 1, 2011. The
monitors remained hooked up until the rockburst on the evening of Dec. 14.
c.

How long were the stress monitors not hooked up in the I-Drift
pillar?

Stress gauges were installed in the 5900 main haulage near the I-Drift pillar in 2006.
Individual gauges were replaced over the years as needed. The stress gauges in the 5900 main
haulage stopped functioning after the Nov. 16 rockburst. Three new gauges were installed on
Dec. 1, 2011, after MSHA gave the mine permission to install them. Three additional gauges
had been ordered for installation. Once the gauges were installed, the gauges had to reach the
same temperature as the rock surrounding it in order to get accurate readings and provide
meaningful data. Temperature stabilization was achieved on Dec. and readings were recorded
and analyzed going forward.

II.

KNOWING VIOLATIONS UNDER THE MINE ACT

Under § 110(c) of the Mine Act, individual corporate agents can be held personally liable
if they "knowingly authorized, ordered or carried out [a] violation" of a mandatory standard.
The term "knowingly" has been defined to include both actual knowledge and constructive
knowledge. See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. FMSHRC, 108 F.3d 358, 364 (D.C. Cir.
1997). To establish liability under § 110(c), the agency must prove that the individual knew or
had reason to know of the violative condition. Target Industries, Inc., 23 FMSHRC 945, 963
(Rev. Comm. 2001). According to the Review Commission, "an individual acts knowingly
where he is 'in a position to protect employee safety and health [and] fails to act on the basis of
information that gives him knowledge or reason to know of the existence of a violative
condition. m REB Enterprises, Inc., Harold Miller and Richard Beny, 20 FMSHRC 203, 211
(Rev. Comm. 1998), citing Kenny Richardson, 3 FMSHRC 8, 16 (Rev. Comm. 1981). There is
no evidence here that establishes the requisite knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the
alleged violations on the part of any agent of Hecla. As such, a knowing violation cannot be
substantiated for any of the alleged violations at issue.
You requested information regarding four individuals in order to determine whether each
was an agent under the Mine Act. Their specifics follow. With regard to the hiring or
You have been advised that Bayer has retained separate counsel with
rnvi~st11?;amm as to Citation No. 8565565.
have
to

to his representation in this
contact his counsel.

~
re~
In November 2011, John Jordan was the
President
General Manager
Friday Mine.
is currently the Vice President of Technical Services, providing specific
engineering support to various Hecla Limited operating sites and directing the work of three
employees. As the VP/General Manager at Lucky Friday Mine, Jordan had overall responsibility
for the mine site and provided guidance to the senior staff. At that time, he had approximately
10 individuals who reported directly to him. Jordan assigned and directed the work of others.
Jordan reports to Larry Radford, VP Operations, and did so in November 2011. Jordan has 42
years of mining experience.

Doug Bayer is the Mine Superintendent and has held that position since January 201 L
Bayer has 21 years of mining experience. Typically, he works straight days, Monday through
Friday, from 4:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Bayer reports to the General Manager of the Lucky Friday,
who is Ed Sutich. In November 2011, Jordan was the General Manager, as noted above. Bayer
is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the mine and maintenance operations, and he
supervises approximately 10 people, including the mine foreman, electrical foreman, mobile
maintenance foreman, and shift bosses. Bayer has the authority to assign and direct the work of
others; he does not schedule maintenance or order parts and equipment.

John Lund is the Mine Foreman and has held that position since early 2011. He reports
directly to Bayer. He works straight days, Tuesday through Friday, typically from 4:00 a.m. to
·--4:00 p:m. Lund; alongwith Bayer, -supervises the shift bosses, who irrtum direct the work of thef
miners cin a day-to-day basis. Lund assigns and directs the work of the shift bosses. He does not
schedule maintenance or order parts. Lund has approximately 32 years of mining experience.
Scott Hogamier is a Safety Foreman and held the same position in November 201 L
Hogarnier presently reports to Jerry Murphy, Sr. Health and Safety Manager. In November
2011, he reported to the General Manager. Hogamier is responsible for safety at the mill,
industrial hygiene, MSHA and corporate reporting, and is the nrine rescue coordinator. In
November 2011, he covered safety in the mine and the mill. Ho gamier will purchase equipment
as needed in the context of safety operations and mine rescue. Hogarnier occasionally supervises
individuals on light duty working in the safety department, otherwise he does not direct or assign
the work of others. Hogarnier has more than 17 years of mining experience. His schedule is
Monday through Thursday from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., except as needed to participate in MSHA
inspections or other safety-related operations.

In relation to each citation and order discussed separately above, none of the enforcement
actions alleges aggravated conduct with regard to any specific individual, except for Citation No.
8565565 which refers to the Mine Superintendent ·(Bayer). There is no evidence here that
establishes the requisite aggravated conduct by management and management's knowledge,
either constructive or actual, of the alleged violations on the part of Mr. Jordan, Wu. Bayer, Mr.
Lund, or Mr. Hogarnier, or
other agent the compac'1y.
such,
cannot
substantiated here.
{D0875439. l}

Based on
foregoing, it is clear that no agent of Hecla engaged in a knowing violation
any MSHA standards or the Mine Act with regard to the above-referenced citations and
orders, nor did any agent engage in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary
negligence. Consequently, there is no basis for individual liability under§ llO(c) of the Mine
Act arising from the allegations in Citation Nos. 8565565 and 8605620 and Order Nos. 8559614
and 8559615.
Hecla reserves the right to offer any additional defenses it may have in any hearing on the
above-referenced citations and orders and to challenge the timeliness of this investigation. If you
require additional documents and/or information, please contact the undersigned directly.
Sincerely,

KLJ/jlk
·Enclosures
cc:

Mr. John Jordan (via E-mail, w/encl.)
Mr. Doug Bayer (via E-mail, w/encl.)
Mr. Scott Hogamier (via E-mail, w/encl.)
Mr. John Lund (via E-mail, w/encl.)
Mike Clary, Esq. (via E-mail, w/encl.)
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Good

amount of

14

November

2011
Stope 10 12 feet of advance, and a 6 foot slab
Stope 11 - 96 feet, both east and west sides·
Stepe 14- 38 feet, both east and west sides
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Mike
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Hecla Limited
6500 Mineral Drive
Box C-8000
Idaho
Coeur

Baker
President and CEO

John Jordan
Vice President Hecla Limited/
General Manager Lucky Friday Unit

Geology Summary of the Lucky Friday and Gold HUI1ter veins and Surrounding Rock
Lucky Friday:
The Lucky Friday ore body is a steeply dipping, tabular, fracture-filled vein containing
argentiferous galena, tetrahedrite and minor sphalerite. The vein is about 1500 feet along strike, with an
average width of 6 feet. Vein dip is variable and ranges from 75° to vertical. Gangue :minerals include
quattz; wall rock and siderite. The surrounding wall rock is vitreous and sericitic quartzite and siltiteargillite of the pre-Cambrian Revert formation. No production activities are currently planned in the Lucky
Friday vein, and no mining operations have been conducted in this vein system since August 2004.
Gold Hunter:
The Gold Hunter vein system is developed with primary levels at the 4050, 4900, and
5900 levels, with sub-levels on 50-foot vertical intervals above and below the primary levels. The Gold
Hunter system is comprised of numerous veins within a zone approximately 50 to 200 feet wide; with the
horizontal strike of economic ore shoots ranging from 100 to 2,200 feet in length. Mining is mainly
concentrated on the "30 Vein" which dips steeply to the south and is conformable to bedding. Vein width
supports mechanized mining operations on this vein and mining widths range from a min.i.rnum of 5-feet to
areas that can locally exceed 20 feet for short lengths. The ore minerals of the 30 Vein are predominately
argentiferou.s galena, sphalerite and tefra1iedrite within a siderite, quartz and barite gangue. The remaining
activity takes place on other veins, commonly referred to as "intermediate veins", in the Gold Hunter
system. These are not as consistently economically mineralized along strike, with ore shoots varying from
50 to 200 feet in length, and ranging from 3 to 1O+ feet in width. As with the 30 vein, these veins are
conformable to bedding. All veins in the Gold Hunter system above 5900 are hosted in the pre-Cambrian
Wallace formation which consists of thinly bedded argUlites and fine grained carbonates. Below the 5900
level, there is increasing evidence that the vein system transitions into St Regis stratigraphy, consisting of
thinly bedded argillites interbedded and interlaminated with quartzites.

Descrigtion of Mining Methods
Two mining methods are currently being employed at the Luch.-y Friday Unit.
···--1.· Mechanized Underhand Stoping,---· ·

This method accounts for approximately 93% of the production in the Gold Hunter area. This undercut and
fill method utilizes rubber-tired diesel powered equipment to extract the ore. Production proceeds along the
vein from the top down with each successive cut taken beneath cemented backfill. Normal ground support
consists of a combination of friction rock-bolts, mats, and wire mesh. Grouted rock-bolts and timber
support is used on an "as-needed" basis. Bolts are installed with conventional percussion drills. Scaling is
done when and where needed. The normal mining sequence is as follows:

1. A p1imary development heading is driven parallel, or sub-parallel to the strike of the ore-body.
2. An access slot is driven perpendicular from the development heading to the vein. This initial
access is driven at a+ 15% to +20% grade.
3. The vein is drifted
until the end of the
or the
is
and then filled
with cemented back.fill.
4. The next successive cut is reached by benching the access slot. This process typically continues
for 5 cuts, after which the orebody is accessed from the next lower primary development sub-level.

another
successive cut taken on
combination of friction rock-bolts, mats, and
mesh, as with. underhand mechanized mining. Grouted
rock-bolts and timber support is used on an "as-needed" basis. Bolts are installed with conventional
percussion drills. Scaling is done when and where needed. The normal mining sequence is as follows:

a) A primary development heading is driven parallel, or sub-parallel to the strike of the ore-body.
b) An access slot is driven perpendicular from the development heading to the vein. This initial
access is driven at a -15% to -20% grade.
c) The vein is drifted along untilthe end of the vein, or tbe adjacent stope is reached, and then filled
with cemented backfill, or a combination of development rock (gob) capped with cemented
backfill.
d) The next successive cut is reached by breasting down the access slot and ramping up to reach the
next cut height. Thls process typically continues for 5 cuts, after which the orebody is accessed
from the next higher primary development sub-Ievel.
Description of Mine Openings
Ore bodies are accessed through two vertical shafts. The Silver Shaft is the primary escapeway, fresh air
intake, and production shaft. It is an 18-foot diameter, concret.;-lined, circular shaft that provides access to
the 2800, 4050, and the 4900 through 6100 levels. The #2 Shaft is the secondary escapeway and exhaust
shaft. rt is a 23 ft x 11 ft rectangular timbered shaft with. four compartments that provides access to all
levels down to the 5100 level. Tracked levels are a nominal 9-foot x 9-foot in cross-section. Ramps, sublevels, drifts, crosscuts, and laterals in areas currently under development are typically 12 ft wide x 12 ft
high-older parts ofthem..ine have 10 ft wide x 10 ft openings in some areas. Access to the mechanized
overhand and underhand stopes is typically through 10 ftx 10 ft access slots.
Ground Support Systems

Depending on local ground conditions and geoiogic structure, once an opening is blasted and scaled, ground
support is installed in accordance with company ground support standards. Extra ground support is added
on an "as needed" basis, as determined by mining crews and supervisors in the course of daily inspections.
Development headings are normally supported with some combination of grouted bolts, friction rock
stabilizers, fencing, mats and/or shotcrete. Stopes are normally supported with some combination of
grouted bolts, friction rock stabilizers, fencing, mats and/or timber.
Seismic Monitoring Methods
Both the Lucky Friday and Gold Hunter areas are monitored for seisniicity by a microseismic system.
· - ··· ·--··Activity-is-monitored-via a-surface·seismograph.in,combination with an. underground system array,
consisting of 16 transducers (accelerometers), which are installed throughout the mine workings.

Two signal types are utilized to gather information on seismic activity at the Lucky Friday Unit.
1.

A Geotech fnstruments S-13 seismometer Qug) is located at the surface level by the old #1 Shaft
hoist room and supplies signal data to a continuous recording drum helicorder (also supplied by
Geotech Instruments). The analog seismographic chart records time and amplitude of underground
events.
2. Data acquired at the underground transducers is transmitted to the surface through a SO-pair signal
cable iocated in the Silver Shaft to a central surface iocation. for data-processing an.d storage.
Signals are monitored Yi.a an MP-250 microprocessor which was fabricated to our specifications
Electro-Lab of Spokane, WashingtoD.. This data is then fed through a continuous data logger
(NetDAS digital interlink) supplied by DAQ Systems, which is interfaced to two computer seismic
programs for processing.

Information
through these systems, can be manually reviewed to
seismic information to the appropriate operational personnel.

for daily

of

A monitoring program is being conducted on the 5900 level where the main access from the Silver Shaft
intersects the Gold Hunter 30 Vein. This program was begun with the Spokane branch ofNIOSH and has
since been taken over by the company. The object ofthls monitoring is to identify the change in load on the
walls of the 30 vein as a pillar is created by mining around it. This information has been used to model the
pillar between. the 5900 and 4900 levels. Most of the instrumentation is in the 30 vein, but a rock strain
strip, an instrumented rebar bolt, and an instrumented split set bolt were installed about 70 ft south of the
vein. The zero location data is used to determine the overall response of the rock mass to mining for
comparison with the pillar response. Observation boreholes are periodically monitored using a borehole
camera to compare the model predictions and actual behavior. A monitoring program is also being
conducted in 1 I and 14 stopes at the 5700 subleveL where there are closure stations and stress meters in
both stopes. Measurements will be taken and analyzed as the pillar between the finished overhand cuts and
the advancing underhand cuts gets smaller. The information will be used to monitor ground conditions and
pillar stresses.
Corrective Measures
Depending on the level of seismic or microseismic activity, the geologic structure of an area, and the
configuration of the stopes and relevant development access areas, seismically active areas may:
L Be de-stressed by drilling and blasting, or other methods;
2. Have excavation or production rates slowed down;
3.-Have crews removed from areas for temporary periods;
4. Be suspended from production for indefinite periods.

Reporting ofRockbursts (as governed by 30 CFRPart 50. l and 50.2)
Reporting is done as required by company officials to MSHA officials in the Kent field office, Western
District. Rockbursts with the following characteristics should be reported as per the following guidelines:
o

..
"

When a rockburst causes extensive failnre of the ground support system, such as the grotl!ld falling
out past the anchorage zone in maintained work places; or
When a rockburst impairs ventilation or impedes passage; or
\Vhen rockburst damage causes a miner(s) to be ,vithdrawn from a workplace during shift for more
than one hour.

Non-damaging microseismic activity will not be reported to MSHA when, as a precautionary measure, the
in.iner(s) is withdrawn from a workplace or not scheduled in a work place.

L:\MINE PLANNING\Seismic\R.OCICBURST PLAN 04011 Ldocx:

Exhibit 36

FROM:
SUBJECT:

4, 2010 Mine Visit

On Tuesday May 4, 2010 I visited the Gold Hunter to inspect the damage and geological
conditions associated with the 2.5 Ml rockburst that occurred April 22, 2010 in the
footwall of the 5700 14 E stope. Other stopes as well as development headings for #4
Shaft were also visited. In addition, the micro- and macro-seismic systems were
discussed, and the 3D model of Gold Hunter mining showing the burst location and the
north dipping structures was viewed.
This summary report presents my observations and thoughts regarding this mine visit.
April 22, 2010 2.5 Ml Rockburst

At 7:51 pm a 2.5 Ml burst occurred out in the footwall of the 5700 14 W stope ( see
Figure 1). One of the crew was working at the face when the burst hit. There was
shockwave damage back from the face along the north rib in the crown over a distance of
some 75 ft. Most of the damage was contained by the bolts and screen along the n9rth
rib, but it was estimated that there was some 8 t of shakedown from the back along the
damaged zone. The ventilation bag was knocked down along a portion of the damaged
zone. This is the largest burst to date in the Gold Hunter associated with day to day
mining. The stope would have been severely damaged had this burst not occurred some
150 ft out in the footwalL
This burst and the previous bursts, also shown on Figure 1, appear to have been located
on either of two well defined, north dipping faults mapped along the 54 ramp from the
5750 sublevel up to the 5600 sublevel. The elevation of all three bursts appeared to be at
about stope elevation, although the stope damage associated with the 2.5 burst was from
shock loading from above stope elevation. The occurrence of these fault-slip type bursts
out in the footwall on north dipping structures does not fit the normal pattern of bursting
associated with an advancing mining front. However, if the north dipping structures
intersect the vein to the east, then a fault slip type event could occur since these structures
are undamped along the mined out zone. Since we have good data on these bursts, I
recommend that we have Itasca do a back analysis of the 2.5 burst to better define the
burst mechanism.
The location of this burst by the microseismic system, JProcess, was poor. The reason
for this poor location is not yet known, but it does point out the
to
Gold
Hunter geophone array by at least 4 additional geophones. Good source locations for this
burst were obtained by post processing of the original seismic and microseismic data.
MineSeis system is now very close to being completely operationaL

i•

! /:

Figure 1 - 5700 14 W Stope Showing Burst Locations (MineSeis/JProcess - circle,
Block- 1.5 Burst 10/18/09 -Yellow, Block 2.5 Burst 2/22/10-Red,
Burst damage - l. 0 Burst 4/06/09 - White)

2

or

Ground conditions and ground control looked good in 6100 15 stope. The 40 vein was
being advanced on both sides, and the overlying fill really looked good. The same
observations apply for 6050 12 E/W stope. Both sides of 5700 11 stope looked good as
well. Stress fractures above the back along the west end of the vein were not nearly as
prominent as observed along the east end of the vein.
A number of access and service openings for #4 shaft infrastructure were briefly visited.
While ground conditions are variable depending on location, and the orientation of the
bedding, the ground support being installed appeared to be very adequate.
Microseismic/Seismic Instrumentation

The poor JProcess source location for the 2.5 burst was a surprise since we have routinely
been getting good source locations for seismic activity outside of blasting times. As
__Q}entioned previously, we need to install at least 4 more geophone_s in the Gold Hunter to
improve both coverage and source location accuracy. The arrival times for geophone #9
have been erratic for some time. This geophone was visited and there did not appear to
be any problems associated with its location or mounting. This geophone was installed in
1996, hence, the problem may be internal. I recommend that we replace it with a new or
other working geophone and have the old geophone checked out.
The MineSeis system is very close to being fully functional. Because most of its
geophones are within the Gold Hunter, seismic events occurring during blasting are
presently non-locatable. While we used to be able to locate bursts during blasting with
the old Macro system, we had more geophones located outside the zone being monitored.
The time window with the old Macro was only 3 seconds, and now we have a 10 second
time window. It appears that we have distortion of all signals during blasting. What is
causing this distortion has not yet been established. While it may be a frequency
response mismatch problem between the geophones and the MineSeis analog to digital
input device, it could also be a frequency problem within the AID device itself. I
recommend that we get Corky up to s01i out this and other signal quality problems. He
should bring his signal generating equipment and an oscilloscope so he can carry out this
task In the past Corky made up a calibration signal device for USBM to use on the old
Macro systems which also must have been thrown out with the other Macro components.

Summary
The 2.5 Ml burst on 4/22/10 was significant because of its magnitude and its location.
Most of the past bursts in the Gold Hunter have been in the Ml 1.5 range, have been
located within some 50 ft of the 30 vein, and have caused little or no stope damage. This
burst would have caused serious damage had it been closer to the stope. We need to
understand the cause and mechanism for this burst since its magnitude and location are
anomalous.
Mining and ground control in the stopes and development openings visited looked very
good, as did the backfill in the underhand stopes. While this is the norm for Gold Hunter
mining, we have had both backfill and ground control problems in a few stopes during
the past couple of years.
The MineSeis system is very close to being completely operational, and did provide a
good solution for the 2.5 burst. JProcess continues to function well, but did not give a
good solution for thi_s_ J::?urst. It is ~lear tha_:!: the Gold Hunter geophone array needs to be
expanded. The signal frequency problems in the MineSeis system need to be addressed
and solved.
The mine 3D model clearly showed the relationship between the north dipping faults and
the 2.5 burst. This model has become very useful in viewing the relationship between
mining and seismic activity in the Gold Hunter.
We need to instrument the bottom of the sill pillar when overhand mining above the 5900
level is halted. The instrumentation in the 5900 drift pillar is still providing useful data
despite instrument failures. It is not clear to me that a complete overhaul of this
instrumentation is necessary at the present time.
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SUBJECT:

November

2010 Mine

On Tuesday November 23,2010, I visited the Gold Hunter to inspect access and mining
openings that might have been damaged from the 2.2 Ml rockburst at 15:01, and the 2.3
Ml rockburst at 15:33 on November 16th. I also reviewed the blasting prior to the
bursting, as well as checking the source locations for the bursts that were obtained from
both Jprocess and Mineseis. In addition, I reviewed the instrumentation data from the
5700 11 and 14 stopes, as well as the 5900 pillar.
This summary report presents my observations and thoughts regarding this mine visit.
November 16th Rockbursts

At 15:01:52 on November 16, 2001, blasting was initiated in the 5500 14W stope. At
about 15:01:57 a 2.2 Ml burst occurred during the blasting. Jprocess located an event at
15:01:56, 17351,24458,-2170, which was presumed to be the burst, but the arrival data
indicate that thi_s was tQe last blast be_fore th_e burst. Mineseis repo1ied that the 15:01
burst was located at 17841,24409,-2123, and a block location using the Mineseis arrivals
located the burst at l 7965,25028,-2074. These locations suggested that the 15:01 burst
occurred in the hanging wall of the 5500 14W stope. Upon obtaining the seismic
waveforms and more information from Doug Dodge, it became evident that the Mineseis
location was not for the 15: 01 burst but a blast just before the burst. Hence, we do not
have a seismic location for the 15:01 burst, but presume it was triggered by the blasting
in 5500 14W. On the Lucky Friday side it was not uncommon for a burst to be
associated with an earlier blast, but that does not seem to be the case for this burst.
At 1533:59 on November 16th a 2.3 burst occurred and was located by Jprocess at
18028, 24640,-2155 and by Mineseis at 18121,24493,-2104. The Block locations for the
Jprocess and Mineseis arrivals are 17935,24560,-2185 and 18107,24529,-2108. The
errors for all the solutions were in the 100 ft range, likely caused by differences in
seismic velocities along bedding and perpendicular to bedding. The Jprocess location
better fits the damage observed along the F3 fault as it crosses the 54-5600 ramp, and the
54-5650 ramp.
.

,.

The 2.3 burst at 15:33 was obviously located in the clamped zone under the advancing
underhand longwall mining front. It was initially presurned that the 2.2 burst at 15:01
was in the hanging wall of 14 stope, and maybe affected
stress
Since we
now don't really have a location for the first burst, it is not clear what relationship it may
have had with respect to the second burst. It seems unlikely that they both would have
on the same structure. The waveforms recorded at
seismic sensor

the
on the
ramp
was widespread minor '-'""'"'"''-'-F,"'
screen in the back, some wall squeeze and bagging of screen, loosening or opening
along the faults and favorably oriented bedding planes, cracking of the shotcreted
bulkhead at the old orepass/vent raise, and some minor squeeze along the left rib of the
up-ramp. Only very minor movement or damage was noted along the slot access to the
old stope.
On the 54-5600 sublevel there was a small fall of ground along the
fault, some open
cracks in the floor of the adjacent muckbay, and minor damage just above the floor along
one of the ribs of the daybox cutout. The fall of ground, due to shakedown and/or minor
movement, resulted in the split sets in the immediate back being ejected from back and
left hanging in the ripped and separated chain link mesh. There did not appear to be any
Dywidag bolts in the back in the damaged zone, based on the photos, however, there
could have been bolts on the ground covered by the pile of muck. There was less
widespread damage on this sublevel. It is clear that the back support along the wider
intersection, with a cross-fault, could not contain the burst damage. This will be
discussed later.
There was no cl_arp.ag_e _apparently r~ported in either the 5500 14 E/W stopes or the 11
stopes. An inspection of the 5700 14E/W open stopes did not really reveal any
significant new damage since my November 8 mine visit, however, there appeared to be
more minor shakedown/spalling along both ends of the stope. At the intersection some of
the ends of the cable bolts were starting to umavel, and maybe there was more bagging of
the screen. It was not apparent that any new closure had occurred. An inspection of
5700 11 E/W stopes revealed only minor additional spalling affects since my November
8 stope visit. There were less changes noted along the 11 stopes than the 14 stopes.
For two large bursts, apparently both associated with the 5500 14 E/W underhand stopes,
there was only a modest amount of damage on two sublevels, and no stope damage. The
second burst was located on the F3 north dipping fault in the footwall, while the source
location of the first burst is unknown. The observed damage fits the location of the first
burst.
Had there been better back support at this wider intersection along the 54-5600 sublevel,
there likely would have been no displaced rock. For a 20 ft wide intersection the worst
case scenario would be a 10 ft wedge type failure. The 6 ft Dywidag bolts on 5 ft rows
across the back are not sufficient to prevent this type failure or contain shock loading
th.is case 8 ft Dywidag bolts would be sufficient. For wider
affects from a burst.
intersections longer bolts or some form of cables would be required.

had any
stress gage data was
more erratic
14 C and 11 D gages showed stress increases of some 500 psi
the previous readings two weeks
Previous increases
two week monitoring
periods for these gages were as much as some 300 psi, hence, the stress jumps for these
gages is not really that anomalous. ·In addition, the closure changes at these locations
were in the O. 0 l range, which don't appear to support any large stress increase due to the
bursting.
There were no changes reported for the just completed 5900 pillar instrumentation
readings. I would have to conclude that the bursts had little affect on the instruments on
the 5700 and 5900 levels, indicating that fault plane movement did not intersect the
mined out area below the 5700 level.

Summary
The source location for the 2.2 Ml burst at 15:01 on November 16, 2010 could not be
determined from either the micro-or macro-seismic systems. The 2.3 Ml burst at 15:33
was located on the F3 north dipping fault that intersected the 5600 54-ramp. While these
bur§ts appeared !_o_be tr:iggere_q_ by the 15- :Q 1: 52 blasting in t4e 5500 14 W stope, there
was no reported damage in either of the 5 500 14 or 11 stopes.
lack of stope damage
suggests that any stope intersection with the F3 fault was at some distance above the
stope level. The relationship between the first and second burst is unknown, and we have
never before seen two bursts occur on the same fault during any burst sequence.
The numerical model result showed that the high stress wrapping around the advancing
underhand longwall face should provide clamping for any fault-slip events on structures
dipping down from either the footwall or hanging wall. It was presumed that the
previous fault slip events associated with overhand mining would not accompany the
underhand mining. We need to have Itasca review these recent bursts.
The ground support at the intersection of the F3 fault and the 54-5600 sublevel was
insufficient to contain the burst damage. There did not appear to be Dywidag bolts in the
back at the burst location. It is likely that rows of 8 ft Dywidag bolts along the 20 ft wide
intersections on the sublevel would have been sufficient to contain shock loading damage
from bursting. Longer reinforcement would be needed at wider intersections.
The installed instrumentation on the 5700 and 5900 levels did not reflect bursts occurring
below the 5700 level.
Minseis array needs to be modified to respond to bursts occurring
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Geotechnical

Mine is based on the

basic information

at the mine:

characteristics of

"'

,A,n understanding of the geology, in situ stress state and
the host rock mass and orebody

•

An understanding of the seismic source mechanisms that have occurred and their
relationship to the geology, mining geometry and blasting

•

An understanding of the relationship of seismicity to location and extent of observed
damage in stopes and access drifts and to the ground support methods and practices
used

This information is used to develop a plan for mitigation of seismic risk based on the following
proactive measures, shown schematically in Figure 1:
•

Use of seismic monitoring methods to track microseismic and seismic event locations
and time-history response, and to verify currently active regions and possible source
mechanisms.

•

Exclusion of personnel from potential seismic areas for a sufficient time after central
mine blasting.

•

Use of mining methods, procedures, an·d geometrie·s to minimize risk of large seismic
events, and adherence to design and mining execution procedures that involve
engineering, geology, safety, mine management, and the workforce in the process.

•

Use of ground support in potential seismic areas that has energy absorption capacity
sufficient to maintain stable openings.

•

Dissemination of current and timely information to mine management, safety personnel
and the workforce regarding seismicity and solicitation of observations and comment on
seismic planning and risk.

This document provides background 1mormat1on on the mine and mming methods used, the
geology, in situ stress state, geotechnical characteristics of the orebody and host rock, and the
observed seismicity and source mechanisms and their relation to geology and mining. The
companion Rockburst Control Plan, which fulfills MSHA requirements set forth in
30CFR57.3461(2), presents the seismic mitigation plan that addresses the above proactive
measures.
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Background Data

Source r.~echanisms and
Damage Potential

Proactive Measures to
Mitigate Seismic Risk

•••1221ca__. ......~ .....~ - Background Information
Exclusion of Personnel at
of Higher Seismic
Risk in the Mining Cycle

• Geology

nmes

• in swstress
• Geoteclmicel ch1m:1cterislics
• Mining methods end geometries

• Seismic history

Seismic Source
Mechanisms- Location,
Timlng and Frequency and
Relation to Mining
Geometry and Blasting

Seismic Damage
Mechanism and Locations

Seismic Monitoring to Track
Location, Frequency and
Magnitude of Current
Activity

Mining Methods,
Geometriesand Procedures
to l.'llnimize Seismic Rlsk

Ground Support to
-==:--,- _Dlssip;ite_S.ei.srnic...Enoo.n-'

Dissemination of
lnformation on Current
Seismic Risk and
Solicitation of Observations
from Mining Crev;s

Figure 1.

Schematic illustration of contents of Geotechnica/ Characteristics document and Rockburst
Control Plan.
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economic mineralization in the projection of the Gold Hunter orebody with depth in
the lower Wallace Formation. A decision to begin production was made in 1997. Since late
2001, all production from the Lucky Friday operation (combined Lucky Friday mine and Gold
Hunter veins) has been from the Gold Hunter. Access to the Gold Hunter is gained from two
levels off the Silver shaft (4900 and 5900) which is located approximately one mile southsoutheast of the Gold Hunter. Construction of the #4 shaft is currently underway at the Gold
Hunter. The No. 4 shaft is a winze with top landing at the 4900 level and planned final depth of
over 9000' from ground surface.

2.2

Current Mine Configuration of the Gold Hunter Unit

A 30 view of the Gold Hunter mining area or deposit, 30 Vein stopes is shown in Figure 2. The
deposit is accessed from the Silver Shaft, which is the main producton hoist. Connections to
the Silver Shaft are made at the 4900 level (- 1600' elevation below sea level), and 5900 levels.
Mining currently extends from approximately the 4000 level to below the 6100 level. The
current operations at Gold Hunter occur in two primary mining fronts on the 30 Vein - the 11
and 14 underhand stopes extending downward from the 5300 level, and the 12, 15 and 16
underhand stopes extending down from the 5900 level (Figure 2). The 11 and 14 stopes are
serviced from the 590-51 and .c54 ramps, respectively, and the- 12, 15 and 16 stopes from the
590-52, -55 and -56 ramps. A developing sill pillar occurs between the 5300, 11 (west) and 14
(east) underhand stopes. The sill pillar is approximately 200' in height on the 11 stope side and
130' in height on the 14 stope side at the time of this writing. A 60' high pillar was left beneath
the 5900 15 stope following the groundfall in April, 2011, and a new cut was established below
the pillar. The previous overhand stopes mined up from the 5900 level were stopped in 2010
and are filled. The three underhand stopes mining downward from the 5900 level create a
roughly longwall front with the stopes at approximately 6150 level at the time of this writing.
Development in the 590-55 ramp extends to 6500 level while the 590-52 and -56 ramps extend
to points just below the current stope elevations.
Additional scattered mining was conducted on various intermediate veins in the footwall of the
30 Vein. Most of this mining occurred above 4900 level. The 1O stope is currently mining
several Intermediate Veins (the 60, 80 and 90 Veins - a series of orebodies that occur in the
footwall of and parallel to the 30 Vein) just above the 5300 level.

2.3

Mining Methods

The Gold Hunter uses the cut and fill mining method to extract the narrow, near-vertical veins.
Two variants of this method are used - overhand and underhand mining. In both approaches,
cross-cuts are driven from each footwall spiral ramp to the center of the stope. From a given
Page 5
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access the next
and so on. This process continues
all five cuts are completed and a new series of crosscuts is established from the next ramp
In overhand stopes, the back and walls are typically bolted and screene'ct with 4' or 6'
bolts and chain link. Breast-down faces progress- in both directions from the crosscut to
the ends of the stope (approximately 500') where the stope cuts eventually connect to the
adjacent stope or stop on an economic boundary.
In underhand mining the process essentially works in reverse, with crosscuts driven from the
ramp to the orebody in a downward progression. Each stope cut is driven by breasting up
beneath a sandfill/mat construction poured in the cut above. The fill mat consists of an 18"
buffer of broken rock left on the stope floor followed by placement of vertically-oriented, 6'
Dywidag bolts on 4' centers into the broken rock floor. This is followed by a nominal 8' high
paste fill pour at 10% cement content. Figure 4 shows laboratory uniaxial compressive strength
data for Gold Hunter paste fill as a function of set time. The plot shows the historical database
and the results of recent (2011) laboratory testing, indicating that 28 day strength of the fill is
substantial, ranging from about 400 to 650 psi. This paste forms a strong back when exposed
below. When breasting beneath the fill mat, the 18" of broken muck falls into the stope with the
blast, leaving a cemented fill back with Dywidags protruding a few inches into the stope. The
Dywidags are then plated over chain link mesh for the final back support. If required, split bolts
can be driven into the back for additional support. Stope/cross-cut intersections are additionally
supported with timber-planks (with Dywidags installed through them)-laid on the broken muck
floor and hitched with wire rope to wall bolts to improve ground control at wider spans and to
provide a solid beam for posting if required. Fill fences are constructed in the slot and the slot
pasted.
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East

West

'1900 l evel

590-52 Ramp

6500 lev el

590-55 Ramp

West

Figure 2.

Views of the Gold Hunter mine from the footwa/1 (toward the south) showing development
and from the hangingwa/1 (toward the north}.
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Figure 3.

Overhand and underhand crosscut access from ramp to stopes.
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Figure 4. Historical (blue and green) and recent (red) 10% cem ent paste fill uniaxial
compressive strength behavior as a function of set time, Gold Hunter Mine.
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2.4

Summary of Geology

2.3.1

Lithology

The Gold Hunter deposit is hosted entirely in the Wallace form ation. It is believed that
minerali zation at the 4050, 4900 , and the new 5900 le ve ls is located in lower W allace .
Lithologies consist of thin-bedded argillites, argillite alternating with silt caps and local siltites .
The argil!ites vary from green to gray with local purple hematitic argil!ites more distal to th e
min eral zone. Also distal to the m ineral zone is an increasing carbonate component consisting
of dolomitic argillites and siltites, which are more typical of the Wallace formation. The
bed ding/cleavage has spacing ranging from a few inches to feet. The cleavage is often coated .
with talcy , slickensided material and can be high ly irregular in shape (Figure 5).
The
bedding/cleavage thus provides a significant anisotropy in the mechanical response of the
material when stressed. Drifts driven perpendicular to bedding tend to be quite stable , whereas
drifts driven parallel to bedding typically show buckling or high deflection of the wall beds.

Figure 5.

Photograph of thinly-bedded argilfite core showing slickensided cleavage
surfaces.
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N80-85W dipping 80S.
fault lies to the south at N80W dipping 85S. These faults are
about
feet around the mine and define the trend of the Star-Gold Hunter mineral belt
Post Mineral faulting

The Master fault is the most prominent structural feature within the Gold Hunter vein system.
The fault is near vertical and follows the trace of the 30 vein for at least 1500 feet along strike,
forming the hangingwall contact. Protomylonitic fabrics are evident within a few millimeters of
the principal slip plane, which is locally highly polished and displays offsets, slickensides, and
other kinematic indicators suggesting dextral slip.
The mineralization in the Gold Hunter deposit is offset by at least two periods of post-mineral
faulting. One period is dominated by both high and low angle reverse faulting which trends
N30-70W and dips south, suggesting compression from the south west. These faults do not
appear to be associated with seismicity. The other period of faulting trends N75-88E and dips
40-60° to the north, also showing reverse displacement. The combined geometry suggests
compression from the northwest which, as described later, is the current estimated maximum in
situ compression direction. These structures, designated as the "F" faults are observed in
interlevel ramps and crosscuts, particularly on the east end of the mine. The continuity of these
structures through the orebody is unknown due to limited access to the hangingwall, but appear
to be cut off at the hangingwall contact. The faults are generally narrow and tight with rough
surfaces, both locally and macroscopically. Their continuity is currently not well known, but they
have been mapped over 1O's to 1OO's of feet in multiple locations. These faults are of particular
interest since they are related to seismic events monitored from about 5300 level downward.
Post-mineral offsets on both of these sets of structures vary from 1 to 15 feet which complicates
production efforts. These structures are currently being mapped in detail in ramp and slot
exposures, and 30 surfaces are being fit to these exposures in an attempt to understand the
topography and continuity of the surfaces.
Folding

The Wallace formation is folded to +/- 90° upright with stratigraphy striking N80-85W and
dipping 80-90° S. The Gold Hunter appears to be on the upright south limb of a faulted N8085W-trending antiform. Up-section is to the south with locally-overturned bedding. To the west,
stratigraphy turns northerly toward the Mill Creek syncline. To the east and slightly north is the
trend of the Deadman syncline, which does not influence the rocks in the mine area.
Wal/rock Fabrics

The rocks around the Gold Hunter veins have a metamorphic shear lineation that trends N83W
This parallels the mineral rake and is
and rakes between 74° and 82° down to the west.
believed to be axial plane cleavage reactivated during mineralization. This fabric can be
observed at the surface in the discovery pit and seen underground as fillings of sericite on
cleavage and bedding surfaces (Figure 5).
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economic
when compared to adjacent veins. The 30 Vein averages greater than
4 feet in width as a composite of closely spaced veins and veinlets. It strikes N83 W and dips
south. The economic vein length is 1,500 feet at the 4900 level and has increased to
over 2,000 feet at the 5900 level elevation. The 30 Vein has yielded more than 90 percent of
Ag, 8.9% Pb and
total mine production since 1997 and produced 1 456 036 tons at 16.0
1.7% Zn through August2005.
1

1

The other veins have shorter strike lengths and generally narrower widths; these are known
collectively as the Intermediate veins and are subparallel to the 30 Vein, with most lying in its
footwall. The Intermediate veins occur from 20' to more than 100' from the 30 Vein and some
have continuity nearly as great, but their ore is typically of lower value. The distribution of silver,
lead and zinc varies widely for each vein. The most prominent Intermediate veins include the
40, 60, 80, 90 and 110 (progressively from the footwall contact of the 30 Vein). These veins
have been mined with scattered stopes, primarily above 4900 level.
The Gold Hunter veins consist of gangue and sulfide mineralization. The typical vein has quartz
and siderite components with lesser amounts of pyrite and barite.
Ore minerals include
argentiferous galena, sphalerite, and local tetrahedrite. There are also minor amounts of
sulfosalts including pyrargrite, bournonite, and boulangerite.
All of the principal veins locally display fabrics that document multiple episodes of faulting and
mineralization. Gangue mineral textures are often cataclastic for siderite and local quartz.
Sulfide-textures vary from locally coarse crystalline-galena to fine grained steel galena. Gold
Hunter sphalerite varies from locally coarse crystalline to fine-grained, and is generally lower in
iron content when compared to sphalerite from the Lucky Friday veins.
Discrete veins
composed of fine-grained matrix-supported galena breccia are common, and are the dominant
ore type of 30 Vein production.

3.0

Geotechnical Characteristics

3.1

In Situ Stress State

The in situ stress state in the Coeur d'Alene district was reported by Whyatt et al. (1995a and b)
as shown in Tables 1 and 2. These estimates are based on stress measurements at the 4250
and 5300 levels of the Lucky Friday Mine and the 7300 level of the Star mine. The
measurements indicate a CT1 direction of about N40W and a ratio of cr1/crv of approximately
1.3 to >2. The maximum stress direction is reinforced by numerous observations of breakouts in
boreholes, shafts, and raises, as summarized for the Lucky Friday in Figure 6 , and similar
breakouts across the Coeur d'Alene district indicate consistent direction of the major stress.
The horizontal to vertical stress ratio appears to vary between the Lucky Friday and nearby Star
Mines, with the Lucky Friday measurements showing significantly higher horizontal
components. It is felt that the Lucky Friday measurements represent a conservative upper
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Mine In Situ Stress Estimate '
(Whyatt et

1995a)
Bearing

57
49
35
-15

er ns:
C,"" .

0.
T ns/e11

T ns1'v
Tet11.'il

01
C,o

2.5
2.2

1.6
-0_6

2

0.1

-10
70
42

-0.4
3.1

1.8

13'

N40' W
S41' W

33'

1

Magnitude is a function of overburden depth.

'Principal stresses from measurement at 4250 level (-885 elevation)

TABLE 2
Star. -Mine- In Situ--··-·
Stress Estimate·
(Whyatt et al., 1995b)
Strer.s component

Magnitude

54

42
34

7,800
6,000
4,9DD

Beanng

?lunge

N3.:J Vi/
M74' E

66

w

22

S 48'

10'

NOTc.-Empry cells in columns intentionally left blank.

'Principal stresses from measurement at 7300 level (-885 elevation)
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Notes
A!imak raise:
3980 ..
4020.
4100
Silver shall loading pocket
4900
5100 .
5500 .
Ore
5100-97
5100-107
5160-107
5210-107
5300-107
Service raise. 5480
Blastholes. service raise, 5400
Grouse vein raise. Star Mine

passes: ..

N40' W
N65' W
N75' W
N45' W
N45' W
N45' W
N55'
N45'
N40'
N35'
N55'
N 35'-45'
N74'
N 30' -40'

W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W

Subunit E, hard.
Subunit G, hard.
Subunit G. hard.

Diameter= 14 cm (5.5 inJ

Figure 6. Summary of borehole breakout directions at the Lucky Friday and Star Mines
supporting a NW orientation of the major principal stress direction.

3.2

Rock Quality and Material Properties

The rock mass quality and material properties of the deeper (around 5900 level) Gold Hunter
vein and wall rock materials were determined from geotechnical logging and laboratory testing
of exploration boreholes drilled from the footwall ramp across the orebody and into the
hangingwall at about the 6100 level. The results of the lab testing and rough estimates of the
rock mass quality and rock mass material properties are given here.
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3.2.1

Exp loratio n Geotechnical Borehole

A horizontal, 225' long exploration diamond drill hole GH61-40 w as driven from the footwall
ramp through the footwall waste, the 30-40 Vein package, and into the hang ingwa ll at a
distance of approxim ately 20' beneath the 6150-15 stope (Figure 7). Th is hole was d rilled
primarily for determ ining t he quality of the rock units in the 5300-5900 pillar area as well as the
stopes below 5900 level, a nd to sample the hangingwall, footwall , and vein rocks for material
properties testing .
T he core log indicates generally 100% c ore re cove ry, but moderate ROD in the footwall rocks ,
whereas the ROD in the vein package is ofte n over 80% . The wall rocks g rade from silty
argillites to stronger siltites that are sometimes cut by low-angle fault planes. The wall rocks
exhibit anisotropy via cleavage that is ori ented parallel to the orebody. The 30/40 vein package
consists of ore minerals (sphalerite and galena with some pyrite ) in a matrix of siderite , quartzite
and siltite gangue. Figures 8 and 9 show examples of the wall and ore rock core recovered
from the exploration hole . No discing was observed in the core, supp orting the argument that
horizontal to ve rtical stress ratio is likely not at the high end of the Lucky Friday measured in situ
stress range .

·------~- -

,._......._.t,:.\1

UDR

View Looking East
Figure 7.

Section view showing the location of geotechnical drill hole GH61-40 drilled
beneath th e 615-15 stop e.
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Figure 8.

Typical footwalf rock conditions consisting of silty argillite and siltite
lithology.
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Figu re 9. Core through 30/40 vein package (approximately 160 to 187 ft hole depth)
consisting of ore minerals spha/erite and galena with gangue minerals siderite,
quartzite and siltite.
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conducted.
tests were
conducted on wall rock and 25 on rocks from the vein
Three sets of triaxial tests were
conducted on footwall rocks (a set consisting of confining pressures of 500, 1000, 2000 and
3000 psi - 3.5, 7, 14 and 20 MPa), one on vein package rocks and one on hangingwal! rocks.
The results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
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Triaxial

Test

Anal
Length

ID

llg

Load

Pressnr

Modnlns

e

GH61-l-O

GH6UO-T-02
GH.61-40-T-03
GB:61-40-T-04
GH61-40-T-05
GH61-40-T-06
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GE:61-40-T..08
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24.60
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31.75
23.05
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152.!W
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159.10
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179.80
192.90
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r ,,
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1..99
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4.60
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4.40
4AO
4.59
4j7
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4.49
-U9
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1741
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86,S35
83,560
111,115
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148,695
68,465
108,355

188.l

&4_T)j

265.5
2432
174.1
1SS.9

82,910
82,035
35,390
S5,S90

2,000
1,000
500
500
1,000
2,000
3,000
500
1,000
2,000
3,000
3,000
.2,000
1,000
500
3,000
2,0!}0
1,0(10

23~133

3,669
6,I6S
26.,920
27,961
26,907
35,779
16,135
32,690
31,095
47,784
22,068
34,811
26,998
26,644
26,310
11,367
27,55D

327
L07
1.51
3.00
3.00
3.48
4.09

3.78
3.9S
5-13
5..51
5.27
5.47
4.51
4..56
4.64
3..51
329

+FW rock tests in green, vein package in red and HW in blue

Histogram plots of the UCS testing results for the footwall and vein package rocks are given in
-Figi:fre 10. The mean UCS for the-FWfocks is 15~307 psi+/- 6,960 psi'(106 MPa +/- 48 MPa)
and 15,660 psi +/- 5,800 psi (108 MPa +/- 40 MPa) for the vein package rocks. Although the
mean UCS is roughly the same, the UCS of the FW rocks is more-or-less normally distributed,
whereas the vein package rocks have a bimodal or skewed distribution toward somewhat higher
strengths. All of the rock units taken together show a roughly-normal distribution with mean of
about 15,660 psi (108 MPa). It is noted that the sampling for the laboratory testing was taken
from intact cores or rock which may contain internal cleavage planes. Thus, the results for the
wall rocks reflect failure along cleavage surfaces as well as intact rock fracture.
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Figure 10.

Histograms of UCS data for at/ FW rocks (top), vein package rocks (center)
and all the data (bottom).
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Estimate

, the beds are confined, dilation is controlled. The wall rocks behave in
a stable fashion and can be characterized as having fair to good
in which the bedding
only a small role in control of rock mass response. When drifting parallel to bedding, the
bedding controls the rock mass response, expressed as dilation of the beds and buckling Rock
mass characterization schemes such as the Hoek and Brown 1 GS! approach do not lend
themselves to conditions in which the bedding lamination controls the rock properties.
Therefore, in this case, estimates are only given for the vein package and for wall rock in which
the bedding is in a confined state.
Due to the limited triaxial database, it is clear that some of the tests were conducted on rock
samples in which failure occurred on cleavage planes. This data was excluded from the triaxial
data when developing curve fits. To estimate the rock mass properties, the laboratory data is
first used to determine a failure criterion for the intact rock (lab-scale) material. Then, the rock
quality data from underground is used to estimate the in situ or rock mass failure criteria. It is
assumed here that the orebody material has a rock quality (GSI) of approximately 60, or a fair
quality rock, which is derived from rock core and agrees reasonably with observations made in
the stopes and bedding-perpendicular drifts from the lower levels of the mine. It is noted that
the rock mass quality can vary significantly depending on depth and orientation.
The Rocscience freeware program Roclab was used to fit the failure envelopes to the laboratory
Figure 11 shows the data and curve fits for the confined waif rock arid vein package
materials. A summary of the Hoek-Brown intact and rock mass properties are given in Table 5.

data.

Table 5
Rock Properties Estimate for Confined Wall Rock and Vein Package
H-B Property
UCS (O"c; • MPa)
Assumed Rock Quality (GSI)
HB Intact Rock Parameter (m;)
HB Rock Mass Parameter (mb)
HB Rock Mass Parameter (s)
Rock Mass Modulus (E,m- MPa)
Rock Mass TensileStrength {O'trm •
MPa)

1

For example:
Engineering.

106

Vein Package
109

60
25
5.9
0.01174

60
27
6.6
0.01174

6240
0.21

0.19

Wall Confined Bedding

Hoek, E., 1998, "Rock engineering: course notes," University of Toronto, Department of Civil
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Figure 11.

Laboratory UCS and triaxiaf data and best-fit Hoek-Brown failure envelopes.
The Hoek-Brown parameters crci (the UCS - the vertical axis intercept) and the
mi parameter (the curvature of the envelope) are derived from these curves.

3.2.4

Material Models For Representation of Wall and Vein Package Rocks

For assessment of mining-induced stress conditions and rock mass yieldingmateriai models
must be assumed for the rock mass in addition to the rock mass properties. The ubiquitous
cleavage and bedding surfaces in the silty argillite and siltite wall rocks results in a directional
behavior of the rock mass. The anisotropy direction is oriented parallel to the strike and dip of
the orebody. This type of behavior is best represented by a laminated material model such as a
ubiquitous joint model in which the intact rock properties represent the solid beds of argillite and
siltite, and the bedding surfaces are represented by weakness planes characterized by
cohesion and friction. In this case, the altered bedding surfaces have !ow (20-30°) friction angle
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n the vein material, which is characterized by ore minerals, siderite, and quartzite, the rock is
expected to behave in a brittle fashion characterized by peak and residual strengths as
illustrated in Figure 13. This type of behavior is typically referred to as "strain-softening" (peakresidual strength), in which peak failure strength is governed by the Hoek-Brown failure
envelope (Figure 11) assumes a "Damage Factor" of zero while the residual strength is
estimated based on a damage factor of 1 (Hoek, et al., 2002) 2 .
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Figure 12. Shear strength of weak faults and discontinuities (Wyllie and Mah, 2004)3.
Bedding and fault range assumed for Gold Hunter shown.

2

Hoek E, Carranza-Torres CT, Corkum 8. Hoek-Brown failure criterion-2002 edition. In: Proceedings of the 5th North
American Rock Mechanics Symp., Toronto, Canada, 2002: 1: 267-73.
Wyllie, D. and C. Mah (2004). Rock Slope Engineering,

4th

Edition, CRC Press.
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R,;sidual Stre~gth

.,.._..,..
c;..

Figure 13.

Strain

The wall and vein package rocks are assumed to be brittle "strain-softening"
materials.
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Hu

and Gold
areas are monitored
underground, mine-wide microseismic systems - the Electrolab MP-250 source location
and the state-of-the-art ESG full-waveform digitizing system. The MP250 system has been in
operation in various forms, first at the Lucky Friday then Gold Hunter operations, for over 30
years. The ESG system was installed in late 2011 Activity is also monitored via a surface
seismograph in combination with the underground systems. The MP-250. system currently
consists of 16 uniaxial geophones (accelerometers), which are installed throughout the mine
workings. The ESG system installation began in 2011, but was suspended during the mine
shutdown prior to full commissioning. The installation was resumed in 2012 and will be
functional prior to re-start of the mine in early 2013. The system ultimately consist of 21 uniaxial
and 5 triaxial accelerometers located in development near the stopes from 4050 to 6150 levels.
Finally, a triaxial accelerometer is to be installed near the ground surface at the #1 shaft collar
for strong ground motion detection and digital recording. The strong motion sensor is placed
sufficiently far from the active mining to eliminate potential "swamping" of the sensors during
large events or blasting. A description of the instrumentation is given below.
1. Surface Seismograph - A Geotech Instruments S-13 seismometer Uug) is located at
the surface level by the old #1 Shaft hoist room supplying signal data to a continuous
The analog
recording drum helicorder (also supplied by Geotech Instruments).
seismographic chart records time and amplitude of underground events. The amplitude
of events large enough to be seen on the strip chart is recorded in millimeters of offset.
2.

Electro/ab MP-250 System - Data acquired at the underground transducers is
transmitted to the surface through a 50-pair signal cable located in the Silver Shaft to a
central surface location for data-processing and storage. Signals are monitored via an
MP-250 microprocessor which was fabricated to Hecla specifications by Electro-Lab of
Spokane, Washington. This data is then fed through a continuous data logger (NetDAS
digital interlink) supplied by DAQ Systems, which is interfaced with two computer
seismic programs for processing:
a. JProcess is a microseismic analyzing program that provides time and an
estimate of location for events.
b. MineSeis is a macroseismic analyzing program that provides time and an
estimate of location for events. MineSeis also utilizes signals from the S-13 jug to
produce a digital signature and amplitude of underground events.

3.

ESG Seismic System - the ESG Paladin System, developed by ESG of Kingston,
Ontario consists of a series data acquisition units (Paladin units) that digitize analog
waveforms from uniaxial and triaxial geophones and sends the digitized data to the
ground surface via a fiber optic cable run in the Silver Shaft. From here, the data is
delivered to a computer on the ground surface where P-wave and S-wave arrival picks
are made automatically and source locations determined. The system is also capable of
performing numerous seismological calculations on the waveforms, including local
Richter magnitude estimate and other information such as shear and compression wave
energy, source radius, stress drop, fault plane solutions, etc. The lowest-magnitude
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Paladin units can be accessed via the internet for
data or troubleshooting of the system. Assistance in data interpretation is also available
from ESG seismologists who can access the data on-line. The system will be ful!y
functional
the time of mine restart in early 2013.
Information processed through these systems is manually reviewed every morning to provide
daily seismic information to the appropriate operational personnel. The data is also regularly
examined for interpretations in trends in the data which can be used as a basis for estimation of
general level of seismic activity.

4.2

Seismic History

The database of microseismic and seismic events for the Gold Hunter operation extends from
1999 to the current day. Some seismicity accompanied the opening of the 4900 level of the
mine, but only a few events of magnitude greater than approximately 1.5 ML occurred until the
latter half of 2009, when a greater number of >-1.5 ML events occurred. Figure 14 shows a
histogram of the larger events (ML>-0.7 reported by the seismological station at Montana
Technological University in Butte, Montana) at the Gold Hunter from 1999 to the current time.
The largest events (>2 ML) have occurred for the most part since 2009, associated primarily
with the 5900 Mainline pillar and suspected movement on flat-dipping footwall faults adjacent to
the reducing 5300 sill pillar on the east end of the mine (14 stope). The largest recorded event
(with the exception of two large, non-locatable events in 2004 that occurred far from the
workings and caused no damage) was the 2.8 ML event in November, 2011. These events
resulted in minor damage (displaced rock) with the exception of the November, 2011, 2.8 ML
event (damage to a ramp intersection below 550-14 stope) and the December, 2011, 2.4 ML
event (damage to the 5900 Mainline pillar and drift).

Page 26

Geotechn ical Characteristics of

0

0.25 0.5 0.75

Lucky Friday Mine, Hecla Mining Company Rev.

1

1.25 1.5 1.75

2

2.25

2.5 2.75

3

Richter Magnitude

Figure 14. Histogram of larger magnitude events at the Gold Hunter, 1999 to 2012.
4.2. 1

Location of Events

Plots of the location of all monitored events from 1999 to 2012 are shown in longitudinal and
cross-sectional views in Figures 15 and 16. In these figures, the size and color of the events
are scaled by the millimeters of offset they generated on the surface seismograph station - a
rough magnitude scale (an offset of 70mm is approximately equivalent to a 1 ML event). In
general, based on Richter magnitudes supplied l?Y the seis_mo!ogical observatory at Montana
Technological University in Butte, events colored in red on this plot have Richter magnitudes of
roughly 2 or larger, with the largest event having a magnitude of 2.8 ML. This event, located in
the 14 stope footwall along the F3 or F4 fault, occurred in November, 2011. The stoped areas
are shown in brown solid while the ramp development is shown in transparent violet. The large
events are clustered at or below the 5300 pillar, and primarily in the east end of the mine in the
footwall (north) of the orebody. There appear to be two prominent clusters of the larger events
- adjacent to and in the footwall of the 5300 pillar and below the 14 underhand stope, and those
in and around the 5900 circular Mainline pillar on 5900 level. The source location accuracy of
these events is not well knovm, so relying heavily on the specific location is not possible,
although the general locations of the larger events are consistent with observed damage. The
occurrence of larger events has increased since the second half of 2009, and has been related
to the stress concentrations of the 5300 sill activating the F3 and F4 fault structures beneath the
14 stope and the stress concentrations in the 5300 Mainline pillar.
4.2.2

Mechanism of Seismicity

There appear to be two basic seismic source mechanisms operating at the Gold Hunter: pillartype/strain bursting, and slip along geologic structure. Pillar-type rockbursts occur when brittle
rock in pillars or exposed faces is stressed beyond its strength limits, typically near a free face.
The host rock mass at the Gold Hunter is composed of thinly-bedded argillites and more thicklybedded siltites or quartzites. These rocks typically fail via anisotropic plastic yielding due to
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events involve unstable slip on geologic structures such as faults and bedding
At the Gold Hunter, observations of movement on north-dipping fault structures at the
east end of the orebody below 5300 level appear to be associated with some of the larger
events. These structures can be seen in intersections in the 54 ramp between 5300 and 5900
levels and in 52 ramp below the 5900 level. Three specific structures (F3, F4 and F4 Splay)
with dip from about 40 to 60° to the north have been mapped within the 54 ramp (Figure 17).
North-dipping structures (possibly the same structures as observed in the ramp) have been
mapped in the 14 stope, and terminate on the Master Fault, which makes up the hangingwall of
the 30 Vein. The continuous length of these structures is not known, but is likely on the order of
several hundred feet in dip-length. Offset (less than 1") along the F3 fault was observed in the
54 ramp below 5700 elevation after the Nov., 2011 2.8 ML event. The mechanism for unstable
movement on these structures is likely the result of: a) stress state on the fault structure that
allows slip to occur, and, b) closure of the stope which drives fault movement. The increase in
occurrence of large footwall events near the 14 stope since late 2009 likely is at least partially
the result of concentrating stresses in the adjacent 5300 sill pillar.
4.2.3

Time of Day of Events and Relation to Blasting

The timing of seismic events with respect to blasting is of critical importance in planning a
mTfigation ·strategy for the mine since blasting tends to trigger a large portion of the seismicity.
Figure 18 shows a plot of the number of microseismic and seismic events from 2006 to 2011 as
a function of time of day, while Figure 19 shows a close-up view of blasting events and the
periods immediately thereafter. Blasting for most of the stope faces occurred at the end of shift
- 00:30 to 00:45 from 1-1-07 to 12-20-10 and from 01:00 to 0:1:15 from 12-21:10 to 12:31-11
(Night Shift) and 15:00 to 15:15 (Day Shift). Additionally, blasting during shift was allowed on
isolated stope faces. Typically, mid-shift blasting would occur at 11:00-11:15 on day shift and
20:30-20:45 (1-1-07 to 12-20-10) and 21:00-21:15 (12-21-10 to 12-31-11) on night shift. This
plot shows that a background level of about 1-2% of all events may occur per hour randomly
throughout the day. Approximately 65% of all recorded events (regardless of size) occur with
blasting, and that the blasting-related events decay to the background rate within about ;h to 1
hour of the blasting window. From 2006 to 2011, 17 events occurred in which some level of
damage was reported. Level of damage ranged from minor flyrock to the extensive damage
from events in Nov. - Dec. 2011. Of these damaging events, 11, or 65% occurred with or
shortly after blasting. In summary, this data provides the basis for use of a central blasting
system in which blasting occurs at the end of shift after workers have vacated the stoping areas,
and excluding entry for approximately 1 hour thereafter.
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ICTCOURT

IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JtJDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

FRANNIE ANDERTON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RAYMOND CAMPBELL,

CASE NO. CV-2013-2722

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

This case arises out of a mining accident which occurred at the Lucky Friday Mine on
April 15, 2011. The basic facts are as follows:

Larry "Pete" and Mike Marek (hereinafter "Pete'' and "Mike") were brothers and were
both employed as 111.iners for Hecla at the Lucky Friday Mine. Shift Boss Dale Stepro was Pete

and Mike's direct supervisor. At the time of the incident Phillip S. Baker, was Hecla's CEO,
President, and a Member of the Board of Directors; John Jordan was Heda's General Manager;

Doug Bayer was Heda's Mine Supervisor; Ron Krusemark 1 was Hecla's Chief Engineer; Scott
Hogamier was Hecla's Safety Coordinator; Cindy Moore was a Chief Engineer for Hecla; and,
as noted above, Dale Stepro was a Shift Boss for Hecla.
On April 15, 2011, Pete and Mike were working at the Lucky Friday Mine at

6150-

1

Krusemark was dismissed from this case by stipulation on March l l., 2015.
.MEMORANDUM DECISJON AND ORDER GRANTING DEPENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
n;.,,-t-at"!af\, ..~~= SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I
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No. 4

was
enaicted by MSHA.
Upon arriving at the 6150-15-3 stope, Pete and Mike set about watering down the muck

in the stope to cool the area; Pete watered the muck in the 6150-15-3 west stope and Mike
watered the muck in the 6150-15-3 east stope. At approximately 5:30 p.m. on April 15, 2011,

Mike observed Pete ro!Hng up the hose he had been using to water the muck in the 6150-15-3
west stope when the stope allegedly failed causing a massive amount of ground to collapse onto

Pete. Plaintiffs allege that the failure of the stope was caused by Defendants' decision to
undercut the waste pillar; the cave-in was approximately 90 feet long, 20 feet wide, and 30 feet
high. Mike was not able to rescue Pete; a search for Pete's body took place over the next 9 days.
Pete ts body was found on April 24, 2011; his cause of death was determined t9 be blunt force
+

--

-

--

-

-

--

-

-

•

--

-

trauma.

Plaintiffs and Defendants have each filed Motions for Summary Judgment. By way of
their Partial Motion for Summary Judgment1 Plaintiffs seek dismissal of Defendants' Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Defenses on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants concede

that their seventh, eighth, and tenth defenses should be dismissed. Defendants oppose Pla.intiffsl

Motion for Summary Judgment and seek Surrunary Judgment that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is
found in Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law; Defendants also seek Summary Judgment on the

claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

It is undisputed by the parties that M.l.ke and .Pete were not assigned to work in the 6 IS0-15-3 stope; rather they
were assigned to work In the spray chamber in the 6150 slot and chose to water down the muck in the 6150-15-3

stope.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Ronne!

Barrette, etal

Mining
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate •1if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together 'With the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." IRCP 56(c). "Once the
movant has established a pri.ma facie case that, on the basis of uncontroverted facts, the movant
is entitled to judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial and cannot merely rest on the pleadings." Mc Vicker v. City ofLewiston,
134 Idaho 34, 37 (2000), citing IRCP 56(e); Theriault v. A.H Robins Co. Inv., 108 Idaho 303,
306 (1985).
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in tbis rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings,
but the p~y's response!! by_affidavits or as o~~~seprovided in this rule,must s~t forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.

IRCP 56(e).
"In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 'make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."' Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,_, 245 P.3d
1009, 1012 (2011), (quotingBadell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102; 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)).
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"Generally,

arising
P.2d 117i, 1

compensation

and

provides the

the course of employment." Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho

(Idaho, i 988); see also

§§ 72-201, 72-209, and 72-211; Dominguez ex

Hamp v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 11, 121 P.3d 938,942 (Idaho, 2005).
LC. § 72-209 provides that:
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the liability of the
employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the
employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representatives or
assigns,

(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also
extend to the employer's surety and to all officers, agents, servants and employees
of the employer or surety,provided that such exemptions from liability shallnot
apply tn any case where ihe injury or death is proximately caused by the w{/ful or
unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or
employees, the loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor and shall
not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer,
or the employer was a party thereto.
(Emphasis added)

In other words. "[f]or those injuries covered by worker's compensation, an employer is
generally liable to its employees only under the worker's compensation system and is immune
other civil causes of action." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 11, 121 P.3d at 942. Nevertheless,
LC. § 72-209(3) provides an exception from the exclusivity rule "where the injury or death is
proximately caused by the wilful o:r unprovoked physical aggression of the employer; its officers,
agents. servants or employees." In Kearney the Supreme Court of Idaho sought to explain the
§

that

the Court stated that:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGivIBNT AND DENYING PLAlNTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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the case at bar, Plaintiffs argue that the burden to prove exclusivity is on Defendants
and that Defendants' reckless conduct precludes exclusivity. The Court finds, however, that
pursuant to the Court's language in Kearny/ the exclusivity of relief under Idaho Worker's

Compensation is a rebuttable presumption of sorts, and therefore, the burden is on Plaintiffs to
prove that their claims fall within the exception to exclusivity.
Plaintiffs rely heavily upon Dominguez for the assertion that egregious conduct comes

within the umbrella of the exception provided by LC.§ 72-209(3). The Court, however, finds

Dominguez to be readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Dominguez, the Plaintiff
suffered severe injµri~s

after being directed by his employer to was sludge containitig cyanide

from a steel tank. 142 Idaho at 9-10, 121 P.3d at 940-41. The plaintiff's employer allegedly
knew it was hazardous to enter the steel tank, did not obtain a con.fined space entry permit, did
not provide proper training~ did not provide appropriate safety equipment, did not provide an
attendant to stand by, and was not cooperative with the rescue and medical workers thereby
hampering the plaintiff's rescue and treatment ld In that case, the Plaintiff was permitted to

collect worker's compensation benefits and to bring a cause of action against his employer
outside of the worker;s compensation system because he alleged «a willful unprovoked physical
aggression by his employer, and therefore his claim [fell] into a statutory exception to the
exclusive remedy rule." Id. at 12, 121 P.3d at 943.
3

"To prove aggression there must be evidence of some offensive action or hostile attack. It is not sufficient to prove
that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur."
Kearney, I 14 Idaho at 757, 760 P.2d at 1173 (Emphasis added)
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case

or impeded rescue efforts.

Furthermore,

Court finds that the procedural posture of Dominguez is distinguishable

from the case at bar. In Dominguez, the employer was denied summary judgment; subsequently,

employer's counsel withdrew. Following the withdrawal of its counsel, the employer failed to
timely respond and thus, default judgment was entered. Id at 10, 121 P.3d at 941. The employer
did not move the trial court to set aside the default) but rather sought to appeal the default and the

denial of its motion for summary judgment, directly to the Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme
Court noted that no direct appeal can be taken from default, and that "[u]pon default by the

defendant, the allegations contained in the complaint are taken as true, and the plaintiff is
relieve~ ()f any obligation to introduce_ evidence in support of those allegations. Dominguez,_
Idaho at 13-14) 121 P.3d at 944-45. Therefore, because of the employer,s default, the plaintiff's

allegations of willful or unprovoked physical aggression by the employer were accepted as true.
The Court is cognizant of the Supreme Coure s statement in Dominguez that:
Contrary to the Employer1s assertions, injury in the course of employment and
injury as the result of an intentional act are not mutually exclusive. As a matter of
common sense, an employee can be harmed while working, whether that harm is
the result of negligence or design. Even if an employer commits an intentional tort
against an employee, it does not follow that the tort necessarily arose outside of
the employment context. or that the employee was acting outside the course of his
employment at the time of irJury.
An injury can be "accidental'' from the perspective of an employee while at the
same time being intentional on the part of the employer. The worker1s
compensation law defines an "injury" as "a personal injury caused by an accident
arising out of and in the course of any employment covered by the worker's
compensation law." I.C. § 72-102(17)(a). In turn, an "accident" is defined as "an
unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap~ or untoward event, connected
v.ith die industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
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reasonably located as to time and place. It is no contradiction for Dominguez's
to maintain he suffered an accident covered by worker1s compensation and at the
same time argue he was harmed by the Employer's intentional acts.
1

Idaho at 11, 121 P.3d at 942 (emphasis provided).

Plaintiffs also rely upon In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900 (Bankr. D. Idaho2003) (subsequently
affd sub nom. Elias,.,. Dominguez, 191 F. App'x 567 (9th Cir. 2006)), a bankruptcy case arising
out of Dominguez. In Elias, the United States Bankruptcy Court recognized the rule set forth in

Kearney, and asserted that "[e]ffectively, to recover outside the Worker's Compensation system,
a claimant must prove that the employer committed an intentional act of aggression against the
claimant which caused an injury. In re Elias, 302 B.R. at 912. The Bankruptcy Court restated the

Dominguez Court's 'judgment as preclusively establish(ing] that the allegations of the complaint

are true, and that Defendant acted with a subjective intent to harm Plaintiff: or that he believed
that harm was substantially certain to occur/' Id at 913. In the case at bar; there are no
allegations that Defendants acted with any subjective intent to harm Pete and/or Mike Marek, nor
are there any allegations that Defendants believed that harm was substantially certain to occur.
The Court finds that the facts in the case at bar are most analogous to Kearney. In that
case the employee was injured while she was working for the employer when her right foot was
partially severed by a lawn mower she was operating. Kearney, 114 Idaho at 756, 760 P.2d at
1172. In that case7 the employer assembled the lawn mower without installing the included safety
devices or a grass deflector that would have covered a.n area exposing the blade of the mower. Id.
Instead; the employer prepared the mower so that a grass catcher could be
attached th.at would cover this opening while the lawn mower was being operated.
The employer left it to the discretion of the person operating the lawn mower
whether the grass catcher was used or not. At the time the employee was injured
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUM:MARY
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was
on
an
injury the employee slipped
hillsides when the grass was wet the time
contact with the
while going downhill with the mower causing her
rotary blade.

In Kearney, the employee argued that Idaho worker's compensation law does not prevent
an employee from recovering damages in a civil action against an employer for injury caused to
an employee by an intentional tort of the employer while the employee is in the course of

employment, and that the rule should be extended to include negligent acts committed by the
employer where there is a substantial certainty that injury to the employee v.ri.11 occur. Id at 757,

760 P.2d at 1173. Ultimately, however, the trial court in Kearney granted summary judgment
because there was no evidence presented that the employer wilfully or without provocation

physically and offensively or hostilely attacked the employee. Id. -The Supreme Court upheld
summary judgment and stated that 1'[i]n the absence of [that] evidence there was no genuine
issue of material fact, and the trial court was justified in granting summary judgment against the
employee." /dat 757-58~ 760 P.2d at 1173~74. Like Kearny, in the case at bar, there are no
allegations and no evidence has been presented that Defendants willfully or without provocation

physically and offensively or hostilely attacked either Pete or Mike Marek.
The case at bar is also akin to DeMoss v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 118 Idaho 176i 795 P.2d
875 (1990). In that case, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking recovery for mental anguish resulting
from exposure to asbestos. The trial court granted summary judgment in fuvor of the City and
concluded that worker's compensation exclusivity barred tort recovery and the Supreme Court of

affirmed. DeMoss 118 Idaho at

P.2d at 876-77. In Delvf.oss. the Supreme Court
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war1tect to cause
manner.
shows further that John Austin, the city welder, told defendant Eastwood that he
thought the material might be asbestos. The record does not show that Eastwood
or any of the defendants actually knew that it was asbestos until the test results

from the laboratory were received. These test results were received after the
appellants' first exposure to the asbestos had occurred. More-0ver, while the
protective clothing provided the workers prior to the second round of removal
may indeed have been inadequate, that does not rise to the level of "unprovoked
physical aggression." To reiterate what we said in Kearney v. Denker, ''It is not
sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that made
it substantially certain that injury would occur." 114 Idaho at 757, 760 P.2d at
1173. The plaintiffs have not proved any "willful or unprovoked physical
aggression" as required in I.C. § 72-209(3), and thus the plaintiffs' state tort
claims were preempted by the Worker's Compensation Act. J.C. §§ 72-201 et seq.
Id at 179, 795 P.2d at 87&.

Similarly, in the case at bar, there is no evidence that Defendants harbored any ill will

toward Pete or Mike or that Defendants wanted Pete or Mike to be injured in any manner, in the

castfat bar there are some -a11egations that Defendants- were warned about potential hazards of the
situation, and there is no evidence that Defendants actually knew the conditions were hazardous
until after the April 15, 2011 incident.

DeMoss is distinguishable from the case at bar in at least

one way: in Delllfoss the plaintiffs were directed into the hazardous environment whereas in the
case at bar, Pete and Mike were not directed into the 6150~ 15-3 stope on April 15, 2011. This
distinguishing factor works in favor of Defendants in the case at bar.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' actions constituted willful or unprovoked physical
aggression against Mike and Pete. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' alleged willful and

unprovoked acts of physical aggression include failing to have engineer review and approval for
the pillar removal, foiling to heed warnings regarding the removal of the pillar, and failing to

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAJNTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDG}v[ENT
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the Court that Defendants acted intentionally with any intent to injury Pete and Mike, that
Defendants knew a collapse was substantially likely to occur. or that Pete and Mike were ordered

work in an unsafe environment.
The Court finds that while there may be some disputed facts in the case at bar, such as
whether Defendants received warnings that the mining practices were dangerous and whether it
was necessary for the chief engineer to approve the mining plan,, those disputed facts are not
material to the Court's determination of whether the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' claims is
IdahoJs Worker Compensation. Furthermore, even if Defendants did know that the environment
was potentially hazardous, Kearney and DeMoss demonstrate that knowledge of the dangerous
condtlion alone that made it su~s_tantially certain that injury would occur does not create an
exception to exclusivity. The relevant inquiry to the Court's determination of exclusivity is
whether Mike's injury and Pete's death were proximately caused by wilful or unprovoked
physical aggression. As noted abovei the Court finds that the burden is on Plaintiffs to establish
that this case falls outside of the exclusivity exception. The Court finds. from a review of the
record, that Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence that Defendants harbored any ill will
toward Mike and/or Pete, nor have Plaintiffs put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted to
cause injury or death to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of
material fact on the issue of whether Idaho Workeris Compensation provides Plaintiffs their
exclusive remedy.
4

The Court notes, that although not verified and thus not matters,
Court may consider in
on the motion
for summary judgment, severa[ of the causes of action alleged ln the Complaint (i.e. negligence, negligence per se,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress) are inconsistent with Plaintiff's argument that this is not a case of

mere .reckless conduct
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' :MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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that Plaintiffs;, exclusive remedy is Idaho Worker's Compensation.

Whether Defendants Phillip Baker, Jr., John Jordan, Doug Bayer, Ron
Krusemark5, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale Stepro, were fellow servants
of Plaintiffs' Pete and Mike Marek and are therefore immune from suit under LC.§
44-1401 et seq. and I.C. § 72-101, et seq.?
The Court notes that according to the plain language of 1.C. § 72-209, the exception from
liability provided by Idaho Worker's Compensation exclusivity also extends to officer, agents,
servants; or employees of the employer. Therefore, the Court fmds that Defendants Phillip
Baker, Jr., John Jordan, Doug Bayer, Ron Krusemark, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale
Stepro, were fellow servants of Pete and Mike, and are therefore immune from liability under
LC.§ 72~209, and for the reasons stated above, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
this issue.
3. Other Arguments Raised by the Parties

The Court having found that Idaho Worker's Comp is the exclusive remedy for Plaintiff's
injuries, the Court need not reach the remaining issues raised by the parties.

ORDER:

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HERBY ORDERED, that:
L The Court finds that pursuant to LC.§ 72-209 and Kearney, Plaintiffs have the
burden to establish that this case falls outside of the exclusivity exception.
2. The Court fmds that Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence that Defendants
harbored any ill will toward Mike and/or Pete, or any evidence the Defendants
wanted to cause injury or death to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court finds that while
there may be some disputed fact; none of those disputed facts are material to the issue
of whether Idaho Worker's Compensation provides Plaintiffs their exclusive remedy.

Krusemark was dismissed from this case by stipulation on March 11, 2015.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING .DE.FENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Defendants, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish that this case falls

outside of the exclusivity exception. Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
this case falls outside the exclusivity exception, the Court finds that Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
4. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is Idaho
Worker's Compensation.
5. The Court finds that pursuant to LC. § 72-209 the exclusivity ofidaho Worker's
Compensation as the only remedy available to Plaintiffs extends to those claims
brought against defendants/co-employees Phillip Baker, Jr., John Jordan, Doug
Bayer, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale Stepro.
6. Pursuant to these findings, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Plaintiffs'

claims are DISMISSED.
7. Defendants' shall prepare and submit a judgment conforming to I.R.C.P. 54.

DATED: The

_l_['day of April, 2015.

A~ IL. ~
~.Simpson
District Judge# 101

~
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JAMES W.

first duly

1.

I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and competent to testify to the matters stated

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and make this affidavit

herein.

based upon my own personal knowledge.
3.

I currently am and at all relevant times mentioned herein was a resident of the

State of Tennessee.
4.

I currently am and at all relevant times mentioned herein was employed with as

Emeritus Profossol' of Engineering at the University of Maryland and

a Doctotate degree

in Mechanics from the Illinois Institute of Technology. I have been a mechanical engineer since
1

. See my curriculum vitae, listing of prior testimony and listing of publications, attached

hereto as Exhibit "1".
5.

I have reviewed the following documents and records in preparing my opinions in

this matter: United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration {MSHA}
Reports of Investigations regarding fatalities and injuries of miners at the Lucky Friday Mine on
April 15, November 17, and December 14, 2011; Citations and Orders issued by MSHA related to
prior fatalities and injuries of miners at the Lucky Friday Mine; Orders Nos. 8559614 and 8559615
issued by MSHA on May 1 2012 regarding the rock burst that caused injury to Ronnell E. Barrett

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W.
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on
dated
April .9, 2015 and Wilson B.lake Affidavit dated November 8, 2013; Correspondence from Hecla
Mining Company to the Mine Safety and Health Administration regarding stress monitors;
Complaint; MSHA Citations and Orders issued to Hecla regarding safety violations related to ground
control and support on December 16, 18, and 19, 2011 with inspector notes and documents; Exhibits
1 through 58 of deposition exhibits for Hecla employees; MSHA Order No. 8565565 issued to Hecla

on December 21, 2011 for continuing to work while still under a previous order; Defendant'
Discovery Responses and Exhibits; Depositions of Doug Bayer, John Jordan, Terry Devoe, and
Ronald Ki·usmark in Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration v. Hecla Limited;
Deposition transcript for John Jordan dated April 6, 201 · Deposition transcript for Doug Bayer
dated April 6, 2015; MSHA Order 8605614 issued to Hecla to conduct readings of stress monitors at
the 5900 I-Drift Pillar; December 27, 2011 Memorandum from Wilson Blake and Mark Board,
Consultants to Hecla managers John Jordan, Doug Bayer, John Lund, Karl Ha1imann, Eric Carlson,
and Zach Thomas; "Recent Bursting in Gold Hunter and Its Implications"; Report by Itasca
Consulting Group, regarding stability of the 5900 I-Drift Pillar in the Lucky Friday Mine;
Memorandum from Blake Wilson to Mark Board, Itasca Consulting Group, dated November 17,
. 2011 regarding the stability of the 5900 Pillar in the Lucky Friday Mine; MSHA repo1is, citations,
orders related to the

at the Lucky Friday Mine on November 16, 2011 and December

1 .
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was

to

caused a

Eight miners were installing a steel tunnel liner in this drift at the

of the rock burst. Seven

these miners were injured by the falling rock during this event and taken to area hospitals.
The injured miners included: Jason Chambers, Ronnel E Barrett, Greg Hammerberg, Erick J.
Tester, Matthew Williams, Geoff Parker, and Wallace Lambott.
7.

The Helca Mining Company, a Delaware Corporation, operates the Lucky Friday

Mine. This is one of the deepest mines in the United States with mining operations being
conducted at depths exceeding 6,000 ft. In 1998 White and Whyatt, from the Spokane Research
laboratory of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, wrote "The Coeur
d'Alene Mining District in northern Idaho

the second largestsilver-mining district in the world·

as well as a leading U.S. producer oflead and zinc. At recent mining depths of nearly 2,000 m,
Hecla Mining Co.'s Lucky Friday Mine has been one of the most active mines in North America
tenns of seismic energy per tonne of ore mined.
8.

The mining area is accessed by an 18 ft diameter concrete lined shaft constructed

in 1983 and known as the Silver Shaft. Ore is removed from a relatively narrow vein (6 to 10 ft
wide) that is nearly vertical. The vein is accessed by tunnels leading from the Silver Shaft to the
various levels where the ore is being mined. At the time of the accident ore was being mined at
the 5500 and 6100 levels while miners were working to install a steel tunnel liner in the 5900
drift. The mining method was to drill holes into the ore, fill these holes with an explosive and
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mme 1s

cross
Attachment
center of
location

mined out

. The 5900 level drift (tunnel) passes through this pillar. The

the mining activity at the time of the accident, 550-11 cut

cut #5, 620-15 cut #4 and 61
10.

particular interest is the donut like pillar located near the

14 cut#4, 610-12

16 cut #5 is shown in the drawing.

As ore is removed from the vein, the walls on the sides of the mined out area tend

to close, due to the weight of the overburden and horizontal forces that develop at depth. The
donut like pillar at the 5900 level resists the closure and in doing so significant compressive
stresses develop within the pillar. These compressive stresses increase as the ore is removed and
the mined out atea: increases in size. When the compressive stresses

the pillar exceed the

compressive strength of the rock the pillar fails. The failure releases the strain energy stored in
the pillar causing a rock burst with stress waves that propagate away from

fracture

causing severe vibrations that register as earthquakes with magnitudes ranging from 1 to 3 or
more on the Richter scale.
11.

Wilson Blake Ph.Dan experienced Geologist and Mining Engineer has served as a

consultant to Hecla Mining Corp. for many years. From May 10, 2010 to December 27, 2011 he
submitted five memos to various managers of the Lucky Friday Mine pertaining to rock bursts in
the Gold Hunter region of the mine near the 5900 level pillar. The first memo written on May
10, 2010 refers to 2.5 Ml rock burst that occurred on April
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footwall of the 5700
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below:

may not be complete, as it was compiled based on

memos

by Dr. Wilson Blake. I have not had the oppottunity to review the complete log of the
seismic events at the mine that were recorded by their system of geo transducers.

Seismic Events in the Gold Hunter
region

Date

Magnitude

4/6/2009

1

10/18/2009

1

2/22/2010

2.5

4/22/2010
11/16/2010

2.2

11/16/2010

2.3

12/9/2010

1.9

8/2/2011

1.9

11/16/2011

2.8 or 3.0+

12/14/2011

2.2

Dr Blake's second memo, written on November 30, 2010, pertains

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W.
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two rock
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1

1

were

associated

It is

(seismic events) are often triggered by blasting the stopes.
13.

While these reports of rock bursts refer to events occurring prior to the

November/December 2011 period, these memos clearly indicate the high probability of rock
bursts in the Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter mine, and the fact that blasting induces rock bursts.
14.

The third memo written on November 18, 2011 pertains to the 2.8 rock burst that

occurred on November 16, 2011. See Blake Repo1t, dated November 18, 2011, attached as
Exhibit "8" to the Rossman Affidavit. In the summary section of this memo, he stated "The 2.8
inthe 5900 pillat

not expected:and did nofappear to be

pillarburst. Because

the upper ribs and back appeared to be solid, we can't assume that the remaining pillar is
destressed, hence the rehabilitation needs to proceed with caution."

also stated that, "we need

to better understand the cause of this burst to be able to relate it to mining the main sill."
15.

His fourth memo, written a week later on November 25, 2011, also pertains to the

2.8 Ml rock burst that occurred on November 16, 2011. See November 25, 2011 Blake Memo,
attached as Exhibit "6" to the Rossman Affidavit. Blake made an initial visit to the 5900 pillar
immediately following the rock burst on November 16 and a subsequent visit on November 23.
The November 25th memo describes his observations and opinion for the cause of the 5900 pillar
burst, as well as the present stability of the 5900 pillar.

important

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W. DALLY, PH.D. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7

that

as the

underhand stope was blasted. However,

magnitude was in

the 3.0 range as measuted by the seismic sensors of the USGS National
Earthquake Center located at Montana Tech in Butte, MT. Butte, MT is
about 250 miles from Mullin, ID; hence it appears that the seismic event
on November 16, 2011 was much stronger than the 2.8 reported by Dr.
Blake.
2.

model studies by Itasca indicated that small rock bursts around

the edges of the pillar could be expected with magnitudes up to 2.0, and
with magnitudes as ftigh as 1

fact, did occur1. The model

results also indicated that pillar was safe unless its height to width ratio
changed and the pillar lost confinement.
3.

The model assumed a 10: 1 width to height ratio for the pillar and

predicted that a foundation failure would occur in the outer walls, rather
than in the core of the pillar. Moreover, the model results did not include
any geologic structures intersecting the pillar.

1 The 3.0+ magnitude earthquake generated by the seismic event on November 16, 2011 was an order of
made in
the mine should have ale1ied management that the status of the 5900 pillar had changed.
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W. DALLY, PH.D. [N SUPPORT OF PLAINTlFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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is actually 3

a 10 ft. vein

thickness. The 5900 pillar is borderline stable based on mining.history
at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter.

5.

The in situ stress in the 5900 pillar area before mining was some

1.2 psi/ ft of depth for the vertical stress, and 1.5 times this value for the
horizontal stress. The actual vertical distance to surface above the Gold
Hunter is in the 7,000 ft range, hence the vertical stress would be 8,400
psi, and the maximum horizontal stress, N40°W direction, is 12,600 psi.
-From the stress ga:ges it is known that the sttesses

the

pillar from mining off of the 5900 level, taking into account the ore and
waste rock modulus values, was also some 12,600 psi. Hence, the stress
in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive strength of the

pillar, and any further loss of confinement could lead to a pillar
failure.

7.

The fact that the displaced rock from the back and walls of the

pillar was comprised of very large slabs, with no dust, indicated that the
2.8 burst was not a classic pillar rock burst. In addition, the domed cavity
formed above the burst zone was not fractured and appeared to stili be

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W.
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memo
on December

2011.

on

1

to

Memorandum from Wilson Blake and Mark

dated

December 27, 2011, attached as Exhibit "18" to the Rossman Affidavit. He observed that the
event appears to have occmred directly in the 5900 pillar, in the immediate east rib of the 5900
drift. Damage was finely-fragmented and crushed rock and bolts and cables appearing to be
broken in tension at the drift east shoulder and rib. This appears to be a typical strain burst
mechanism resulting from the solid pillar in the wall of the 5900 drift reaching its peak strength.
attributes the cause of this rock burst to the damage produced during the November 16 event,
which ejected rock from the 5900 drift, expanded the drift

reduced the width to height ratio

----·of the-pillar (to around·3: 1t and increased the minih1f induted stfess

tlie pillar.

noted that

the pillar failure was centered in the strong, non-failed core of the pillar ofreduced w/h ratio.
17.

Dr. Wilson Blake warned the management team at Helca Mining Corp. of the

danger of rock bursts at the 5900 drift and pillar.

18.

He cautioned Hecla management that the stress in the pillar was very near the

unconfined compressive strength of the pillar, and any further loss of confinement could
lead to a pillar failure.

19.

He also informed management that the damage due to the rock burst of November

16, 2011 changed the geometry of the 5900 pillar. The new width to height ratio of the 5900
pillar (a doughnut shape) is actually 3 .5, assuming a l Oft. vein thiclmess. Previously the width

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W.
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at Lucky

that

rehabilitation needs to proceed with caution.
21.

It is important to note that these warnings about the pillar's borderline stability and

additional loss of confinement could lead to pillar failure were made on November 28th more
than two weeks before the accident on December 14, 2011.
22.

The managers at Helca decided to rehabilitate the 5900 Drift. On November 29,

2011 Doug Bayer issued a memo2 describing the rehabilitation plan for the 5900 drift. See Bayer
Update, dated November 29, 2011, attached as Exhibit "10" to the Rossman Affidavit. The rock
burst on November 16th had caused approximately 12 feet of its back to fail and damaged both

23.

The repair of the area was plam1ed for two stages. The first stage was to bolt and

shotcrete the area. The second stage was to install a steel tunnel liner through the vein area of
the drift and fill the void above and around the liner with Tech.foam (a compressible concrete
foam). The initial stage of repair, completed by November 29, 2011 involved installation of
dywidags, cable bolts, wire fencing and splits sets. The entire area was shotcreted to a depth of2
to 3 inches.
24.

The secondary, long-term repair involved a steel tunnel liner that was to be

installed through about 35 ft of the 5900 drift. The rock burst of December 14, 2011 occurred

AFFIDA Vff OF JAMES W.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

PH.D. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL

to burst

wrote "that although the pillar is still

and is

still carrying some load and stress, it is believed the majority of the stress was dissipated
with the large rock burst and it will take months or years for the pillar to gain more stress
that could cause any major rock bursts. In addition, the pillar is now smaller in size so it
cannot carry the same load that caused this rock burst". This statement is not consistent
with Dr. Blake's conclusion in his November 25 memorandum that "the pillar was borderline
stable" and that "the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive strength
of the pillar and that any further loss of confinement could lead to pillar failure".

26.

After completion of the first stage or rehabilitation, Mr. Bayer considered the rock

burst area to be stable-and wrote thatmanagement of the mine would like to resume productionprior to completing the installation of the tunnel liner.

Requesting the resumption of

production was a serious error as they were authorizing blasting that was known to trigger
rock bursts. On December 6, 2011 MHSA authorized travel by trucks through the 5900 drift

and mining was initiated.
27.

The decision to initiate mining was willful and exceedingly dangerous because it

involved blasting at three different levels not far removed from the perimeter of the 5900 pillar.

It was well known that blasting triggered rock bursts.
28.

Personnel at the mine employ stress meters to monitor the stresses that develop

2 The rehabilitation memo was

four days after Dr. Blake had

i.,·

ulS

that the pillar was
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by
The stress meters

stress meters (2

back

2

East and West

the back were to be installed 10 ft above the drift and the stress

meters in the ribs were to be placed at a depth of 20 ft. Personnel were able to install 3 of the 6
meters which were in inventory; however 3 of the other meters were on order and were required
by MSHA to be installed immediately upon receipt by Hecla. In addition to the stress meters,
closure points were re-established, and closure was measured east-west across the drift and
north-south across the vein.
29.

During the period of the repair from December 2 to the 14 111 two of the stress

meters installed in the 5900 pillar showed that the stresses in the pillar were continuing to
at the rate of about 1,000 psi pei· week. Helca managers ignored the increasing stress

level in spite of the advice from Blake that the pillar was borderline stable and that the
stresses were very near the unconfined compressive strength of the pillar.
30.

Mr. Ted Williams, for several years, was responsible for measuring the stresses in

the 5900 drift in the Gold Hunter pillar. He collected data from functioning stress gages at the
site and installed new stress gages when replacements became necessary. An illustration of the 6
bore holes used for mounting the stress gages in the 5900 drift is presented in Fig. 1.
31.

The data collected from the stress gages over the period from May 23, 2006 to

April 27, 2011 is presented in Fig. 2. The data collected in earlier years (2006 to 2009) was

stable. and that the stress in the pillar was very near the

strength of the pillar.
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installation.
measurements
32.

at

the stresses.
The measurements are increasing steadily with time and indicate very high stress

The West-Hi gage registered 22,500 psi before malfunctioning and the West-Lo gage is
indicating a stress of 20,300 psi. These values are almost twice the estimate of the unconfined
strength of the rock in the pillar. Wilson Blake, a consultant to Hecla, has stated, the maximum
horizontal stress is 12,600 psi which is near the unconfined compressive strength of the pillar.

He also stated that the pillar after the 3.0 (USGS) magnitude burst on November 16, 2011

would fail with any further loss of confinement. Note the gaps in the data are due to either

failure or failure of the data Iogget;-

Wilson Blake Memo ofNovember
Zach Thomas.

, John Lund. Karl

Eric Carlson and

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W. DALLY, PH.D. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTrAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14

•

693 of 1172

Fig. 1 Location of the stress gages in the 5900 drift (2006 to April 20 11). Note the direction
of the stresses is parallel to the drift.
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on November 16, 20 I
area and to restore the 5900 drift so it could be used for haulage. Part of the repair plan4
involved the measurement of stresses at six sites in the 5900 pillar. Because.the gages originally
installed in the pillar were destroyed in the rock burst new bore holes and gages were required.
Because only three gages were available at the time they were installed at the locations shown in
Fig. 3. Additional gages were to be installed immediately after their delivery.
34.

Three stress gages were installed on December 1, 2011. Readings from the tlu·ee

from December 2nd to the 14th are shown in Fig. 4. It is evident from these results that the
stresses recorded by the Top and the West gages are increasing with time and the stresses in the
pillar continue to increase;- However,. the results from the East

decteased initially and then

held essentially constant for the remaining interval. This behavior was not anticipated as all
three gages were expected to indicate either increasing load or constant load. I believe the East
stress gage was not properly installed. The fact that the gage is providing readings indicates that
the gage is functioning and has not failed. The installation was a failure.
35.

The stress gages respond to

very small changes in the diameter of the
borehole and Geokon is specific in its

4 See document titled
2011

Drift

5900
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00

I did not find evidence that they used a
borescope to confirm that the walls of the boreholes were sufficiently smooth for a successful
installation.
Fig. 3 Location of the three stress gages installed in the 5900 pillar following the rock burst
ofNovember 16, 2011.

-2:C.C•

J-----------------------------

Fig. 4 Stress measurements from the three gages installed in the 5900 pillar following the

rock burst

1

11.

readings are

12 day
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2

of
a

12

on the

1,000

Although stress gages were not

place

November 16 to

1, 2011, it is reasonable to assume at least another 1,000 psi of stress was imposed oh
the 5900 pillar during this 14 day period.
37.

Helca was able to monitor the stresses in the 5900 pillar at two locations. These

stress meters showed that the stresses in the pillar were increasing; however, management at
continued with the repairs in the 5900 drift in spite of the warningss from Wilson Blake
that the pillar was "borderline stable based on mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter."
38.

Two of the stress gages showed increasing stress levels, which should have

managers at tlieLucky Fdday Mine that

.... -on the 5900 pillar was increasing

and that Blake had previously warned them that the pillar had little or no margin of safety.
39.

Mark Board working for Itasca Denver, performed a numerical analysis of the

5900 pillar in the Hunter Gold region of the Lucky Friday Mine. The purpose of this study was
to provide a numerical model to match the pillar observations and thereby develop an
understanding of the current pillar behavior. The issues raised pertaining to the 5900 pillar are:
1.

Is the pillar currently in a failed or unfailed state?

5 See page 2 of Blake's memo ofNovember
Carlson and Zach Thomas.

2011 to John

Doug

, John

Karl
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to
3.

Given

pillar

high stress values monitored, why is the

not

showing more damage?
4.

Is the discing and hole breakout observed what might be expected

given the monitored stresses?
Why is the response of the pillar apparently different on the two
sides of the 5900 drift?
40.

A summary of the numerical results indicated:
1.

A reasonable agreement of the numerical model to predict stress

chan:ges:was-achieved;- aftefl;onsidehngth.e uncertainty of the stress mefer ·
measurements.
2.

The reason for the variation in measured stress on the east and west

side of the 5900 drift was not determined. However, the results were
within the typical uncertainty of the output from the stress meters. The
most significant unce1tainty in the stress measurements is the calibration
factor used in for converting the vibrational frequency of the sensor's wire
to stress change. This calibration factor is dependent on the modulus of the
rock in which the gage is installed. The high variability of the rock
modulus (vitreous

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W.
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to siderite-argillite) means

a
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stress measurements

OCCUL

uncertainties involve installation orientations and hole roundness (contact
seating area). Becaus.e of these uncertainties, the correspondence of the
numerical and experimental data is considered to be very good.
3.

The numerical analysis predicts that the outer boundaries of the

pillar (about 10' to 15' thick) will fail in brittle tensile and shearing
modes. This failure relieves the stresses from the pillar boundaries and
transfers them into the confined core of the pillar. These stresses are
sufficient to produce discing and borehole breakouts, particularly in the
weaker siderite zones·. -The· observation holes show

discing

whose intensity appears to vary by rock type, but discing occurs
tlu·oughout most of the holes away from the 5900 drift. Breakouts occur in
both holes, and are strongest in the west borehole, although both holes are
open and passable to the camera. The bottom 10' of the west borehole is
rubblized and core lost, which corresponds to the depth of extensive
failure predicted by the numerical analysis. The bottom 1O' of the east
borehole, conversely, shows little non-failed core in what appears to be
strong silicic material. The east hole actually is drilled in the stronger

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W.
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the
5900

is relatively small; about 1 drift radius in the

and sidewalls

of the drift. The model indicates that the drift should be stable under the
current stress conditions, largely because it is driven parallel to the major
principal stress that flows vein-perpendicular.
5.

The strength properties taken for the stronger silicic rocks result in

approximately the c01Tect zone of brittle fracturing in the back and floor
observed in the overhand and underhand stopes (about 3 to 5' of back
fracturing).
The results indicate a closure of the orebody (hanging wall to
footwall) at the 5900 drift of about 1.5 in." is similar to that measured by
the tape extensometer. This is not a very sensitive calibration measure, but
the modeling appears to have used about the conect applied N-S stress and
elastic modulus of the rock.
41.

The numerical results were considered to be in reasonable agreement with the

measurements and observations of failure zones considering the uncertainties in the rock
properties and measurements. The important question pertains to the stability of the 5900 pillar,
and how might it be expected to respond in the future?
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4 3.

It is important to note that the Itasca report is dated March 2010 and does not

account for the effects of continued mining of the 30 vein. See Calibration of 5900 Pillar
Numerical Model, attached as Exhibit "31" to the Rossman Affidavit. Mark Board expects that
the stress changes in the pillar should stabilize. It is also expected that the pillar should have an
elastic core, because it has a width to height ratio of about 8 to 10 to 16. Experience and research
studies have shown that pillars with width to height ratios (W/H) in brittle rocks are elastic for
W /H greater than about 3. With squat pillars, the rock cannot displace under the action of
compressive stress, the interior of the pillar is confined; thus, permitting large stresses to build
-·-·· without yielding; Itis wellknown that the rock strength:.fricreases dramatically with confining
pressure. These squat highly stressed pillars can fail and in doing so produce small seismic
events in the highly-stressed regions around the periphery. However, they are unlikely to fail by
crushing. Time-dependent yielding in the pillar's periphery can cause small seismic events as the
pillar slowly adjusts to the stress redistribution.
44.

The stability discussion in the paragraph above may have been valid in March of

2010. However, the rock burst ofNovember 16, 2011 markedly changed the geometry of the
pillar.
45.

Blake in his November 25, 2011 memorandum observed that Itasca's numerical
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a magnitude

The model results

indicated that the only way the pillar could fail

was if the height to width ratio changed and the pillar lost confinement, in which case a
foundation failure might occur. The model assumed a 10 to 1 width to height ratio. The
foundation failure would occur at the walls, rather than in the core of the pillar. And further, the
model results did not include any geologic structures intersecting the pillar.
46.

Blake then adds that with the observed stress deterioration along the inner and

outer edges of the pillar, likely in the 10 ft range, the width to height ratio of the in place
doughnut shaped pillar is actually 3 .5, assuming a 10 ft. vein thickness. This pillar is borderline
stable based on mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter.
Finally Blake indicatesthat the stf'ess ih the pillar is at the unconfined stre1igth of
the rock. He states that ''the in situ stress in the 5900 pillar area before mining was some 1.2 psi/

ft of depth for the vertical stress, and 1.5 times this value for the horizontal stress. The actual
vertical distance to surface above the Gold Hunter is in the 7,000 ft range, hence the vertical
stress would be 8,400 psi, and the maximum horizontal stress, N40°W direction, is 12,600 psi.
From the stress gages we know that the stress increase in the pillar from mining off of the 5900
level, taking into account the ore and waste rock modulus values, was also some 12,600 psi.
Hence, the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined compressive strength of the

6 The IO to 1 W /H ratio does not account for the fact that the 5900 pillar has a drift through its center that
the W/H ratio.
the effect
drift in
memo
2011.
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vast

2013
events at

Friday Mine are

by blasting

occurring with the

blast or within some time window thereafter)". See Geotechnical Characteristics of the Lucky
Friday Mine, December 2012, Section 4.2.3; Rock burst Control Plan, Lucky Friday Unit,
December 2012, Section 3.3. See Jackson Kelly PLLC letter, dated November 8, 2013, attached
as Exhibit "32" to the Rossman Affidavit.
49.

The Lucky Friday Incident Report for the November 16, 2011 rock burst identifies

the trigger of the seismic event as blasting together with ground movement causing a build-up of
pressure in the rock. See Incident Report, attached as Exhibit "33" to the Rossman Affidavit.
states that rock· bursts can

our-

will happen

employees are in a safe place during blasting will aid in our goal of sending everyone home safe
and sound. Continued monitoring of the working conditions is a must.
50.

Dr. Blake in his memo of November 18, 2011 identifies the trigger of the seismic

event ofN ovember 16, 2011 as the firing oflast hole of the round from the overlying 5500 level
underhand stope. See id, Exhibit "8".
51.

Dr. Blake in his memo ofNovember 30, 2010 identifies the trigger for the seismic

event of November 16, 2010 as the blasting on the 5500 14W cut. See id., Exhibit "37".
52.

Blasting can induce rock bursts or rock falls in tvvo different ways. First the

detonation of an explosive, which is coupled

to

rock

a

hole,
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as
2011. The stress waves from

slip on November 16,

2011 was sufficiently intense to cause a 3 .O+ earthquake as registered on the seismograph 200

away at Montana Tech.
53.

The second mechanism for blasting to cause seismic events is by local rock

bursting. The ore body is confined, except at a bench face where mining is occurring. Confined
rock bodies can support much higher stresses than unconfined rock specimens.
54.

\Vhen a miner blasts away the bench face to loosen the ore, he exposes a new

which has not be stress relieved. This new surface has suddenly lost its confinement and
cannot support thestresses thatexist there,. A

small and local rock-btii:st occurs thatejects rock

into the muck pile and relieves the stresses for a depth of a few feet into the bench face. The
detrimental effect is again the stress wave generated by the small local rock burst that may
interact with a near-by fault causing a fault slip that in tum generates a much more significant
stress wave capable of damaging structures in the mine.
55.

There is clear evidence that blasting triggers seismic events with rock bursts or

rock falls.

When Helca managers resumed mining on December 6, 2011, they authorized

blasting in the stopes above and below the 5900 pillar. The daily shift reports show blasting
occurring daily on multiple levels. Blasting was occurring at 520-10, 550-11, 555-14, 610-12,
61

1

615-16, 620-1

and 650-55 levels above and below the 5900 pillar from December 6 to
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ore
dated

1

to

an

was

20

2012~

attached

as Exhibit "34"to the Rossman Affidavit. The report states that the amount of footage mined in
the 10, 11, and 14 stopes between November 17, 2011 and December 13, 2011 was:
Stope 10 -12 feet of advance, and a 6 foot slab
Stope 11 - 96 feet, both east and west sides
Stope 14 - 38 feet, both east and west sides
57.

Note that this listing of advances is not consistent with the daily shift reports

which indicated drilling and blasting on stopes 10, 11, 12, 1

· "16"- to the Rossm·an Affidavit. The

1

and16

16 and
the

See id., Exhibit

6f00 to 6200

located below the 5900 pillar, and the stopes 10, 11 and 14 are located above the 5900 pillar.
58.

Mining above and below the pillar had two detrimental effects. First blasting at

many sites (I estimate 10 to 12 sites) for 8 days with 3 shifts per day provided more than 100
opportunities to trigger a seismic event that would result in failure of the 5900 pillar. Second
removal of ore from above and below the 5900 pillar increased the mined out area and thereby
increased the pressure of the side wall on the pillar and elevated the compressive stresses. The
stress gages confirmed the increased pressure on the 5900 pillar.
59.

bursts in

Helca's Management at the highest levels were aware of the occurrence of rock
Friday Mine and they developed a three

Burst Plan dated
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these

bursts were

directed to various managers m charge of operations at the mine.

Wilson

and

My report provides

considerable detail on the content of Dr. Blake's findings. Of particular importance are his two
memos describing the major rock burst that occurred on November 16, 2011. In his memo of
November 25, 2011, Blake makes several statements which clearly represent warnings to the
managers.
1.

The occurrence of the 2.8 (USGS) magnitude burst in the 5900

pillar during blasting on 11/16/11, and its resulting extensive and
- widesptead -damage, was-~very- much -unexpeded. - Such
damage is not characteristic of a simple pillar burst.
With the observed stress deterioration along the inner and outer
edges of the pillar, the width to height ratio of the in-place, doughnutshaped pillar is actually 3 .5. This pillar is borderline stable based on
mining history at Lucky Friday/Gold Hunter.
3.

Hence, the stress in the pillar was very near the unconfined

compressive strength of the pillar, and any further loss of confinement
could lead to a pillar failure.
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I
burst

occurrence

this

it cannot be totally eliminated.

See id., Exhibit "6".
61.

Managers at the Lucky Friday Mine decided to rehabilitate the 5900 drift. On

November 29, 2011 Doug Bayer issued a memo describing the rehabilitation plan for the 5900
drift. See id., Exhibit "10" to the Rossman Affidavit. The repair of the area was planned for
two stages. The first stage was to bolt and shotcrete the damaged areas. The second stage was to
install a steel tunnel liner through the drift and fill the void around the liner with Techfoam (a
compressible concrete foam). The initial stage ofrepair was completed on or before November
29,-201 L
62.

The secondary long term repairs involved a steel tunnel liner that was to be

installed through about

ft of the 5900 drift. The rock burst of December 14, 2011 occurred

while this liner was being installed. Seven of the eight miners working to install the liner were
injured during the rock burst.
63.

After completing the first stage of the rehabilitation, Mr. Bayer considered the

rock burst area to be stable and wrote that management of the mine would like to resume
production prior to completing the installation of the tunnel liner.' On December 6, 2011, based
upon reports issued by Hecla, MSHA authorized travel by trucks through the 5900 drift and
mining was initiated. See Bayer Update, dated December 6, 2011, attached as Exhibit" 13" to the
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stress measurements
an mcrease

was

1,000

gages

additional stress imposed on the 5900 pillar in the 12

day period leading to the rock burst of December 14. Although stress gages were not in place ·
from November 16 to December 1, 2011, it is reasonable to assume at least another 1,000 psi of
stress was imposed on the column during this 14 day period.
65.

Disregarding the fact that the stresses in the pillar were increasing, mine managers

continued with repairing the 5900 drift ignoring the warnings from Wilson Blake that the pillar
was borderline stable and that the pillar had little or no margin of safety.
66.

The decision to send employees into the pillar to rehabilitate the pillar while at the

same:time·initiating mining.was ·extremely

~~..,....

-k

because it involved blasting at thl'ee

different levels and at least 10 sites not far removed from the perimeter of the 5900 pillar. It was
known that blasting triggered rock bursts and the pillar was at or very near its compressive
with increasing monitoring stresses.
67.

From my review of the actions of the managers at the Lucky Friday Mine, I

believe they were taking unwarrantable risk in deciding to rehabilitate the 5900 drift. I believe
this risk became inexcusable when the stress gages in the 5900 pillar were clearly showing that
the stresses, already at their limit, were continuing to increase. Finally I believe that Hecla
management acted willfully with gross disregard for the safety of its employees when mining
5900
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or should have

action under circumstances
reasonably known that this conduct would.create an unreasonable risk

direct physical injury

and aggression to the miners and that there was a high degree of probability that such direct
physical injury would actually result from the conduct.
DATED this - - day of June, 2015.

James W. Dally, Ph.D.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _ _ day

June, 2015.

Notary Public for West Virginia
Residing at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Commission expires:
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Mechanical Engineering,
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M.S. Mechanical Engineering,
Institute of Technology, 1953
Ph.D. Mechanics, Illinois Institute of Technology,

EXPERIENCE:
Engineering Trainee, Mesta Machine Company, Homestead, PA, 1951-1953
Senior Research Engineer, Armour Research Foundation, Chicago, IL, 1953-1958
Assistant Professor, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1958-196 l
Assistant Director of Research, IIT Research Institute, Chicago, LL, 1961-1963
Professor of Mechanics, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL, 1963-1971
Chairman and Professor Mechanical Engineering, Univ. of Maryland, College Park, MD, 1971-1979
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Professor Mechanical Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 1984-1997
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National Academy of Engineering
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Honorary Member 1983
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American Academy of Mechanics
Fellow Award 1992
Past President A ward 1990
" 1 "'ren·v of Maryland
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PATENTS
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Patent No. 3,778, l 09 Low Noise Process for Pavement Fragmentation
Patent No. 3,718,066 A Tension Indicating Fastener
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TEXTBOOKS:
Experimental Stress Analvsis. with W. F. Riley, McGraw Hill Book Co. 1965.
2°d edition 1978
1
3" edition 1991
1
4 1, edition withW. F. Riley, College House Enterprises; LLC 2004

Instrumentation for E1rn:i11eeringMeasurements., with W. F. Riley and K. G. McConnell, Wiley, 1984.
2"d edition 1993
Photoelastic Coatin2:s. with F. Zandman and A. Redner Iowa State University

1977.
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Ed.2003

2001
Book 8,
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Ed., 2007
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3rd Ed., with R. J. Bonenberger, 2003
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with Robert J. Bonenberger, College House Enterprises,
eBook Edition 2012
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2010

2010
eBook Edition 2012
Instrumentation and Sensors for Engineering Measurements and Process Control, with Arun Shukla,
College House Enterprises, 2013
Experimental Solid Mechanics, with Arun Shukla, College House Enterprises, 2010
2nd Edition, 2014

TECHNICAL PAPERS
!.
2.
3.
4.
5.

"Determining Stresses in Pressurized Thin-Wall Tubes of Near-Circular Cross Sections," with A.J.
Durelli, Machine Design, December 1954. Vol. 26, No. 12.
"Stresses in Perforated Panels," with A.J. Durelli, Product Engineering, March 1956.
"Prediction of Brittle Coating Strain Sensitivity Based on a Statistical Regression Analysis," with A.J.
Durelli, Proceedings ofSESA of 1955, Vol. XU!, No. I.
"Some Properties of Stresscoat under Dynamic Loading," with A.J. Durelli, Proceedings of SESA,
Vol. XV (1958), No. 2.
"Further Studies of Properties of Stresscoat Under Dynamic Loading Conditions," with A.J. Durelli
and VJ. Parks, Proceedings of SESA, Vol. XV (1958), No. 2.

Studies on Turbine Blade
Proceedings of
Vol. XVI, No. l, December (1958).
"Stress Concentration Factors under Dynamic Loading Conditions, with A.J. Durelli, Journal of
Mechanical
Science, Vol. l, No. 1, June (1959).
Variables Affecting Brittle Coating in Stress Analysis," with A.J. Durelli, Product Engineering,
Design Digest
Vol. 30, No. 38, pp. 302-305, September i 959.
l l. "A Photoelastic Approach to Ti·ansient Stress Problems Emphasizing Low Modulus Materials," with
W.F. Riley and A.J. Durelli, Journal of Applied Mechanics, Vol. 26, No. 4, December (1959).
12. "Developments in the Application of the Grid Method to Dynamic Problems,1' with A.J. Durelli and
W.F. Riley, Journal of Applied Mechanics, Vol. 26, No. 4, December (1959).
l 3. "A Photoelastic Study of Stress Wave Propagation in Large Plates," with A.J. Durelli and W.F. Riley,
Proceedings of SESA, Vol. XVH, No. 2.
14. "An Experimental Study of Attachments to Cylindrical and Shallow Spherical Shells," with E.T.
Cranch, Proceedings of a Symposium on Nuclear Reactor Containment Buildings and Pressure
Vessels, Royal College of Science and Technology, Glasgow, Scotland ( 1960).
I 5. "Stress Analysis of a Reactor Head Closure," with A.J. Durelli, Proceedings of SESA, Vol. 17, No. 2,
pp. 71-86, September (I960).
16. "Experimental Study of Large-Diameter Thin-Wall Pressure Vessels," with-"" A.J. Durelli and S.
Morse, Experimental Mechanics, Vol. 1, No. 2, February (1961), pp. 33-42.
17. A Photographic Method to Sharpen arid Double Isochromatic Fringes," with F.J. Ahimaz,
Experimental Mechanics, June ( 1962).
18. "An Experimental Investigation of the Stresses Produced in Spherical Vessels by External Loads
· ·· Transferred by a Nozzle," Welding Research Council Bulletin No.·84, January 1963.
19. "Approaches to Discovering New Materials," Industrial Research, November ( 1963 ).
20. "Three Article Series on Experimental Stress Analysis Methods," with W.F. Riley, National Engineer,
April, May, June (1962).
21. "A Short Bibliography of Recent British Work in Photoelasticity," with W.F. Riley and l.M. Daniel,
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Photoelasticity, Pergamon Press (1963).
22. "Fatigue and Creep Properties of Glass Reinforced Plastic Under Compressive States of Stress," with
R.H. Cornish and H.R. Nelson, ASME Paper 63-W A-236, Technical Digest, Mechanical
Engineering, February 1964.
23. "Experimental Stress Analysis of a Thick-Walled Cylindrical Pressure Vessel with a Hemispherical
Head Closure," with G.T. Schneider, Welding Journal Supplement, Vol. 43, No. 10, October 1964.
24. "Experimental Methods for Investigating Strain Wave Propagation and Associated Charge Release in
Ferroelectric Materials," with C. W. Beadle, Experimental Mechanics, March 1964.
25. "Uniaxial and Biaxial Static Fatigue and Stress Rupture Compressive Performance of Fiber
Reinforced Plastics," with R.H. Cornish and H.R. Nelson; Proceedings of the Society for the Plastic
Industry, February 1964.
26. "Experimental Determination of the Rigidity and Load Carrying Capability of Circular Steel and
Concrete Plates," with C.W. Beadle and W.F. Riley, Journal Eng. Mech. Division, December 1964.
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On Improvements in Measuring Crack Arrest Toughness, with R. J. Bonenberger, International
197.
Journal of Solids and Structures, Vol. 32, No. 6/7, pp 897-909 (1995).
198.
Electron Beam Moire Study of Fracture of a Glass Reinforced Plastic Composite, with D. T.
Read, Journal of Applied Mechanics, Vol. 61, pp 402-409 ( 1994).
199.
A Hybrid Method for Determining Material Properties from instrumented Micro-Indentation
Experiments, with Y-M Chen and A. W. Ruff, Journal of Materials Research, Vol. 5, No. 9, pp 13141321 (1994).

Copper
with D.
AMD-Vol.187,
Mechanics and Materials for Electronic
Vol. 2 Thermal and Mechanical Behavior and
Modeling,
pp 41-49, (November 6-11, 1994).
with P. F. Cunniff and P. C.
Integration of Design into the Engineering Science
Canada, YoL 2, pp 1872Chang, 1994 ASEE Annual Conference
Edmonton,
1878 (June26-29, 1994).
204.
Experiences in Introducing Finite Elements in Mechanics of Materials, with R. F. Wild, D. D.
Webb and J. K. Sircar, 1994 ASEE Annual Conference Proceedings, Edmonton, Albe1ta, Canada,
Vo!. l,pp 385-389 (June 26-29, 1994).
205.
Numerical Simulation of Sliding Contact Over a Half-Plane, with Y-M Chen and L. K. [ves,
Wear, Vol. 185 pp 83-91, (l 995).
206.
Further Studies of a Modified-Charpy Specimen for Lower Bound Toughness, with R. J.
Bonenberger, Fracture Mechanics: 25th Volume, ASTM STP 1220, Editor F. Erdogan, American
Society for Testing Materials, Philadelphia, PA (1995).
Fatigue of Microlithographically-Patterned Free-Standing Aluminum Thin Film Under Uniaxial
207.
Stresses, with D. T. Read, Journal of Electronic Packaging, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp 1-6, ( 1995).
A New Course: Product Engineering and Manufacturing, with P. F. Cunniff, 1995 ASEE Annual
208.
Conference Proceedings, Anaheim, CA, Vol. I, pp 1293-1299 (June 25-28, 1995).
A Mechanical Engineering Cmriculum for the Next Decade, with D. K. Anand, P. F. Cunniff, J.
209.
H. Duncan, E. B. Magrab, R. K. Radennacher, J. S. Sirkus and W. H. Walston, 1995 ASEE Annual
(:onference Proceedings, Anaheim,
Vol 2 pp 2138-2146 (June
1995).
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CASE NO. CV 13-8793

AFF1vA VIT OF RICK NORMAN

RICK NORMAN, being

duly

deposes

L

I am over the age of eighteen

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and make this affidavit

8) and competent to

to the matters stated

herein.

based upon my own personal knowledge.
3.

I was employed with Hecla in November and December, 2011 and still am an

employee with Hecla.

4.

I was assigned to one of the crews responsible for rehabilitating the pillar at the

5900 foot level of the Lucky Friday mine following the 2.8 Richter scale rock burst on
November 16, 2011.

5.

I, and the other members of the crew, was seriously concerned about the safety of

the pillar during the rehabilitation process.

6.

Throughout the process, we observed cracking, spalling and other indications that

the walls of the pillar were carrying considerable stress.

7.

I, and other crew members, communicated our concerns on several occasions to

John Lund, Doug Bayer and other members of Hecla management.
8.

A few days following the November 16, 2011 burst, I asked Wilson Blake Ph.D.,

the company's rock mechanics consultant, whether the pillar was still carrying

a

AFFIDAVIT OF RICK NORMAN - 2
E.

following

as

This

. Blake was observing the pillar.

rehabilitation was complete, Matt Williams and I asked Doug Bayer in his office if the
employees driving.the trucks should be worried while driving through the pillar. Mr. Bayer's
response was that there were no concerns about the safety of the employees while working in or
travelling through the pillar.
10.

We were never shown by Hecla the reports prepared by Dr. Blake, nor did we see

any monitoring or closure data that had been conducted.
11.

We were never told that the stress gages were showing significant increases in

stress or that Dr. Blake believed that the reduced width of the pillar rendered it in serious risk of
failure, Had I knowri these things, I would have refused to participate

the rehabilitation

process.
DATED this _ _ day of June, 2015.

Rick Norman
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of June, 2015.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Commission expires: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Michael E. Ramsden
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and is supported by

to Idaho Rule
pleadings on file

this matter, the memorandum and affidavits filed contemporaneously

herewith.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this

p.~

day of June, 2015.
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Plaintiffs,
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY

Summary Judgment.
L

The Coeur D'Alene mining district has a long history ofrock burst activity that

was well known within in the district and to any company mining within the district. See
Deposition of Wilson Blake ("Blake Depo."), p. 33, LL 18-25, attached as Exhibit "1" to the
Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Rossman
Affidavit").
The Lucky Friday Mine was particularly susceptible to rock bursts given its high
quartzite rock properties. See Blake Depa., p. 29, line 19 -p. 34, line 21.
3.

Since 2009, the mine had experienced a sharp increase in the number of violent

seismic events. See Blake Depa., p. 41, line 20

p. 42, line 18; see also Email dated April 4,

2011 (Exhibit 3 to the deposition), attached as Exhibit
4.

to the Rossman Affidavit.

Dr. Wilson Blake is a geotechnical and consulting mine consultant who holds a

Ph.Din mining engineering. Dr. Blake has specialized knowledge in rock mechanics. See Blake
Depo, p. 31, LL 7-17.
5.

Rock mechanics is the science of the behavior of openings under different loading

conditions, including open pits and underground mining. See Blake Depo., p. 31, LL 18-24.

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

to
7.

4

Specifically,

1

55,

8

5

Blake had informed Hecla that a

activity in

5900 level area occurred within pillars and that, at some point, the pillar was going to be a
serious issue for Hecla. Hecla proceeded with mining that area anyway. See Blake Depo., p. 39,
line 22 top. 40, line 11; p. 55, line 5
8.

p. 59, line 8.

Hecla had been seismic monitoring, stress monitoring and closure monitoring at

certain areas of the Lucky Friday mine since 2006. See Deposition of Doug Bayer ("Bayer
Depo.), p. 19, line 21 -p. 20, line 21, attached as Exhibit "3" to the Rossman Affidavit.
9.

Stress monitoring at the 5900 level showed dramatic increases in 2009 to the point

where the mine was concerned about pillar failure.

pressures did, however, tend to level out

in the subsequent years. See Executive Summary dated March 22, 2010, p. iii, attached as
Exhibit "4" to the Rossman Affidavit.
10.

Modeling of the 5900 pillar was conducted by Rim as Pilkanis and Associates in

2009. See Technical Memorandum dated March 22, 2010, p. 1, attached as Exhibit "5" to the
Rossman Affidavit (Exhibit 5 to the depositions). Hecla was unhappy with the results of this
modeling and retained Itasca, specifically Mark Board, to do further modeling in the spring of
2010. See Blake Depo., p. 34, LL 1-15; see also Technical Memorandum dated March 22, 2010,
attached as Exhibit "5" to the Rossman Affidavit

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT E

at
vsu.,,1..,v

but

enough to handle the stress placed upon it unless the

ration were to change.

See Technical Memorandum dated March 22, 20 l 0, p. 1, attached as Exhibit "5" to the Rossman
Affidavit; see also November 25, 2011 Blake Memo, p. 2, attached as Exhibit "6" to the
Rossman Affidavit.
1

Dr. Blake had been consulting for Hecla since 1975 and Hecla was a major client

of his. See Blake Depo., p. 11, LL 10-12; p. 35, line 2 p. 36, line

p. 36, LL 19-23; p. 37, LL

17-22.
13.

Each time there was an incident at the Lucky Friday

-Blake to consult. See BlakeDepo.,
14.

36,

Hecla would call Dr.

6-18.

Hecla did not employ a rock mechanics expert prior to the December 14, 2011

rockburst and relied primarily on Dr. Blake's expertise. See Bayer Depo., p. 14, line 22-p. 15,
line 3; p. 15, LL 11-16.
15.

Mine superintendent Doug Bayer testified that he did not consider himself to be a

specialist in rock mechanics. See Bayer Depo., p. 14, LL 19-21.
16.

On November 16, 2011 a rock burst occurred which caused substantial damage up

to the 5700 drift pillar effectively closing that pillar. The burst further caused isolated damage at
the 5900 pillar involving large slabs of rock from the roof of the pillar, no fragmented rock or
dust consistent

a

or

failure,

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
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7

1

Blake sent an

on November

2011

inspecting

5900 pillar

which he stated that the damage at the pillar was consistent with a fault slip. See Blake Depo., p.
101, LL 4-16; p. 103, line 6- 104, line 10. See also, E-mail dated November 1

2011, attached

as Exhibit "7" to the Rossman Affidavit.
18.

Dr. Blake also authored a memo, dated November 25, 2011, in which he indicated

that the vertical and horizontal stress at the 5900 pillar leading up to the November 16, 2011
burst was "very near the pillar's maximum confmed strength." See Memo dated November 25,
2011, p. 2, attached as Exhibit
1

Hecla instructed

to the Rossman Affidavit.
Bayer, the mine

Biaketo send a~draft of his

superintendent, before preparing a final draft because the report would ultimately be provided to
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). See Blake Depo., p. 13, line 23
7; p. 114, line 21 20.

p. 15,

115, line 8.

Hecla would not allow Dr. Blake to see the damage at the 5700 level after the

November 16, 2011 rockburst. See Blake Depo., p. 96, line 21

p. 99, line 18; p. 100, line 15 -

p. 101, line 3.

21.

Dr. Blake testified that had he seen the damage and fault plates at the 5700 level,

he would have clearly concluded that the burst was a fault slip originating at the 5700 level, not a
strain or pillar burst at the 5900

Blake

99,

1

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

1

also
believed

shift

and that

was

believed they were working on the west wall at the time. See Blake Depo., p. 79, line 18 - p. 81,
line 22; p. 82,
23.

4-25.
Employees were unable to get the East wall to take dwyidags, so they instead had

to drive eight (8) foot split sets into the wall to hold ground support. See Affidavit of Rick
Valerio,

~

8; see also Bayer Depa., p. 139, LL 9-20.

24.

Hecla used a "jumbo" to drill the bores for monitoring gauges because it allowed

them to be a sufficient distance from the wall during the drilling. The Geoken manual for the
.. monitors states that.the
13, line 21

12,

p. 14, line 5.

Dr. Blake

a report on November 18, 2011,

Bayer's review, which

states that the cause of the burst was a "strain burst" and that it could not be assumed that the
pillar was destressed based on the fact that the upper ribs and back appeared to be solid. See
Blake Depo., p. 106, line 19 - p. 102, line 15; see also Report dated November 18, 2011,
attached as Exhibit "8" to the Rossman Affidavit
26.

Dr. Blake testified that one could not have expected much if any energy or strain

release at the 5900 pillar if it was concluded that the burst was a fault slip at
Blake Depo.,

71,

9

5700leveL See

l

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF
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17

a

p. 96, line 16;
. 28.

98,

p.

8-15

Dr. Blake testified that, based on his prior research at the Galena mine in the same

district and with similar rock properties to the Lucky Friday mine, he published a doctoral thesis
on the relationship between pillar size and complete pillar failure in that area. See Blake Depo.,
p. 53, LL 7-16; see also Study, attached as Exhibit "9" to the Rossman Affidavit.

29.

Dr. Blake testified that the conclusion he drew from his research was that 8-10

foot wide pillars that were 40 feet or less in height were at serious risk of complete failure due to
their inability to carry a sufficient load. Dr. Blake testified that when a pillar is smaller than 40
Blake

48,

line 16; p.

119, LL 16-25; p. 121, LL 11-25.
30.

Dr. Blake testified that the November 16, 2011 burst rendered the 5900 pillar to an

approximate width/height ratio of 3 or 3.5 to 1. See Blake Depo., p. 89, line 4-p. 90, line 18.
As a result, Dr. Blake included a sentence in his draft report on November 25, 2011 that stated
the 5900 level pillar was "borderline stable" which, based upon Dr. Blake's research, was at
serious risk of failure. Dr. Blake's memo further advised Hecla to proceed with caution in the
rehabilitation process. See Blake Depo., p. 119, line 16 - p. 121, line 25; see also Memo dated
November 25, 2011, attached as Exhibit "6" to the Rossman Affidavit.
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1
testified
not know

was borderline stable and

not

miners at

5900 level pillar

had he thought the pillar was borderline stable. See Bayer Depo., p. 101, LL 6-8.
33.

Doug Bayer either removed the sentence from the report or requested that Dr.

Black remove it. Dr. Blake testified that he removed the "borderline stable" language at the
suggestion of Hecla. The sentence was not included in the report that was shared with MSHA.

See Blake Depo., p. 123, LL 1-19. see also Revised Memo dated November 25, 2011.
34.

Bayer sent "updates" to MSHA on November 29, December 1, December 2, and

December 6, 2011 asking for modifications to the 103k order which had allowed rehabilitation of
the 5900 pillar and, ultimately on I)ec~mber 6, 2011, resumed mining operations at the Gold
Hunter vein. The updates state that the November 16, 2011 burst destressed "a majority" of the
pressures at the 5900 level, that stress monitoring readings had "stabilized" and that the mine did
not expect "any measurable increase in

to occur for weeks if not months. See Updates,

dated November 29, December 1, December 2, and December 6, 2011, attached as Exhibit "10",
"11" "12" and "13" respectively to the Rossman Affidavit. See also Bayer Depo., p. 121, line 12
- p. 124, line 19; p. 128, line 23 - p. 129, line 17.
3 5.

Bayer also told MSHA that the stress monitoring information would be reviewed

daily by mine personnel and Heda's rock mechanics consultant. See Bayer Depo., p. 127, LL
21-24.

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

at

LL
further testified that his statement about

amount

that it would

take the stress to build-up was based not on any statement from Dr. Blake, but rather from his
own experience and history. See Bayer Depo., p. 129, line 25 - p. 130, line 15.
38.

Dr. Blake testified that, in fact, the 5900 pillar was at its maximum confined

strength prior to the November 16, 2011 burst; that the fault slip in reality released little if any
stress from the pillar; and that stress monitoring readings indicated that pressures increased every
reading of every shift of every day between December 2, 2011 and December 14, 2011 (the burst
that injured the plaintiffs) resulting in an increase
line

1

line

p. 1

8

1000 psi in two weeks. See Blake Depo., p.
line

see

Stress Monitoring graph,

attached as Exhibit "19" to the Rossman Affidavit.
39.

Dr. Blake testified that he never told Hecla the information that Doug Bayer was

reporting to MSHA regarding the alleged destressing at the 5900 level pillar or the estimate that
it would take weeks or months for any measurable increase in stress to occur at the 5900 level
pillar. Dr. Blake specifically testified that he did not tell Doug Bayer or anyone at Hecla that he
believed that November 16th burst had dissipated a majority of the stress at the 5900 pillar. See
Blake Depo., p. 137, LL 6-17; p. 140, LL 3-6.
40.

Dr. Blake admitted that Hecla showed him only 4-5 days of monitoring gauge

readings beginning on December

2011. See

Depo.,

131,

1
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1

to

See Blake Depo.,
42.

3-

134,

135,

18;

136,

16-23.

Hecla never communicated to MSHA that the East low gauges were improperly

installed and providing inaccurate information. See MSHA Citation No. 8559615, dated May
15, 2012, attached as Exhibit "20" to the Rossman Affidavit. Hecla never did anything to
reinstall or check the placement of the East low gauge. See Bayer Depo., p. 41, line 14

p. 46,

line 3; p. 46, LL 20-24.
43.

Hecla represented to MSHA that it would install three gauges immediately and

that an additional three would be installed "immediately upon receipt" by Hecla which were to
shipped from

manufacturer on

2011

BayerDepo.,

53,

24

54,

line 12; see also November 29, 2011 memo to MSHA, attached as Exhibit "10" to the Rossman
Affidavit.
44.

Hecla never installed the three remaining gauges. See Bayer Depo., p. 55, line 20

p. 56, line 7.

45.

Hecla lied to MSR.t\ by submitting a modified November 25, 2011 memo that did

not include Dr. Blake's conclusion about the borderline stability of the 5900 level pillar. See
Blake Depa., p. 122, line 1 -p. 123, line 19; see also Revised Memo dated November 25, 2011
attached as Exhibit "21" to the Rossman Affidavit.
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1

1

only allowed management to have access to

1

1 .

stress and closure readings.

Deposition of John Jordan ("Jordan Depo."), p, 46, LL 17-23, attached as Exhibit "14"
the Rossman Affidavit; see also Affidavit of Rick Valerio.
48.

Hecla never informed employees that the November 16, 2011 burst did not relieve

stress at the 5900 level pillar. See Affidavits of Matt Williams, Rick Valerio, and Rick Norman.
49.

Hecla never told employees that the 5900 level pillar was at its maximum confmed

strength. See Affidavits of Matt Williams, Rick Valerio, and Rick Norman
50.

Hecla never told employees that stress readings showed steady increases in
5900 leveLpillar.

13-20, attached as Exhibit "15" to the Rossman Affidavit; see also Affidavits of Matt
Williams, Rick Valerio, and Rick Norman
51.

Approximately two to three days following the November 16, 2011 burst, Doug

Bayer was inspecting the pillar while mine employees were working on it. i\t that time he held
what was represented to be a report from Wilson Blake and he said to the miners that he knew
several of them were concerned about the safety of the pillar but, while waiving the report in the
air, he stated the report indicated that "we don't have to worry about it for at least five years."

See Affidavit of Rick Valerio, 1
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E

from me with
no response. See Affidavit of Rick Valerio,
53.

iJ 8.

When the company began running trucks through the pillar before the

rehabilitation was complete, mine employees asked Doug Bayer in his office if the employees
driving the trucks should be worried while driving through the pillar. Mr. Bayer's response was
that there were no concerns about the safety of the employees while working

or travelling

through the pillar. See Affidavit of Rick Norman,~ 9.
54.

blasting.at

On

6, 2011, Hecla resumed "normal" mining activities which included
during both

I .and.December

2011

while knowing the relationship between blasting and rock burst activity in the mine. See Bayer
Depa., p. 111, line 20 - p. 112, line 15; p. 112, line 13 -p. 115,

3; see also Shift Reports,

attached as Exhibit" 16" to the Rossman Affidavit. MSHA was never informed of the full nature
of the mining activities during this time and had only approved "very limited activity". See
Bayer Depo., p. 106, line 5 p. 112, line 1; see also Modification Order 8605614-03, attached as
Exhibit "1 7" to the Rossman Affidavit

55.

The mining resumed prior to the completion of the rehabilitation work on the 5900

level pillar and prior to the installation of the tunnel liner that had been ordered which was

PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT -

1
1 2011

16,2011

was a pillar

and the changed width/height ratio of the pillar and continued stress from associated
mining. See December 27, 2011 Mernorandurnfrorn Wilson Blake and Mark Board, p. 6, attached
as Exhibit "18" to the Rossman Affidavit.
DATED this

li,:il> day of June, 2015.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

~S-~

~er.., Eric S. Rossman
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